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“Cyprus, the island of Aphrodite, the island of beauty and love, so the
legend goes. But Cyprus has also been a place of conflict and
animosity. Since 1974 it has been divided, one side being inhabited by
Greeks and the other by Turks. Divided, the island is united by mutual
fear and mistrust” (Papadakis, 2005, p. 5).
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ABSTRACT

Historical events in Cyprus have played a very important role in the
institutionalization of nationalist movements and political conflict between the
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalist movements on the island of Cyprus. In
order to make the case of the “Cyprus problem” understandable, the sociological
elements of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalism of the island were
analyzed in this study in relation to some fundamental elements of the conflict.
Internal and external elements including nationalism, the role of outsiders,
modernization, and some other cultural factors, such as the educational and religious
systems and colonial policies, played an important role in the creation of these rival
nationalisms. Different ethno-national identities on the island caused ethnic and
geographical partitions among the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. In this
analysis, the effects of nationalist mobilizations and political conflicts in Cyprus as
reflections of both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalisms will be the main
elements for demonstrating the rise and fall of both Cypriot nationalist movements
that caused the failure of the civic nation state in 1960.
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INTRODUCTION
Which words can best describe Cyprus? “A heaven in the Mediterranean” or
“An island that united by fear and mistrust in view of violent conflict” are best
descriptors of the island. The third biggest island in the middle of the Mediterranean
Sea, Cyprus has had to deal with a lot of mysteries since the beginning of its history.
Although it has also witnessed much beauty and love, Cyprus has been conquered
many times, hosted—and is still hosting—a lot of different nations, been used for
many reasons, but could almost never succeed at staying away from many kinds of
conflict.
The importance of geographical location, the process of modernization, rival
nationalist movements, opposing national identities, and the negative influences of
colonial policies significantly affected the island’s fate. The first seeds of the last
violent conflict on the island were constructed when the Ottoman Empire conquered
the island in 1571. Although it was very low-level in the beginning, the fate of the
island was drawn when the Ottomans brought many Muslims --particularly Muslim
Turks-- on the island and added them to the existing inhabitants who were GrecoChristians. Bringing a mass of Muslims into the Christians paved the way for creation
of religious based dual identification formation in the island, which caused the distinct
separation between two major communities of the island. Consequently, these two
major communities could not share the island peacefully and developed rival TurkishCypriot and Greek-Cypriot identities step by step, which would later play a central
role in developing the Cyprus dispute and the creation of the partition in the future.
The Ottomans were not the last empire on the island that took over control;
however, their ruling policy established certain boundaries between the two ethnic
groups step by step. Following the Ottoman Empire, the British Colonial Empire in

1878 settled on the island, which had negative consequences for the Turkish and
Greek Cypriots. For instance, this created disturbances between the two communities
on the basis of British ruling policy, which would trigger conflict on the island. The
regimes of imperial powers—the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire—were
basically the cause of the development of different nationalisms in Cyprus in their
own ways. When the construction of rival nationalist ideologies was completed, the
conflict known as the “Cyprus Problem” continued until the demographic and
geographical partitions in 1974 occurred. Although, since 1974, there has been no
visible violent conflict between the two major communities, the deadlock has been
imminent in the form of political conflict and psychological tension, including
mistrust, fear and discomfort. Since the partition of the island, the political conflict
has been continuously progressing among Turkish and Greek Cypriots, while some
new parameters have been created in order to solve the problem and build a peaceful
environment on the island. There is, however, still no peace agreement between the
Turkish and Greek communities today.
The main reason for this lack of peace between the two poles is based on the
political equality of the two groups. While Turkish Cypriots were seeking political
equalities to become a peace partner with Greek Cypriots, Greek Cypriots agreed on
giving minority rights to Turkish Cypriots and becoming a peace partner with them.
By extension, while one side wants to share the power of a common government, the
other side disagrees with that idea. Despite all these factors, the Republic of Cyprus
was established in 1960 on the basis of equal political power in order to provide a
peaceful atmosphere among Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island. However,
“equal political power” of the administration played the central role in the first violent
conflict in 1963 and created today’s situation by creating problems that have existed
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and been left unsolved. While its own multi-faceted problems and unsolved problems
destabilize the environment of Cyprus itself, these problems also affect surrounding
areas such as the Middle East, with its own problems of deadlock. The problem has
moved from a regional political platform to an international one and has affected the
relationship between local and international politics. The interests of the USA, the
UK, Turkey, and Greece paved the way for the Cyprus dispute to be placed in an
international forum. The Cyprus problem was based on rival nationalist movements in
which external powers had a strong influence in creating the deadlock. Particularly,
Turkey and Greece, as the mainland homes of both communities, have a strong
impact on the development of separate nationalist movements by imposing their own
nationalist ideologies on Turkish and Greek Cypriots and also by determining the
domestic politics of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In addition, third-party interests
with regard to the geo-strategic significance of the island played a role in triggering
the Cyprus problem. There are also many internal reasons—including the location of
the island, demographic changes (i.e., the population transfer of Muslims from
Anatolia to the island under the Ottoman rule), socio-cultural factors (including
religion, education, language, economic and class factors), and strong ties with the
Turkey and Greece—that have affected the nationalist conflict among Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and created today’s position of the island. In addition to
sociocultural and political elements behind the Cyprus conflict, the impact of the
Ottoman Empire and the British colonial rule—and finally the establishment of
statehood in 1960, were also reasons for the main problem between the ethnic groups
on the island to be exacerbated. Briefly, the current situation between two major
communities of the island could be summarized as a “love-hate relationship”
(Meleagrou and Yeşilada, 1993, p. 85).
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I believe that the Cyprus problem, also known as “a problem of Turkish and
Greek Cypriots,” can be a beneficial case study that includes diverse forms of
nationalism, rival ethnic identity, and an unfortunate ethnic conflict among Turkish
and Greek Cypriots who have been living on the same land, who share the historical
narrative of Cyprus, and who have different comprehensions of the same event since
the late sixteenth century in the course of developing two distinct nationalist
movements. While the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement was action-oriented, the
Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement was born as a response for Greek Cypriots to
defend themselves. To put it another way, the Turkish Cypriot nationalism was born
as a defensive nationalist movement in order to protect itself from Greek’s nationalist
actions. The Cyprus conflict is basically a protracted political conflict that has been
developing itself among Turkish and Greek Cypriots, which put barriers against the
enhancement, reconciliation, and re-unification in order to prevent a peaceful
atmosphere between ethnic communities on the island. Considering the traditional
hatred between Turkey and Greece based on their historical antagonisms, it could be
one of the reasons of the development of the Cyprus problem between two major
communities of the island. Also, as a social and political adaptation from their
mainland, Turkey and Greece have also had a strong influence on drawing Cypriot
Turks and Greeks culturally, religiously and ideologically apart from each other,
which played an important role in the ethnic conflict on the island. Fundamentally,
Turkish and Greek Cypriots’ political, economic, social, and cultural structures
including linguistic and religious factors all directly affected the Cyprus issue in their
own ways and created nationalist struggles on the island. In addition to the influence
of all these factors of the conflict, the influence of imperial powers on the creation of
the Cyprus problem cannot be ignored either.
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The purpose of this study is to test the nationalism theory by determining how
ethnic groups can be affected and how their actions can turn into conflict and violence
while they are sharing a common territory. Although “violence has generally been
conceptualized as a degree of conflict rather than as a form of conflict, or indeed as a
form of social or political action in its own right,” violent conflict usually refers to the
involvement of at least two groups using psychological tension and physical force to
solve competing self-interests, and it could even be a synonym for war (Brubaker and
Laitin, 1998, p. 425). At any level where a violent conflict occurs, it usually involves
at least two confrontations about the interpretations to show what drives ethnic groups
into conflict (Lacher, 2006). In this sense, this study will explain fundamental factors
that played a strong role in the development of opposing Turkish and Greek-Cypriot
national identities. More specifically, this study will show the process of developing
opposing Turkish and Greek Cypriot nationalism on the basis of their self-interests
that turned into violent conflict and ended up with geographical and demographical
separation among both ethnic groups in Cyprus. Additionally, this study will also
address the importance of the geographical location and the process of modernization
and colonial policies which played very important and critical roles in the
development of the Cyprus problem that ended up with violent conflict. Besides
addressing these elements, this study will show how the involvement of foreign
powers and their interests affected the development of the anti-colonial nationalist
movement of Greek Cypriots and the contra-nationalist movement of Turkish
Cypriots whose construction led to the Cyprus conflict.
What made two ethnic groups—Turkish and Greek Cypriots—turn into
conflicting groups on the high-level nationalism and what kinds of elements were
affected during the creation of distinct national identities? The historical background
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of Cyprus played a crucial role in the identity of two ethnic groups, and these two
major ethnic communities had to face a violent conflict in the course of the historical
events of the island. While the historical events of the island were occurring, Turkish
and Greek Cypriots developed rival nationalisms on the basis of an affinity towards
the motherlands’ nationalism. In this sense, in order to prevent Turkish and Greek
societies’ nationalist movements, a new state was established in 1960 in order to
protect their interests of Turkey, Greece and Britain by forcing both communities to
live under the same roof and be united as Cypriots rather than based on ethnicity. In
this sense, the question of whether the civic nation state successfully achieves the
creation of “Cypriotism” by putting people into one rather than ethnicity came to
mind. This study will attempt to answer these questions. There are many studies that
have addressed the “Cyprus Problem”; however, I am not going to present a solution
to “the Cyprus problem.” The aim of this study is to provide some historical
perspectives and conceptual distinctions that are related to thinking about the history
of conflicting parties and of the process of developing rival nationalisms. The Cyprus
problem is going to be used as an example in order to illustrate the situation in more
understandable ways. The importance of the island paved the way to a ground for the
construction of distinct ethnic identity formations on the basis of ethno-nationalism,
which ended up with violent conflict. Historical events affecting ethnic groups or
nations play a very important role on the construction of identity of a community.
Especially the identity of a country that has faced violent conflict is always affected
by historical events including pain, fear, and negative elements, as in the example of
Cyprus. Before doing so, a meaningful way to compare and evaluate the reasons and
the formation process of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalisms is to
mention both ethnic groups’ common history. It is also necessary to draw attention to
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the factors that created the case of nationalism in Cyprus among Turkish Cypriots and
Greek Cypriots. In other words, the aim of this study, in general, is to analyze the
establishment of Cyprus nationalism and to distinguish its structure by mentioning
several theoretical approaches; in particular, it aims to analyze the rise of Greek
Cypriot nationalism and the rise of counter-nationalism among Turkish Cypriots.
Following the introduction, in Chapter 1, I will examine definitions of ethnic
identity formation, nation and nationalism in order to show the historical dimensions
of Cyprus with regard to nationalism in more specific ways. Finally, I will also
address different types of nationalism in order to help readers understand what
nationalism is and how different forms of it can draw the fate of nations.
In Chapter 2, I will examine the history of the transition from the Ottoman
Empire to the British Empire in order to illustrate the rise of ethnic communities
within Turkish and Greek Cypriot nationalist movements, how they were born, and
how rival national identities were created. Although the fundamental reason behind
the violent conflict is seen behind the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus
declared in 1960, the Cyprus problem cannot be completely analyzed without
considering the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire transitions and their effects
on the problem. The Ottoman cultural and political policies shaped the structure of
Turkish and Greek Cypriot nationalist ideologies at a low level. In fact, the British
cultural and political policies draw certain structural boundaries of ethnic separation
on the basis of the establishment of rival ethnic identities and opponent nationalist
movements. For these reasons, the first and most effective historical narratives will
help the readers understand the roots of Turkish and Greek Cypriot nationalism and
their institutionalization process, which led to the violent conflict between both ethnic
communities. Besides two imperial effects on the creation of Turkish and Greek
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nationalism movements, different political, economic, social and cultural elements
(including language, religion, educational systems), among others, also turned them
into enemies.
In Chapter 3, I will examine, more specifically, the rise of Greek nationalism
as having taken place before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. In order to
illustrate the Greek Cypriot national movements, I will elaborate on the background
of Greek Cypriot nationalist movements. Moreover, I will state the elements of
nationalist ideology of Greek community, the factors, and which third parties backing
its establishment. Overall, in Chapter 3, I will provide the historical background of the
Greek nationalist movement process and its ideological elements in order to prepare
the reader for the sociocultural and political underlying of Greek Cypriot nationalism
and its theoretical discussion.
In Chapter 4, I will examine the second component of the Cyprus problem,
which is the rise of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. I will address the differences of
Turkish nationalism that surfaced as a response of Greek nationalism and how it
affected Turkish nationalism. Overall, in this chapter, I will provide some background
on Turkish nationalism throughout history and the process of its ideological
development. This chapter will also prepare the reader for the socio-cultural and
political factors underlying of Turkish Cypriot nationalism and its theoretical
discussion.
In Chapter 5, I will address the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus by
examining the historical narratives of the transition period from the last empire power
of the island to the independent state in order to provide the latest roots of the violent
conflict and the latest reasons of the partition of the island. In this chapter, I will
provide reasons for the establishment of the new state, how third parties were
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involved in the situation, and how the nationalist struggle turned into violence. Before
doing so, I will state how both communities were affected from the independent state
in order to provide a clear way for the reader to understand the reasons behind the
1974 partition.
In Chapter 6, I will examine how the unequal distribution of values and
resources are caused by a structural contradiction and conflict among ethnic groups.
In order to make clear to the reader the situation of Cyprus and the situation of people
on the island, I will also show how the two ethnic groups changed, how their
ideologies were replaced with new thoughts, and how the partition affected them.
In the last chapter, I will explain the effects of nationalist mobilizations and
political conflicts in Cyprus as reflections of both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot
nationalisms by applying the nationalist theories. Overall, I argue that the rise and fall
of both Cypriot nationalist movements created two enemies as well as two rival ethnic
identities that caused the failure of the civic nation state in 1960.
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PART ONE
Chapter One: Ethnic Identity Formation, Nation and Nationalism
A) Ethnic Identity Formation
The identity of a person as a human being is one of the most important social
constructions in expressing themselves. Every human being must be able to answer
the questions “Who I was?, Who I am? and, Where I come from?”. Each answer
identifies differences of individuals and draws boundaries of their lives. Also it helps
people to make their own decisions in their own ways in order to draw their future.
The role of identity is very important for the individual’s life, too. Moreover, groups
are able to create and shape any kind of group identities, including ethnic identities
and national identities in terms of their needs and self-interests. The boundaries of the
identification of ethnic groups were drawn from the beginning of human history. On
the other hand, along with the creation of collective identity after the revolutionary
period in the eighteenth century, particularly after the French Revolution, the
boundaries of the nations on the basis of collectivity were drawn.
According to Adrian Hastings (1997), ethnic identity is a
common culture whereby a group of people share the basic of life –
their cloth and clothes; the style of houses; the way they relate to
domestic animals and to agricultural land; the essential work which
shapes the functioning of a society and how roles are divided between
men and women; the way hunting is organized; how murder and
robbery are handled; the way defense is organized against threatening
intruders; the way property and authority are handed on; the rituals of
birth, marriages and death; the customs of courtship; the proverbs,
songs, lullabies; shared history and myth;, and the beliefs in what
follows death and in God, gods or other spirits (p. 167).

Obviously, each ethnic group has similar identity, historical narratives, or
shares the same feelings with other members of the specific group. These groups carry
and share the common identity. Before nations were constructed, thousands of ethnic
10

groups have existed with their unique ethnic identities. The integration of these
unique ethnic groups created nations in terms of the different needs of people along
with modernization. Along with these different needs, the new political based
ideologies were developed. These ideologies paved the way for the creation of
collective identities. According to Bernhard Giesen (1998), collective identity occurs
when people can determine the differences between notions such as “inside and
outside, strange and familiar, relatives and non-relatives, friends and enemies, culture
and nature, enlightenment and barbarism” (p. 13). Collective identity drew the
boundaries of nations and underlined the importance of collectivity starting in
eighteenth century. Consequently, the construction of boundaries between ethnic
groups or even between nations had been sharpened by the differentiations based on
the consciousness of belonging of groups. In order to protect the collectivity of a
society and determine the certain boundaries of a nation, the collective identity
represented nationalist feelings of the society. It paved the way for developing
nationalist movements all around the world, particularly starting in the eighteenth
century.
Nationalism is also a feeling of commonality in which a person identifies
himself similar with other members who share an ethnicity. Here they share similar
historical backgrounds, socio-cultures, and a common language. It is important to
analyze ethnic identity formation to understand nationalist movements. Ethnic identity
is formed according to two main approaches, primordialism and instrumentalism. In
this chapter I will focus on examining the types of ethnic identity formation and the
role of ethnic identity on societies. I will also provide an overview of ethnic identity
and its common theories, nationalism and its common classifications. At the end, I
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will clarify the rise of nationalism among Turkish and Greek Cypriots by outlining
nationalism as its origin in the context of global trends.

Primordialism vs. Instrumentalism
The primordialist approach claims that each ethnic group has “given features”
such as “natural, given or unchangeable facts” that establish how the ethnic group is
formed (Bacık, 2002, p. 29). The primordialist approach, more specifically, focuses
on “genetic origin,” particularly, to the blood ties between members of a specific
group; thus, the “tradition and the emotions evoked by perceptions of common
ancestry” (Gil-White, 1999, p. 802). According to Anthony Smith, commonality
includes having the same blood tie, the same language, religion, territory, and the
same race, which are involved in the certain boundaries of the specific groups since
the beginning of the history of human beings. These common social features of ethnic
or cultural groups differentiate each group from others. The instrumentalist approach,
on the other hand, is accepted as opposite to the primordialist approach. However,
instrumentalism does not totally reject primordial elements. The instrumentalist
approach does not totally disclaim ‘given features’ such blood ties, religion, race;
however it focuses on ethnicity within the framework of politics. Additionally,
instrumentalism also focuses on economic interests of a certain group of people rather
than using cultural elements to explain the ethnic ideologies as primordialism.
According to this approach, “culture does not contribute directly to the formation of
ethnic identities; rather, ethnic platforms use selected customs as emblems to
legitimize ethnic claims in the public domain” (Tilley, 1997, p. 507).
Generally, the instrumentalist school claims that the origin and the given
features including blood ties, race, language, and religion are not very important parts
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of ethnic groups. It claims that people have their own rights to choose the group
where they want to belong, no matter where they came from. The premordialist
school, on the other hand, claims that a person who was born into a family was also
born into a certain ethnic group without any choices (Özkırımlı, 2008, p. 85).
Eventually, comparing both approaches, it can be said that the instrumentalist
approach is more flexible than the primordialist approach. For instance, while the
primordialist approach claims that “ethnic identity is generally acquired at birth”; the
instrumentalist approach claims that “the modern state indeed provides the arena for
the development of ethnic identities” depending on social, economic, and political
dimensions of a certain state (Gil-White, 1999, p. 812; Tilley, 1997, p. 509).
Moreover, the instrumentalist approach claims that people choose their own groups in
terms of their own choice and their needs regardless of the importance of “given
features” that are acquired at birth. Bacık (2002) highlights the importance of the
individual’s rights by stating “you are what you feel yourself” (p. 31). It is clear that
the “instrumentalist” approach excludes genetic origins in some cases. Though, “the
instrumentalist approach rejects the alleged roles of race, origin, and even language,”
instrumentalists do not totally reject givens and do accept the importance of given
features in some point (Bacık, 2002, p. 31). While the instrumentalist approach
emphasizes the political and economic dimensions which are basically important to
determine the needs of a nation besides the given features, the primordialist approach
advocates the given features that are the most important elements of drawing the
boundaries of communities. According to Giesen (1998), these features “cannot be
moved socially and passing them is extremely difficult” (p. 27). Furthermore,
instrumentalists argue that these features are not enough to draw the boundaries of
nations and to fulfill the demand of the certain group because of lack of political
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dimensions. These dimensions are very important to build national boundaries.
Additionally, the consciousness of belonging to a nation is the most important feature
in determining where the individual belongs. In this sense of identification formation,
ethnic actors switch to new interests with regards to a new meaning of territorial
boundaries or political alliances. Also, ethnic identity can be replaced by national
identity, depending on members’ interests (Gil-White, 1999).
Instrumentalists claim that nations and national identities are modern
phenomena shaped by recent history. Some other instrumentalists believe that
instrumental elements brought political and economic dimensions into the system.
These elements created the collective identity to “achieve power or to enforce social
discipline” (Tilley, 1997, p. 507). Although the transition from the cultural system to
the political system was not made easily, the cohesive social institutions of ethnic
groups broke down. This break down created many social problems that could even
“be couched in ethno-nationalist discourse” (Tilley, 1997, p. 508). Ethnic political
movements are usually “related to the group's internal cultural institutional
composition, its institutional relation to ethnic others, and its socio-economic position
in the larger society” (Ibid). Common interests, similar beliefs, and the same life style
accelerate the ethnic division among mixed ethnic neighborhood. Especially in a
country where there is a majority and a minority depending on distinct ethnic
formation, the ethnic division is unavoidable (Bacık, 2002). Besides this possibility of
the division of ethnicities, another root of division could lie “in the legacy of
colonialism, especially its administrative policy and the decision to merge the North
and South into a unitary state (Nasong and Murunga, 2005). For instance, colonial
administrations such as the British colonial power gained power from the creation of
ethnic division among Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus and paved the way for
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the ethnic division among them. When the colonial power takes ethno-political
leadership of the settlement, the tension might start to rise. This tension could even
turn into conflict among ethnic neighborhoods and even against the colonial power.
These movements against colonial power would keep alive ethnic groups’ identity. In
these cases,
The very existence of the ethnic group may lack (or be losing) any
substance for its members; a deliberate movement is needed to create
or preserve the group's cohesion as a group - certainly through political
rhetoric, but also through folkloric programs (dances, festivals, prayer
groups) which render the identity meaningful and attractive to its
claimed constituency (Tilley, 1997, p. 509).

Therefore, it is often said that this situation leads to the reconstruction of
socio-politic position of them on the basis of their cultural dynamics. It brings these
ethnic movements into the political arena and on to the intra- and international
platforms. Although both approaches claim different theories of ethnicity and identity
formation, they both agree on the existence of ethnic groups. Thousands of ethnic
groups have been created with different ethnic identities on the basis of their historical
origins. Also, the assimilation of small ethnic groups created nations and these nations
gradually became nation-states starting in the revolutionary period. Tilley (1997)
states that “the modern 'nation-state' - at least, where it takes seriously the
international norm that it represents the political interests of its population - clearly
provides a political motive for inflationary ethnic claims to any who can argue that
they represent unique needs from among that population” (p. 509). In this sense,
collective identity is constructed under the roof of multi-ethnic states in order to
prevent ethnic division. On the other hand, while the new state was trying to instill a
new collective identity into the people, such attempts could instead cause problems
between the major and minor ethnic or cultural groups. It could have led to the
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creation of different nationalist mission among groups. In fact, it might be a reason for
cultural assimilation among minorities which could even trigger conflicts. Another
reason for the possibility of triggering conflict between majorities and minorities is
that the construction of nation-states caused high expectations among people in terms
of different socio-economic interests. The new interests of nations could be a reason
for mobilizing different national movements and for the origin of conflict based on
different ethnic identities.
In fact, collective identity is also a tool of developing nationalism. Nationalism
is also a feeling of commonality in which a person identifies himself/herself with
other members of a common ethnicity. People within a common ethnicity share
similar historical backgrounds, socio-cultures, and even a common language.
Nationalism has played a very important role in the development of the modern
world. Nationalism itself has a very strong influence on the creation of the entire
world by developing new nation-states and by drawing new borders. Nationalism
even has strong impact on the creation of either peace or war among ethnic
groups/nations.

B) Nations and Nationalism
The process of developing identity in pre-modern societies can also be
distinguished in nation-states although it might appear in different form. The nation is
a broadly-based political movement for democracy and liberty on the basis of modern
values, institutions and strategies of a certain society. Moreover, it is a tool for
developing nationalism in that specific society in order to protect its sovereignty and
boundaries. To describe the process of the “nation” and “nationalism” as a concept
needs to be examined with regard to the common classifications of nationalism. As
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the historical background of the Cyprus has played a fundamental role in shaping the
distinct identity, it is important to understand the ideological structure of Turkish and
Greek Cypriot nationalisms. Evidently, the opposing nationalist struggles on the
island created two enemies who represent themselves with different identities.
Various approaches to nationalism to be discussed in this chapter will be used to
analyze the framework of Turkish Cypriot nationalism and Greek Cypriot nationalism
on the basis of the historical narratives of Cyprus in the following chapters.

Overview of Nationalism
It is often said that nationalism generally embraces the support of a nation;
however, it cannot be fitted into one definition because there are different
explanations of nationalism. Generally, each nationalist struggle in the world has
different aims and origins in terms of serving the needs and self-interests of a
particular society. Besides not having a clear definition of nationalism, we cannot
specify the exact time when it first emerged. However, the French Revolution period
could be considered as the beginning of the nationalist movements in terms of
modernization. As Ranner states, “the birthday of the political idea of the nation and
the birth year of this new consciousness, is 1789, the year of the French Revolution,”
which paved the way for the creation of today’s world on the basis of nationalism
(cited in Hobsbawn, 1990, p. 125). Assuming the French Revolution as a start of
nationalist movements that divided societies into two main categories of pre-modern
and modern periods, nationalist struggles also offered different dynamics for everyone
with regards to the need for a nation. The main reason for dividing the time eras into
two main periods is to make it easier to differentiate the dominant consciousness and
political ideologies of societies with regards to life standards of people by comparing
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the 16th and 17th centuries and the beginning of the 18th century to today. In the view
of the first period, the religious-based national movements dominated in the world,
particularly in Western Europe. The dominant religion had a strong impact on people
and their lives in pre-modern times. On the other hand, the second period refers to a
new politically based ideological movement. Nationalism was considered as a
crossroad in terms of drawing distinct boundaries between pre-modern and modern
societies and sharply separated them. Consequently, nationalism means “the clash
with the traditional societies [which] had been risen and became the dominant
political struggle against traditional societies” (Godson, 2001, p. 38). As a natural
result of the collapse of pre-modern societies, nationalism the catalyst for the
emergence of into modern societies. It purported to provide the best for everyone
regardless of the specific aims of the administration or the economy. As a result of the
transition to the modern world, nation states were started gradually established on the
basis of different expectations for societies. For this reason, nationalism accelerated
and spread around the world, transcending traditional societies. Moreover, along with
modernization, nationalism was a combination of all ideas of a nation including new
political, economic, and sociocultural dynamics. Nationalism created the best political
system for each nation and offered to protect their sustainability at the same time.
Moreover, those new political-based expectations and ideologies of societies have
played a significant role in the creation of the modern world. Also, it helped to switch
the traditional values, institutions and strategies to the modernist values. In
institutions and strategies those elements were used in order to characterize the new
nation states.
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Pre Modern Societies and Modern Societies
To better understand the modern state, it is important to understand premodern societies, including their political and economic systems, institutions, values
and culture. According to Gellner (1983), there are three stages to explain human
history including pre-modern and modern periods. These stages are (cited in Işıksal,
2002, p. 6-7):
1. Pre-agrarian society, where hunting and gathering bands were too small to allow
for political divisions.
2. Agrarian society, where only a minority of the population were specialists in the
military, economics, politics, or religion.
3. Industrial society, where the state is the protector of the community with distinctive
factors such as mobility, universal literacy, and individualism.
Gellner (2009) discusses these three stages of human history in his book. In
the first two stages, societies were smaller, and insiders and outsiders were strictly
separated. For instance, although an elite class including aristocrats, soldiers,
bureaucratic and religious functionaries existed in agrarian and pre-modern societies,
it was much narrower than the elite class of industrial societies. In general, according
to Gellner pre-modern societies were different religiously, ethnically, linguistically,
culturally and politically from other societies. However, the political ideologies of
pre-modern societies were not developed to create the political boundaries of nations
and/or nationalism but were created to maintain and protect insiders from outsiders.
Additionally, the local values, institutions and strategies were decisively distinguished
from other societies at the time. Also, Gellner emphasizes that pre-modern societies
generally lacked cultural and ethnic homogeneity where people were classified as
human, compared with modern people, who were classified as civilized. Pre-modern
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people were living in local groups in enclaves where the sense of individuality was
not created separately from the pre-modern cultures during the first period of premodern societies. In that period, religion dominated over people, in order to control
them easily. People often lived under the force of religion rather than ruling under the
democratic, secular and liberal state as in nation-states of the modern era. According
to Gellner (2009), the primary issue was to struggle with poverty rather than
struggling with cultural or political homogeneity during the period of pre-agrarian and
agrarian societies.
The economy in the pre-modern period was based on agriculture. Local people
were generally engaged in an agricultural system in which the peasant class was very
wide comparing with the upper class in the pre-modern era. As Gellner (2009) states,
the subsistence economy of the peasant class was totally dependent on agriculture.
This helped to develop strong bonds between members of the peasant class rather than
the use of political force. Compared to modern societies, many things were limited,
including life standards of people and their beliefs within the religiously based
authoritarian system. For instance, the division of labor was not sharply formed in
pre-modern societies and it was pretty limited compared to modern societies. The
difference between social classes was also limited, and their social statuses and social
identities were usually determined at birth. Consequently, primordial ties were highly
influential for ethnic groups in the pre-modern era. According to Gellner (2009), the
culture was not a very important factor in drawing political boundaries of the territory
in pre-modern societies. However, the importance of culture consisted of the
separation of the social classes in these societies. The limited cultural diffusion among
ethnic groups caused the communication problems that led to the separation of such
groups from each other. Also, it prevented the growth of societies. Along with these
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limitations, the rate of illiteracy was very high whereas the level of technology was
very low.
In the course of time, the creation of multiethnic societies and empires such as
the Ottoman, Hellenic and British Empires was completed. All of the Empires
continued ruling themselves and their colonies from the late 15th century until the
beginning of the 20th century. This period of time was considered as a bridge between
pre-modern societies and modern societies/nation-states. The spread of colonization
increased from the industrial revolution until the 19th century. It ended with national
liberation movements in the middle of the 20th century. These multi-ethnic societies,
multi-religious societies and empires were ruled by ethnic hierarchies. They took
advantages of colonial societies’ economies, resources, technologies and labor in
order to gain more power. Moreover, as it is often said, they expanded their territorial
boundaries by imposing their political and cultural values, such as in the British
Empire (with its “divide and rule” policy that was created conflict among different
ethnic groups) and the French Empire. Also, they expanded territories on the basis of
religion, such as the Ottoman Empire’s use of the “Millet System,” which allowed
some religious autonomy for minority populations. Another way of expanding the
territories was by colonizing weak but strategically important states or places that had
a convenient location for their military, as in the Cyprus case. The annexation of
Cyprus in 1878 by the British Empire could be an example of this type of the
colonization.
On the other hand, in parallel with modernization, the economy of modern
societies was also changed depending on the development of industrial sector. The
national market took the place of agriculture in the new global world of the modern
era. In addition to political and economic reforms, the high culture on a specific
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territory was created and became open to everyone with the transition to modern
states. Kızılyürek (2005a) states that national culture was provided to citizens in order
to unity those who shared a territory. Eventually, the meaning of culture had changed,
and became more important for describing the society in terms of homogeneity rather
than separating classes from one another (Gellner, 2009). As Geller claims, industrial
societies require and provide a homogeneous high culture rather than cultural
differences. A homogeneous high culture requires and provides an educational
system. It helps to impose the culture and national will on its citizens. According to
Kızılyürek (2005a) people started getting educated by the central schools in order to
create the nation on the basis of commonality. Along with educated people, the state
also developed nationalism to limit ethnic antagonisms in order to better to survive
(Gellner, 2009).
There are some visibly important changes in meanings and roles between premodern and modern societies. Evidently, pre-modern societies’ traditional values,
beliefs, institutions were almost everywhere in the world. As multi-ethnic civilizations
began to emerge, pre-modern values started being replaced with modern-based values,
institutions and beliefs. These changes were mainly related with “the Reformation,
Renaissance, and later the Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution” (Godson, 2001,
p. 38). Ethnic identities have always been very effective for ethnic groups. Obviously,
people have been identifying themselves according to their ethnic groups since the
beginning of human history. People emphasize their identities in different ways such
as a premordialist-based identity (given features at birth) or an instrumentalist-based
identity (collectivity). Consequently, in the pre-modern period, people were
identifying themselves by “using their ethnic-oriented motives and values” and these
values have always been attached to the societies throughout their history (Bacık,
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2002, p. 19). In the modern period, on the other hand, people started identifying
themselves on the basis of the collectivity rather than on ethnic factors. This
development helped them to differentiate themselves from other nations. Sir Ernest
Barker pointed out this self-consciousness by stating:
The self-consciousness of nations is a product of the nineteenth
century. This is a matter of the first importance. Nations were already
there; they had indeed been there for centuries. But it is not the things
which are simply ‘there’ that matter in human life. What really and
finally matters is the thing that is apprehended as an idea, and, as an
idea, is vested with emotion until it becomes a cause and a spring of
action. In the world of action apprehended ideas are alone electrical;
and a nation must be an ideal as well as a fact before it can become a
dynamic force (cited in Connor, 1994, p. 4).

As said above, the role of self-consciousness is an extended form of ethnic
based identities. Ethnic-based identities have still been maintaining their importance
even in the modern societies albeit different forms. Even though the seeds of ethnic
and local identities remained after the political-based ideological movements spread
throughout much of the world, the meaning of identities had been changed on the
basis of the modern system. Moreover, identity gained a new role, which came to be a
“national” identity that symbolized citizenship. Evidently, the importance of the
individuals increased on the basis of the constitution. The rest who were considered as
foreign with their national identity in a particular nation were seen by default as a
national “minority” of the state and got minority rights depending on laws (Üstel,
1999). Thus, the national identity preserved the rights of individuals of a certain
territory by laws. According to Smith (1991), there are five common features of
national identity;
1. a historic territory or homeland
2. common myths and historical memories
3. a common, mass public culture
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4. common legal rights and duties for all members
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for members. (p. 14)

According to Smith, the commonality in many areas including common
historical narratives, common rights, common economy and so forth is very important
in developing a national identity. Culture and nationalist feelings of a society, which
were strongly interrelated with the process of the establishment of modern societies,
were also reasons for changing the bases of identity formation among societies over
time. Therefore, culture became politicized through the transformation from traditionbased societies in an attempt to modern-based societies to determine the political
based boundaries of nation. At the beginning of the transformation to the modern
world, ethnic groups had been transformed into nations along with modernization.
There are some difficulties in defining the concept of nation. Consequently, it
is hard to decide what type of groups could be considered a ‘nation’. Generally, there
are fundamental elements that are used to develop nations and considered as an
extension of pre-modern societies such as having the same language, culture, national
will, and historical background. In general, a nation is a group of people united
around a common political consciousness, which is developed as a political subject in
history. Benedict Anderson describes “nation” in his book Imagined Communities as:
An imagined community – and imagined as both inherently limited and
sovereign. (…) It is imagined because the members of even the
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of
their communion. (…) The nation is imagined as limited because even
the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human
beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other
nations. It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an
age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the
legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.
Finally it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is
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always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 2006,
p. 6-7).

Anderson describes nations as a constructed idea because a social group on a
national level including its tradition, institutions, and symbols regardless of its
regional size is also created. He also states that that even a feeling of solidarity is
constructed because it is impossible to know every single group member even in a
small nation.
Another definition of nation, according to Smith (1991), is “a named human
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a
mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all
members” (p. 15). Smith (1991) claims the commonality in many areas, including
common ethnic myths and common ethnic heritage, provides a basis of creation of
nations. According to him, ethnicity has been always existed and is the most effective
aspect of the process of the nation-states building. He claims that the nation is formed
with common myths and common historical memories as in an ethnicity but in
different format. He argues that nations are expanded forms of pre-modern societies
because he sees that the cultural basis, the importance of historical narratives,
common symbols, myths, memories and values of pre-modern societies are also very
important in order to form the modern societies (Smith, 1995). To sum up, Smith
(1991) claims that nations are definitely modern phenomena. Yet he points out that
pre-modern factors are also needed in order to develop nations. To make this clearer,
he lists four criteria;
1. They require a unified legal code of common rights and duties with citizenship
rights where the nation is independent
2. They are based on a unified economy with a single division of labor, and mobility
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of goods and persons throughout the national territory
3. They need a fairly compact territory, preferably with “natural” defensible frontiers,
in a world of similar compact nations
4. They require a single “political culture” and public, mass education and media
system, to socialize future generations to be “citizens” of the new nation (Smith,
1991, p. 69).
Smith strongly argues that most of the roots of modern societies are an
extension of pre-modern societies. It seems that the political cultures of nations are
almost impossible to develop without the elements of pre-modern societies. Thus,
modern societies are affected by pre-modern elements, and developed these on a
national level. Smith goes on to say that the technological and political bases in
modern societies are essential. Political ideologies also became more important right
after the revolutionary period, because politics barely appeared in religious-based premodern societies.
Kızılyürek (2005a) also emphasizes the importance of political dimensions in
modern societies. The major difference between pre-modern societies and modern
societies is obviously “distinctive political dimensions.” Nationalism is one of the
factors that paved the way for developing nations with regards to the political needs of
societies. In order to protect the national interest of nations while drawing their
boundaries, politically based national movements became very important. The
political consciousness of modern societies is one of the most important things for of
bringing the nation to the international stage. (Kızılyürek, 2005a).
According to Gellner, once societies became nations on the basis of
institutionalization, nationalism played a very important place in industrial societies
and started drawing the fate of nations. Violent struggles increasingly drew the new
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political and cultural boundaries of states during the transformation to industrial
societies. All these progresses emphasized the importance of communication.
According to Gellner, everyone had to speak the same “language” and share the same
culture in order to be a part of a specific nation. He also claims that the constructed
high culture secures the uniformity of a social group over ethnic cultures “because
cultural differences will diminish with globalization, economic interdependence, cooperation, and extended international communication systems” (Cited in Işıksal,
2002). He also emphasizes that states become the protectors of high cultures along
with modernity and the nation-state. According to Altay (2005), “The nation has
continuously existed since ancient times.” However, there is only one constructed
element that is called national consciousness since the beginning of the modern world
(p. 18). He also points out that in order to develop a nation, a particular community,
which has a central role in processing the specific territory as a state, must have its
own sovereignty and share common beliefs (Altay, 2005). Basically, there must exist
communality in many areas, including a common language, a constructed high
culture, a common political ideology and a common sense of consciousness in order
to develop a nation-state. These commonalities made people recognize differences
between themselves and others, which led to the creation of nationalism.
Nationalism has a strong impact on developing national identity, nations or
nation-states in terms of modernization. Eventually, nationalism is a politically based
ideology “that places the nation at the center of its concerns and seeks to promote the
nation’s well-being. Nationalism is an ideological movement for attaining and
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members
deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (Smith, 2001, p. 9). Evidently, as
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Smith claims, the roots of ethnicity must be politicized on the nationalist level in
order to create the actual or potential nation.
Smith (1991) identified and listed the goals of the ethnic nationalist
movements as following:
1. The creation of a literary “high culture” for the community where it was lacking.
2. The formation of a culturally homogenous “organic nation.”
3. Securing a recognized “homeland,” and preferably an independent state for the
community.
4. Turning a hitherto passive ethnie into an active ethno-political community, a
“subject of history” (p. 126).
According to Elie Kedourie (1994), nationalism is a doctrine that holds that
humanity is naturally divided into nations, with certain characteristics and that the
only legitimate type of government is national self-government. Along with the
national self-government of states, “citizen armies, increased administration road
building, linguistic standardization, popular educational system, occasions for popular
political participations, and many other changes that helped produce a new
consciousness of simply create national identity” (Calhoun, 1997, p. 10).
Accordingly, there are different perspectives for identifying a nation and
nationalism. Although, there are different forms of nationalist struggles depending on
the self-interests of nations, nationalist struggles divided nations into two distinct
areas. Lecours (2000) points out that, within the scholars of nationalism, there are two
different types of nationalism, ethnic and civil, and two different types of nation,
cultural and political. More commonly, these types of nationalism are known as
Eastern (cultural and ethnic) and Western (politic and civic), which are used to
analyze the different structure of nationalism among nations. Although East and West
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are geographically related to nationalism, they mostly illustrate the conceptual
characteristics of national movements. For example, Western Europe is characterized
by Western nationalism, such as French nationalism. However, although Germany is
geographically located in Western Europe, German nationalism shows the features of
Eastern nationalism with regard to some specific cases. In fact, it is obviously clear
that the conceptual characteristics of the national struggles are more important than
geographical features to name the nationalist struggles of a nation.
In some cases, the origin of ethnicity and culture is taken into consideration to
develop a nation in terms of a national culture or on the basis of political principles. In
some other cases, politically based features such as citizenship are required to create a
nation. However, both political and cultural factors are generally important for the
legitimacy system of modern states in order to pave the way for developing nations.
The level of political features and the level of cultural features emerges in nations at a
different level, depending on its type. Additionally, if common factors of a social
group including language, religion, race, and ethnicity must not be considered
separately, an Eastern type of nation would emerge. On the other hand, if the unity of
nations within the framework of a high culture was developed to impose unity on its
citizens regardless of cultural diversity, a Western type of nation would be born.

Western (Civic-Political) Nationalism vs. Eastern (Ethnic-Cultural) Nationalism
The Eastern form of nationalism, which defines a certain national grouping in
terms of ancestry, was extensively developed in Central Europe, Eastern Europe and
some parts of Asian regions where multi-cultural and multi-national societies were
established on the basis of cultural and ethnical elements. According to Lecours
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(2000) some pre-industrial Western nations could be also associated with ethnic
nationalism.
According to Charles Kupchan (1995), “Ethnic nationalism defines
nationhood in terms of lineage. The attributes that members of an ethnically defined
national grouping share include physical characteristic, culture, religion, language,
and a common ancestry. Individuals of a different ethnicity, even if they reside in and
are citizens of the nation state in question, do not become part of the national
grouping” (p. 4). Lecours (2000) states, “Ethnic nationalism and cultural nations are
related to an objective definition of the nation that uses linguistic, religious or ethnic
criteria to determine membership” (p. 153). Eventually, as both scholars emphasize,
ethnic elements are a very important part of a certain national grouping.
Anthony Smith (1995) also emphasizes the importance of ethnic elements
while discussing an ethnic group or a national group. He also points out that these
ethnic elements with their own myths and symbols are always needed to protect their
continuity throughout history. Accordingly, ethnic nationalism must be related to at
least some basic ethnic factors including common language, religion, and culture in
order to emerge in a national group. Additionally, blood ties among citizens is also
one of the important requirements of ethnic nationalism.
Eastern nationalism is a very complex foundation that is constructed on “a
blood related group,” specific territory and religion. “The only label you deserve is
what you are with the blood you bear” (Bacık, 2002, p. 21). Also, the cultural
homogeneity and ethnic ties are very important regardless to the citizenship and
individual’s interests in ethnic nationalism. As Calhoun (1997) points out, a common
citizenship is generally related to a common ethnicity in Eastern nationalism. In this
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sense, Harder underlines the importance of a common language, which must be the
key features of ethnic citizenship in a certain territory (Cited in Özkırımlı, 2008).
The Eastern type of nationalism is often considered as an opponent of Western
type of nationalism. According to Bora, Eastern nationalism is more likely antiWestern nationalism (Bora, 1995). He also claims that Eastern nationalism is based on
either ethnic ties or cultural-historical-linguistic-based national identity in Eastern
Europe (Bora, 1995, p. 72). Societies are built on an ethno-linguistic structure where
rival interaction among them exists. This type nationalism also focuses on ethnic
background of a certain group. Evidently, it is hard to talk about the high culture due
to complex multiple loyalties, regarding the importance of the blood ties in the
Eastern type of nations. Moreover, ethnic nationalism is generally associated with
ethnic and economic features of the nation rather than political elements. Political
features are more likely to be associated with a Western type of nationalism.
According to Kohn, Eastern nationalism is based on emotional and authoritarian
structures unpaved with rational, pluralistic and optimistic, structures that characterize
Western nationalism. Ethnic nationalism imposed authoritarian regimes on its citizens
(Cited in Bora, 1995). For instance, Eastern nationalism is exemplified by the
authoritarian structure of the administration in Russia and Asia. According to him, the
collectivity is also more associated with eastern nationalism where civil rights are less
tolerated in comparison to the individualist Western nationalism where civil liberties
are embedded in the system. According to Hans Kohn, Eastern nationalism lacks
individualistic struggle to procure legitimate interests (cited in Özkırımlı, 2008).
Eastern nationalism was born as a contra trend to Western nationalism. It
created a different atmosphere with its complex structure. To clarify the difference
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between Eastern and Western types of nationalism, Kohn (2005) compares Western
and Eastern nationalisms as following:
While Western nationalism was, in its origin, connected with the
concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism current in
the eighteenth century, the later nationalism in Central and Eastern
Europe and in Asia easily tended towards a contrary development.
Dependent upon, and opposed to, influences from without, this new
nationalism, not rooted in a political and social reality, lacked selfassurance; its inferiority complex was often compensated by
overemphasis and overconfidence, their own nationalism appearing to
nationalists in Germany, Russia or India as something infinitely deeper
than the nationalism of the West, and therefore richer in problems and
potentialities (Kohn 2005, p. 330).
In most cases, civic liberties are only taken into consideration when elites’
rights/majority rights are in question in Eastern nationalism. Basically, minority rights
are usually excluded in ethnic nationalism. This distinctive mode of administration, in
particular the lack of liberal and democratic elements of the ruling system that
characterizes Eastern nationalist countries could be a reason for the ongoing political
violence among citizens of the nation-state as in Cyprus. The lack of liberal, secular
and democratic regimes of Eastern nations is usually associated with underdeveloped
countries. Especially, considering multi-ethnic based Eastern nations, the Eastern
form of nationalism “may be conflict-producing mould when a country includes
several ethnic groups” (Bacık, 2002, p. 22).
Comparing Eastern to Western nations, Eastern nations are organic in terms of
the process of nation-building on the basis of a blood bond. By nation-building,
William Bloom means that “both the formation and establishment of the new state
itself as a political entity, and the processes of creating viable degrees of unity,
adaptation, achievement, and a sense of national identity among the people” (Bloom,
1990, p. 55-56). These are necessary in order to create nations; however, Bloom
claims that psychological-based elements should also be included in the process of
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nation building. According to Bloom (1990), “There are always individuals and ethnic
groups who, for one reason or another based in previous identifications, do not
identify with the nation-state” (p. 63). Calhoun (1997) explains this situation in the
following way:
Even today, there are other important bases of identity and solidarity
that don’t fit with the nation-state model-religion, for example,
particularly for those, like many Islamists, who reject the distinction of
religious and secular authority and seek to create unified religious
states (p. 17).

The Kurdish point of view could serve to analyze the exceptional situation.
The process of nation-building in Turkey was an ethnic-oriented formation,
emphasized after the declaration of Turkey Republic in 1923. The Turkish Minister of
Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, describes the exceptional situation of the Turkish case
as such:
Only the Turkish nation has the privilege of demands for such a right
will be recognized. There is no need to hide the truth. The Turks are
the sole owners and the sole notables of this country. Those who are
not of Turkish origin have only one right; to serve and to be the slaves
without question of the noble Turkish nation (Cited in Bacık, 2002,
p. 23).
As Bacık (2002) notes, although this explanation might not cover the general
ideology of Turkey, some words from the terminology of nationalism, including
“nation,” “national rights,” ”noble nation” which are associated with ethnic
nationalism, were emphasized. According to Jack Eller (1998), “This view eventually
gave to a race ideology, however, and Turkey was to be the national home of this race
exclusively” (p. 171).
Besides these exceptional cases, on the other hand, there are some certain
elements, such as political and civil, which are associated with the Western form of
nationalism. Eventually, Western nationalism is more political and civic comparing to
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ethnic based Eastern nationalism. As Hans Kohn states, the political and civic origins
of Western type of nationalist movements started developing in the West (particularly
in France, the US and England) even before the Eastern form of nationalism, which
was based on “a community of laws.” For this reason, the nationalist struggles in the
West were based on individuals’ legitimate interests (Özkırımlı, 2008, p. 60, 61).
Political elements are very important in shaping the Western form of nationalism.
Kupchan (1995) also emphasizes the importance of political factors in explaining
Western nationalism. According to him, Western nationalism “defines the term of
citizenship and political participation. Members of a national grouping that is defined
in civic terms share participation in a circumscribed political community, common
political values, a sense of belonging to the state in which they reside, and, usually, a
common language” (Kupchan, 1995, p. 4). Hence, “A citizen is national, regardless of
ethnicity and lineage” (Ibid). The set of givens is not a necessary requirement to be a
citizen of a nation in Western nationalism. According to Lecours (2000), “Civic
nationalism and political nations are associated with a subjective definition that
ignores these criteria and insists on the free will of individuals” (p. 153). Eventually,
according to Bora (1995), the political ideology of the West excluded the East,
because Western nationalism was civilized, democratic and supported human rights
rather than being anachronistic and based on micro nationalism as is Eastern
nationalism. Eastern nationalism was generally shaped by ethnocentrism, revanchism,
and isolationism based on anti-Western sentiments (Bora, 1995, p. 74).
Overall, objective (Eastern) and subjective (Western) “conceptions of the
nation are said to be related to specific socio-economic and intellectual conditions that
correspond to particular historical and spatial dimensions” (Lecours, 2000, p. 153).
More specifically, a civic and territorial model of nationalism is associated with
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political factors. Briefly, whereas the Western type of nationalism provides liberalism
and democracy, the Eastern type of nationalism provides authoritarian regimes in
order to serve their continuity.
Furthermore, civic identity is a constructed identity and even foreigners can be
a part of a civic community “but only by participating in the local practices and
institutions and by slowly adopting the customs and even the modes of reflexive
criticism” (Tempelman, 1999, p. 18). For instance, anyone could want to be a citizen
of a civic nation, such as American society or French. He or she could do so, and yet
have completely a different culture and language, different blood ties, religion, and
race. The only way to realize this is to fulfill requirements of that specific nation’s
laws. Laws also have significantly important in shaping and determining Western
nationalism regardless of blood origin.
The constitution plays a very important role in Western nationalism. It
provides an opportunity to protect the common citizenship and to provide equal
treatment for all the citizens within multi-cultural structure. The constitution of
Western nations could be considered very liberal and democratic in order to be a
protector of individuals. Also, it provides equal rights for its citizens in order to help
them to express their freedom. Habermas stresses the importance of common
citizenship in Western nations and explains that as “the political unity of European
nations cannot be based on the shared traditions, cultures, and languages that
characterized successful nation-states” (cited in Auer, 1997, para. 10). Accordingly,
whereas Eastern nationalism emphasizes shared values, Western nationalism
emphasizes common citizenship. More specifically, Western nationalism is a political
project in which the citizenship was established for members of a nation in order to
provide territorial integrity regardless of their blood ties.
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PART TWO
Historical Dimensions of Cyprus
Chapter Two: Transition From the Ottoman Empire to the British Empire
When the Seeds of Nationalism Speared Across Cyprus
Cyprus, which has been called one of the islands of heaven in the
Mediterranean Sea, has faced a lot of mysteries either about the legend of love and
beauty or conflict since the first human settlement on the island in 10.000 BC.
However, usually the first thing about Cyprus that comes to mind is the “Cyprus
Problem” that has existed over the last couple of centuries between two communities,
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot. The problem persisted under multiple empires
and continued through self-rule. Cyprus has always been strategically very important
to imperial powers because of its location in the Mediterranean Sea, which has made
it a key position for trade and military bases since 2000 B.C. Because of its
importance, the island has changed hands many times and witnessed different cultures
and civilization including Aegean, Anatolian, Egyptian and Levantine civilizations
during its earlier history.
Eventually, foreign factors started showing strong interests for Cyprus by the
beginning of Bronze Age when copper production was found on the island in 2300
BC. Right after the discovery of copper production in Cyprus, the island became a
heart of trade route in the Mediterranean area in the first half of 2000s BC. In
addition, Cyprus gained a significantly higher level of attention by the late Bronze
Age when the island had witnessed a couple of migrations from the region of the
Aegean. Following those years, the Mycenaean, who were one of the most important
factors of Greek civilizations, settled on the island in 1300 BC. The period of
Mycenaean settlements on the island is considered one of the most important

36

civilization periods in the historic period of the island Cyprus. As soon as the
Mycenaean conquered the island, their culture flourished. Evidently, different kinds
of Mycenaean pottery were found in Cyprus, which was considered as a significant
mark of flourishing culture. Such findings are evidence that the island engaged in
international trade relations with the Mycenaean. As soon as they conquered the
island, their language, particularly spoken language, which was “Greek,” spread over
the land. Their written script affected the whole island as well. In this sense, the
conquest of the island by Mycenaean is accepted as an evidence of the primordial tie
of the island with Greeks since 1300 BC because their flourishing culture and trade
relations paved the way for strengthening the roots of the Greek existence on the
island and the proof of primordial ethnic ties with Hellenic culture. Thus, the history
of the Greek existence on the island started since the Bronze Age. The history of the
Turkish Cypriots of the island, on the other hand, started right after the conquest of
the island by the Ottoman Empire in 1571.
The strategic importance of the island increased the interests of other powers
and paved the way for changing hands many times including Persians, Egyptians,
Romans, Byzantines, Lusignan, and Venetians. These powers also flourished on the
island until the full-scale invasion of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire with the
conquest in 1571. As many other powers had done before, the Ottoman Empire also
took the island just because of its strategic importance; but one distinguishing factor
that differentiated it from the other empires’ motivation was Cyprus’s close proximity
to the Ottoman Empire’s mainland. When the Ottomans conquered Constantinople
from the Byzantine Empire, it became the capital city of the Ottomans and was
renamed “Istanbul” under the leadership of Mehmet II in 1453. The Ottoman Empire
started dreaming about having the island in order to expand its territory. After ending
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the Ottoman’s hegemony over Cyprus, the British Empire settled on the island in
order to provide the sustainability of its colonization strategy. In this sense, Cyprus
had “considerable geostrategic importance for the regional stabilization of British and
Ottoman power, they were marginal to the political and economic life” of Europe”
(Zink, 2008, p. 586). During the administration period of both Ottoman and British
powers, the empires paved the way for a new and complex structure for Cyprus and
created the conflicting environment in the historic period of Cyprus in order to secure
their places on the island. Although the problem itself is more complex than everyone
would like to believe, there are some visible factors including involvement of third
parties, effects of modernization, nationalism, different ethnic backgrounds of major
groups on the same land that have caused the conflict over Cyprus and brought it to
where it is today.
One of the factors that affected the dispute on the island was that the Ottomans
were considered very weak compared with the British and their colonial policy. Some
of the other factors exacerbating tensions included the educational system of the two
major communities, the effect of the Orthodox Church, and the developing
bourgeoisie class of Greek Cypriots. However, even though the Ottomans’ effect on
the creation of the current dispute on the island was very weak, all these elements,
including those of the Ottoman period, caused the creation of politics that has led to
ongoing conflict on Cyprus, brought the extension of Turkey and Greek animosity on
the island, paved the way for the creation of rival ethnic communities over Cyprus
and the development of different ethnic identities, and also caused the nationalist
based demographically and geographically partition on the island in 1974.
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The Ottomans on the Island
The Ottoman Empire encompassed one of the longest periods of imperial rule
on the island. Before the conquest of the island by the Ottomans, the Empire attacked
the island in order to conquer it; however, each attack ended with devastating result.
Until 1571, Ottoman’s attack destroyed a couple of cities of Cyprus. In the summer of
1570, the Ottomans landed on the coast of Larnaka with 60,000 troops under the
leadership of Lala Mustafa Pasha and they fought with Venetians until August 1571
in order to hold the island. In the summer of 1571, the Ottomans conquered the island
and declared their authority on Cyprus. Right after the conquest of the island, the
Empire destroyed “the Venetian feudal structure which ruled the mass of the Greekspeaking, Orthodox Christian population” and established its own government on the
island from the late sixteenth century until the British Empire signed a convention in
the late nineteenth century” in 1878 (Attalides, 2003, p. 1). As soon as the Empire
fully invaded the island in 1571, the Ottomans abducted Greek Christian children
from their families and trained them to be Turkish fighters who killed thousands of
thousands innocent people by that time (Papadakis, 2005, p. 5-8). The Ottomans
always followed the similar way to gather strength of its military wherever it
conquered. In addition, there had been some other important structural changes during
the Ottoman hegemony over Cyprus between the sixteenth and the nineteenth
centuries that would see the first seeds of paving the way for nationalist struggles on
the island.
The first development of the Empire was that the island population increased
by adding Muslims, particularly Turkish Muslims, to Cyprus step by step up until the
end of Ottoman rule amongst the native inhabitants of Greeks to create a religiously
pluralistic structure on Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2005a). Basically, in order to create a
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religiously pluralistic structure in Cyprus, “the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots
prepared to live in the same environment for the long years under the Millet system”
(Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 19). These religious communities were organized as autonomous
communities under the Ottoman’s Millet system (Millet: nation, community; national
ruling system of the Ottoman Empire), which addresses the treatment of non-Muslims
communities on the basis of Islamic rules, in Cyprus as many other colonial territories
of the Ottomans. The Millet system generally refers to separate legal courts for the
millets (Christian communities, etc.) by given them right to govern their internal
issues with minority laws. Those people who were ruled under the Millet system were
usually allowed to set their own laws, and collect their tax under the Ottoman
administration. Cyprus was also one of the countries that was conquered by the
Ottomans and were ruled by the Millet system. Right after the arrival of the Ottomans
on the island, the Millet system was put into effect and “guaranteed the Christian (that
is, Greek) community extensive cultural autonomy under the supervision of the
autocephalous Orthodox Primate” (Zink, 2008, p. 587).
Although “the Greek Cypriots were left mostly undisturbed by their TurkishMuslim ruler” under the Millet system, the Cyprus problem worsened over time,
starting with the settlement of the mass of Turkish immigration on the island by the
late 1500s that would affect the partition between the two communities until the
present (Zink, 2008, p. 587). As Morag (2004) explains, sending a new population to
the island in three hundred years during the Ottomans’ period on Cyprus “created a
new demographic balance that continued to affect the island” by creating two sided
social stratification (p. 597).
As shown in Table 1, the population of Turks on the island during the
Ottoman’s ruling period had reached almost forty-six thousand in three hundred years,
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which addresses the new social and political structure of the island, and also shows
different ethnic based new demographic balance on the island (Kızılyürek, 2001).

Table 1: Ratio of Muslims, Greeks and Others in Cyprus After Bringing New
Population into Cyprus in 1881
The Distribution of total population (Religious Group)
Muslims

45,458

Greek/Orthodox

137,631

Others

2,541

Total

185,630

*Cited in Kızılyürek 2005a p: 213

As is seen in Table 1, the total Muslim population reached 45,459 on the
island whereas Christians were 137,631 under the Ottoman administration in Cyprus
by the year 1881.The ratio of Christians to Muslims was around 3 to 1. The new
demographic balance of the island would play a very important role on the creation of
the Cyprus dispute.
The second development of the Empire involved religions and religious
institutions. The Orthodox Church was established instead of the Roman Catholic
Church, which used to be under Venetian rule, until the Ottoman Empire took control
of the island. The second development of the Empire on the island was an exceptional
case for the Ottoman Empire, because under the nation system (Millet system) the
conquered areas were often allowed to keep their own religion and the place of their
worship; yet the empire followed a different path for Cyprus by instituting the Cypriot
Orthodox Church, even giving them administrative and economic opportunities. The
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Orthodox Church had the right to self-govern the Greek community on the island. In
addition to this exceptional case, “in 1754, the Sultan (the presidential title of the
Ottoman Empire, NM) issued an ordinance and declared the Archbishop of the
Orthodox Church as a secondary political figure” (Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 21). The
Archbishop became the representative of the Christian community in Cyprus by
gaining some privileges on the basis of the Ottoman ruling system after the arrival of
the Ottomans to the island (Attalides, 2003). In this sense, the Orthodox Church
increasingly had an important role in the political ideologies of the Greek Cypriots,
and founding and strengthening their ethnic roots. The establishment of the Orthodox
Church “maintained a dominant position among the Greek Cypriots helped them
preserve their religious, ethnic, cultural, and political identity” (Joseph, 1997, p. 8).
Along with the establishment of the Orthodox Church, the Greek Cypriots started
going to their church for security and continuity of their nations during the occupation
of the Ottomans (Markides, 1977). However, although the Orthodox Church was
given the authority to govern non-Muslims, “Greek Cypriots were led by a
conservative Church hierarchy, not modern” (Attalides, 2003, p. 22). By the time,
conservative religious institutions of the non-Muslim population played a very
important role in the inhabitants’ lives, including political, social, cultural and
intellectual life (Joseph, 1997). The Orthodox Church has always played an important
role in the Greek Cypriot life even under the British administration and today’s island.
Having the power to self-govern non-Muslims gave the Church an opportunity for
“fostering and institutionalizing a religiously-based ethnic identity” which would pave
the way for the developing nationalism within Greek Cypriot community later in the
Greek history of the island (Morag, 2004, p. 603). The administrative policy of the
Orthodox Church had a counterproductive hidden aim to pave the way for an eligible
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environment to develop nationalism among Christians under the rule of the Ottomans
(Ibid).
Overall, as Joseph (1997) noted, by following its traditional system, the
Ottoman millet system created segregation between major communities depending on
their religion and ethnic background instead of creating a common will for all ethnic
groups. In general, the relations of the society under the multi-ethnic and multireligious Ottoman Empire were followed by the tradition of the Islamic religion which
directly affected social relations and social life of ethnic groups. Each ethnic group
under the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire usually showed cultural
differences in different level depending on the time period among each other, rather
than sharing a common culture as modern societies do. In addition, the differentiation
between each ethnic group usually appeared in the relationship between culture and
politics on the same land. The Ottoman rule was an example of differing from
traditional societies by not developing a common culture or converting everybody to
become Muslims. Instead, the religious groups were separated from each other and
were administrated according to their religious origins by the Ottomans as in the
Cyprus case. For example, the ethnic groups were divided into two main groups with
differing political structures by taking into consideration religious differences in
Cyprus. The Muslims were ruled directly by the Ottoman Empire, whereas the
Christians were ruled by the Orthodox Church under Ottoman control. Apparently,
the millet system of the Ottomans only embraced minorities’ religious affiliations
rather than their ethnic origins and treated them upon their religions. Even though
social diversity was developed under the Ottoman regime, ethnic or religion based
conflict never appeared on the Ottoman territory.
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Basically, religion was a more important factor than ethnicity according to the
pre-modern Ottomans. That was the main reason for separating groups on its
territories into two main groups, Muslims and non-Muslims. For this reason, the
Ottomans restored the Orthodox Church of Cyprus in order to separate nations and
make them realize the differences between their national identities. Generally, in
traditional societies such as the Ottoman Empire, people who belonged to different
religions, linguistic, or ethnic groups could have lived together but they could not
have united and developed a common political view or a common will for their future
in the modern sense. In the Cyprus case for example, both major religious groups
were distinctly separate and created separate political views and plans for their future
on the island.
The Ottoman Empire did not only separate national identities on the basis of
religious institutions; they also separated the educational institutions “with separate
boards of education” along the same religious lines after the establishment of the
Ottoman rule on the island (Lindley, 2007, p. 229). As Joseph (1997) noted, Turk
Cypriots’ and Greek Cypriots’ schools were separated according to their religious
institutions in order to create two opponent communities on the same island.
Depending on the time, education had a really strong impact on spreading the national
feelings among each ethnic group of Cyprus. As Hörner, Döbert, Kopp and Mitter
(2007) noted, the educational system could be separated into two main periods
throughout the history of both ethnic groups on the island;
1. Education before independence of Cyprus,
2. Education after the independence of Cyprus.
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The reason for dividing education into two main periods of schools is that it
emphases the differences between the two communities. It will become clearer later in
this chapter, the underlying roots of the separation between the periods had to have
different curriculums and different main goals for education that would shape the
tensions between Turks and Greeks on the island. This was a guiding force in the fate
of the island. Additionally the control of education changed hands after the first
period.
The Greek educational system in the first period, under the Ottoman and the
British rules, was governed by the Church by imposing the religious elements among
Greek Christians. On the other hand, the evolution of the Cypriot educational system
during the second period covers the period after the declaration of the independence
state of Cyprus in. Still, until the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus, religiously
based educational systems strongly dominated the island from the Ottoman ruling
period through the British ruling period.
The discriminatory policy of the Ottomans increased tension and fostered
disputes amongst religious groups on the island, which paved the way for a large
conflict between the two communities of Cyprus, even though the tension was low
until the British administration was established in 1878. Greek national movements
had been already started planting and spreading within the Greek Cypriot community
under the Ottoman rule, even though they were not prominent. On the other hand,
there is no evidence of Turkish nationalism by the time Greek nationalism was
gaining power. While the Greeks started building their nationalist feelings against
others in these years, these movements were usually non-violent during Ottoman rule.
Under the rule of the Ottomans, each ethnic society was treated differently
depending on their religions even in their social life. Because they had to go to
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different schools, they could not have any chance to create “inter-group relations in
the educational environment. Each group had the right to be independent of the other
and to find intra-group solutions for its educational problems,” and also other
problems (Özerk, 2001, p. 256). Thus, the social mobilization could not develop
among ethnic groups, considering the strong effects of the characteristics of the
traditional society on ethnic communities in Cyprus.
These structural changes on the island after the settlement of the Ottoman also
built the subsistence economy on agriculture. Two ethnic communities, Turks and
Greeks, were pulled into the Ottoman’s agricultural system, particularly the peasant
classes of both communities. Although inhabitants belonged to different religions,
people who were engaged in agriculture working together under the Ottoman rule
(cited in Kızılyürek, 2005a). Basically, as is understood, the class factor had different
effects on people; the differences between each group’s peasant classes were not
conflictual. On the contrary, as Kızılyürek (2005a) states, the structure of the
peasantry was not changed and they continued engaging in agricultural pursuits under
the Ottomans.
Even though the arrival of the Ottomans to the island brought a new governing
system, provided privileges to non-Muslims, brought new economy order, etc.,
changes in the social structure also directly affected inhabitants of the island. In
general, the peasant classes of both religious groups on the island were adversely
affected by recent social changes of Ottomans because becoming a dependent on
Europe ended up imposing higher taxes on the public, which directly affected
peasantry class. As a result of imposing higher taxes to people, the Muslims and
Christians fostered solidarity in their shared communities within the peasant classes of
each group where they lived under the same social conditions, including sharing the
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same needs, way of life, behavior patterns, even the way they dressed. (Kızılyürek,
2001). Eventually, the peasant classes of Muslims and non-Muslims who were
working together and sharing a lot of things in their daily life chose unity and
solidarity and the result put all of them into one side against the current ruling system
in order to fight for their rights (Kızılyürek, 2001, p. 25).
Even though the Ottomans main goal was to build a peaceful environment
between Muslim and non-Muslim communities on the island, it negatively affected
the relations between them because it imposed high taxes on inhabitants upon their
religions and their business right after its entrance into the island in order to create
financial resources and centralized the authority for itself on the island. Because the
right to collect taxes from the non-Muslim community was given to the Greek
Orthodox Church due to privileges, a hierarchical structure was also started gradually
developing itself on the island. These priests who were taking taxes from the Christian
community were using the money for their personal expenses and for living in
opulence. This gave them an opportunity to automatically enter the bourgeoisie class.
Once priests became richer by taking higher taxes from Christians and spending the
money for their personal expense, priests started living as elites. This was the start of
the gradual creation of the bourgeoisie class of Christians/Greeks on the island, which
was not a sign for peaceful environment.
In order to create better financial income besides collecting taxes from its
citizens, the Greek Cypriot elites let European products, which were created with
higher technology, enter into the Ottoman territory. However, this was a main reason
for losing their power to Europe and becoming dependent on the West because those
European goods that began entering the country were cheaper than local productions;
eventually, those local industries were not very developed compared with others, and
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could not compete with these cheaper products of Europe. These results paved the
way for opening a way for many European embassies to enter into the Ottoman
territory. After foreign embassies entered the Ottoman state, they started to contact
many local people to convince them to be their citizen instead of staying under a weak
state (Kızılyürek, 2005a). All of these developments over the Empire definitely
appeared on the island as well, though on a different levels.
The middle class in Cyprus began to change parallel with the Ottoman in the
nineteenth century depending on the changes the current administration and also
changes in the world in the basis of modernization. Due to some major changes in the
social structure of the island, the nationalist feelings of Christian villagers started
developing faster on the basis of modernization. Even though the peasant class was
affected least from these changes, nationalist sentiments in the middle class of the
Greeks which was influenced by Greece national liberation movement started to be
planted within middle class of the Greeks on the island in those years (Kızılyürek,
2001). The nationalist seeds within the Greek middle class started to gain more power
after 1844 when the “Megali Idea” was adopted as the state doctrine of Greece. The
reason for not developing violent nationalist sentiments was because the Orthodox
Church was trying to control any kinds of uprising against the Ottomans in order to
maintain their peaceful relationship with the Ottoman in order to maintain the
privileges that were provided by them. Having a close relationship with the Ottomans
prevented the Orthodox Church on Cyprus refuse from having a close relationship
with the Greek Church until 1850.
Overall, during the Ottoman ruling years, Greek Cypriots were aware of the
nationalism and started organizing year after year until the British Empire temporarily
settled on the island and established its own administration in 1878 “to protect the
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Ottomans from Russia” (Hofstotter, 2008, p. 161). However, “when the new British
colonists came ashore in 1878, their mission was to safeguard the Mediterranean route
to the Suez Canal; their moral mission was to prove the fertilizing, fecund influence
of British reason, oriented towards the ever-hastening future and its promised bounty”
(Bryant, 2004, p. 24). The British put forward some reasons and annexed the island
after World War I. The Ottomans had allied themselves ranged with the British
enemy, the German Empire, and made war upon the British. The main reason for the
British annexing the island was to achieve their main mission, rather than protecting
the Ottomans from Russia. Until the annexation of the island by the British, the
Ottoman Empire power continued on the island, though they were not in charge (cited
in Hofstotter, 2008).

The British on the island
The inhabitants of Cyprus, particularly the two major communities -- Greeks
and Turks -- were governed by the British from 1878 to 1959 (Attalides, 2003).
Imposing higher taxes more than the Ottomans on inhabitants, and taking over the
governmental position from them were evidence of not being a modern colonial
power. Basically, the two major groups became subjects instead of being citizens of
the island along with the settlement of the British colonial power on the island
(Bryant, 2004, p. 21). Still, “a modern bureaucratic administration was established,
the two ethnic groups retained control over matters of religion, education, culture,
personal status and communal institutions” (Joseph, 1997, p. 76).
Four years after the British settled on the island, they established a Legislative
Council that consisted of eighteen memberships. “Three members were Muslim, nine
members were non-Muslim, and three were also six appointed members who were
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civil servant and the Governor has a casting vote” for both Greek and Turkish
Cypriots (Attalides, 2003, p. 23). This proportion of membership in the council
depended on the population ratio of each community which Greek to Turks was 3 to
1. Although this council did not provide the legislative authority for the inhabitants of
the island, members were supposed to give advice related to the problems of the
island to the colonial power. Even though the annexation of the island by the British
created an expectation within the Greek community that the island would acquire
democratic and national liberation in order to be set free, “the entry of the British into
Cyprus and the administration of the island by a protestant power changed all of this”
(Bryant, 2004, p. 22). Eventually, the British established this council in order to serve
its interest on the island although Greeks saw it as an opportunity to take advantages
from it in order to find a way to unit with the motherland Greece. As a result of these
reforms, the British incited more Greek Cypriot community to develop Hellenic
nationalism on Cyprus. “The reasons for the expression of dissatisfaction in this form
have partly to do with British colonial policy, and partly with the relations of the
Greek State to Orthodox” (Attalides, 2003, p. 24).
While Greek community of Cyprus was developing its nationalist feelings and
getting closer to Greece, the arrival of the British Empire on the island, a couple of
reforms came into force that affected Cypriots directly. These reforms removed the
inhabitants’ privileges that they used to have under the Ottoman Empire. For instance,
Turks lost their power in the government and the Greek Church lost its representative
function after the British settled on the island and declared some reforms on the basis
of its ruling policy. In addition to these unexpected reforms, economic problems also
started developing among inhabitants on the island. However, the British did not even
try to take any measures for the comfort of inhabitants (Kızılyürek, 2001).
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As a result of discriminatory processes, the educational system took the
responsibility to create and disseminate more nationalist feelings. After the settlement
of the British on the island along with the discriminatory policy, the educational
system and churches escalated the tension based on ethnic differences on the island
(Lindley, 2007, p. 228). Even though both groups used the educational system under
the British rule to impose nationalist feelings, “education was one arena in which the
British government, despite its efforts, would never gain full control” (Bryant, 2004,
p. 124). As Bryant said, British rule did not fully put its hand on the administration of
schools; however, they made a lot of changes as to quality and quantity the
educational systems of Greeks and Turks. In addition to these improvements of the
educational system, the British even provided economic help to inhabitants’ schools
and helped them to build many modern schools by providing economic help as well.
Also, they gave both communities a chance to administrate their schools by
controlling them secretly.
Although many modern schools were established and were took the right to
govern themselves; educational system, particularly elementary education was
continued being under the religious influence because it was a necessary part of
becoming a full member of the religious community, someone who could engage in
its rites and recite its text (Bryant, 2004, p. 126, 127). Basically, the Orthodox
Church, which was established after the Ottomans settlement on the island got the
control of the Greek society on the basis of a religious regime, which was “considered
itself to be the responsible body for the education and enlightenment of the younger
Greek – Cypriots” in order to maintain on its control of Greeks to secure its continuity
on the island by planting nationalist ideas to Greek students (Özerk, 2001, p. 256).
“As a result, the educational sector developed in schools was based on the Old
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Testament, which used a high-status form of old Greek” (Ibid). Also, “to become a
fully literate Greek Orthodox meant that one learned the languages of Socrates, of the
Bible, and of Byzantium” in Greek Orthodox according to the Greek Church (Bryant,
2004, p. 126). The Church was willing to have full control over the education of
Greek people to impose Greek traditions and culture especially after dissatisfaction of
not getting any legislative autonomy in the council to be able to fulfill their own
interests.
Overall, those unfavorable changes under the British administration negatively
affected inhabitants of Cyprus and paved the way for violence based on nationalist
struggles later in the history of the island. The unexpected process of the British were
the real reasons for the development of the European and anti-colonial nationalist
struggles on the island against colonial rulers and also were a reason for the
development of different national identification formations which created enemies of
the Muslims and non-Muslim inhabitants of the island who had been living in peace
for hundreds of hundreds years under the Ottomans. In this sense, the “divide and
rule” policy of the British exacerbated the conflict.
The Church and educational systems expanded the main functions of the
process of the development of nationalist feelings against others. Besides the church,
“the educational system however had, even before the beginning of British rule in
Cyprus, formed a link between the Greek-Cypriot bourgeois and the Greek State” and
caused the development of nationalist among the higher class Greeks (Attalides, 2003,
p. 25). “The schools were seen as a central mechanism for promoting Hellenism and
Greek identity within the Greek Cypriots” and paving the way for the creation of
different classes (Lindley, 2007, p. 229). The main goal of education was to convince
students to believe the idea of enosis (national idea) and to make them follow this idea
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to become a part of Greece (Lindley 2007, p. 229; Attalides 1979, p. 26). The slogan
of the Greek national movement which was taught at the Greeks’ schools was “enosis
and only enosis.” For these reasons, throughout the British rule on the island, Greek
students were taught to be closer to Greece, whereas Turkish students, on the other
hand, were taught to be closer to Turkey later in the history of the island. Basically,
Turkish and particularly Greek societies were using their educational system for their
own nationalist ideological practices. In 1881, Josiah Spencer (the English director of
education) pointed out the role of schools on the development of nationalism by
describing “the well-known policy of Greek nationalist within Greece to use the
Greek schools of Anatolia and Cyprus to cultivate the meghali idhea, or the irredentist
ideal of uniting all Greek-speaking peoples in what were seen as historical Greek
lands” (Braynt, 2004, p. 125).
Overall, the educational separation on the island created and gradually
increased conflict between the Muslim/Turkish and Christian/Greek communities of
Cyprus year by year rather than building a good relationship between them. The main
reason of growing separately and against each other was because “the two groups
were encouraged to view themselves as extensions of their respective motherlands,
and the development of two distinct nationalities with antagonistic loyalties was
ensured” (Meleagrou and Yeşilada, 1993, p. 57). Moreover, the educational system
played a very important role in shaping the current fate of Cyprus. Additionally, the
nationalist-based educational system also prevented the rise of bilingualism among
inhabitants, which would exacerbate the separation of two major communities.
The Turkish and Greek languages had been the two main languages of Cyprus
for more than four hundred years. In those hundreds years, Turkish Cypriots and
Greek Cypriots met in their daily life very often, especially people who lived in mix
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villages; however, they rarely went to the same schools because of the colonial policy
of the British in Cyprus. Although there had been two main languages throughout the
history of Cyprus, bilingualism had not really taken hold among Turkish and Greek
Cypriots. Table 2, for example shows how the amount of bilingualism in the island
was very low.

Table 2: Ratio of Bilingualism Among Muslims, Greeks and Others in Cyprus
After Bringing Muslim Immigrants to Cyprus in 1881
The Distribution of Total Population (Language and Religious Group)
Muslims

Greek

Orthodox

Greek

2,454

137,499

42,489

95

445

17

Other

70

26

Total

45,458

Turkish
Arabic

137,631

*Cited in Kızılyürek 2005a p: 213

As seen in Table 2, the number of Muslim community was 45,458 whereas
2,454 Muslims were speaking only Greek. Only 95 Greek Orthodox were speaking
Turkish out of the 137,631 population of Greek Orthodox. As shown in Table 2,
people were hardly speaking another main language of Cyprus. However, living on a
bilingual island, but being monolingual was one of the factors damaging the
relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots (Özerk, 2001). Considering how
important communication is in order to establish friendship and peace between
groups, it is quite obvious why the two groups had difficulties in building a friendly
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relationship.

Each community, particularly the Greek Cypriots, chose to be

monolingual for a long period of time. Despite the fact that second languages as an
option were added to their educational systems (such as English, Latin), neither of the
communities added the other’s language to their educational system. However, Turks
were a little bit more flexible regarding these kinds of nationalist behaviors if we
compare both communities’ nationalist movements historically. Communication
problems on the island provide for the development of two enemies and two rival
nationalist movements. The communication problems on the island also created
significant difficulties in many areas such as economic, social, cultural, and political
fields, the educational system, communicating, working together, and so forth
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots throughout their history in Cyprus.
In fact, “education in Cyprus was necessary for nationalism because education
already embodied community traditions and represented communal continuity”
(Bryant, 2004, p. 11). Each major community on the island had different
backgrounds, including different languages, cultures, and religions; each group was
characterized by different elements on the basis of the role of ethnic identity
formation and this caused the creation different national movements. Although these
different elements were used in the curriculum of each group on the basis of their
ethnic backgrounds, they would eventually create different identities which would
exacerbate the social separation and conflict between them. To sum up, different
ethnic formation could create nationalism among groups, and national feelings could
also be imposed by using educational system to socialize people.
Turks established their schools by using the curriculum on the basis of the
religious information. “Courses were mainly based on rote learning of religious
psalms and on training in reading and writing, using the Ottoman alphabet, which was
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strongly influenced by the Arabic and Persian languages. Most of the schools were
run in connection with the mosque and were either publicly financed or privately
owned” (Özerk, 2001, p. 256). Depending on the educational system, two languages
were developed among Turkish islanders. One of these languages was used in the
daily life of Turks, the other one was used as a formal language in Turkish schools.
“Over the years Arabic and Persian became elective subjects in Turkish schools. This
practice was discontinued as a result of Ataturk’s reforms in the Turkish Republic
during the 1920s” (cited in Özerk, 2001, p. 256). Arabic and Persian languages were
“the languages of the Qur’an and of poetry” (Bryant, 2004, p. 126). In the 1860s,
some modern Turkish schools were established in the capital city, Nicosia. “These
schools gave more emphasis to algebra, natural sciences and Turkish language in their
curriculum.” However, at the same time, “religious teaching and the Arabic language
were still important” in those years (Attalides, 2003, p. 42). He also states that the
Turkish schools’ curriculums, including those of the modern schools, had nothing
about “nationalist elements” to be planted in these years. Obviously, according to the
history of Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, national movements were not an option in their
community until the 1920s. As evidence, “the Greek language had a place in the
Turkish-Cypriots’ educational system during some periods in history” on the island
compared with the Greek-Cypriots who “have never given the Turkish language a
place in their school system” (Özerk, 2001, p. 253). Also, most of Turkish Cypriots
were using the Greek language to communicate with Greek Cypriots considering the
Greek language became the dominant language due to the percentage of the
population on the island. The communication with Greeks became very important into
the Turkish community, and just because of that they added the Greek language into
the Turkish school curriculum in the late 1800s until 1955, when the Greeks
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established the organization of EOKA and this organization was an armed for a
campaign of enosis from 1955 until the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1959
(cited in Özerk, 2001). Obviously, “it was in this demographic, sociolinguistic, and
political/legal situation that the Turkish-Cypriot School Board made the decision to
offer Greek as an academic subject in Rusdiye in 1896 (Özerk, 2001, p. 257).
Learning and using the Greek language was very normal in those years, because there
was no need for developing any kinds of national feeling within the Turkish
community, as the Greeks had, until the late nineteenth century. One of the reasons
for that was that the governments of Cyprus including the Ottoman and the British
periods were providing and protecting the interests of Cypriot Turks. Another one was
that the governments of Cyprus gave the Turks an important role in the administrative
council of Cyprus in order to provide them religious-based privileges or to keep them
on their sides against Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, “in 1896, approximately 20
years after the British takeover, the Turkish-Cypriot School Board decided to offer
English as a subject in its Rusdiye curriculum (Rusdiye or secondary high school
corresponds to today’s junior high and high schools)” (Ibid). The French language
was put as an optional subject into the Turkish schools’ curriculum as well (Behçet,
1969). All these privileges explain why there was no need for the nationalist attitudes
within Cypriot Turks by the time Greeks’ national sentiments were growing.
However, on the other hand, even though Greeks had never put the Turkish language
in their curricula throughout their history on the island, besides native languages,
Greek Cypriots were only taught Latin in their schools as an elective course. This
situation obviously shows that Greeks strongly continued imposing the Hellenism
based national feelings on students under the roof of their schools in their own way
instead of trying to build a good atmosphere on the island. In this sense, “Greek
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nationalism was intensified by the inherent contradiction between liberal educational
and other legislation and ultimately authoritarian rule by a colonial power” that started
from the Ottoman Empire but reached its peak during the British colonial rule
(Attalides, 2003, p. 3). However, the British rulers could not estimate that Greek
Cypriots would be using the educational system to achieve the enosis and gave them
the flexibility to govern their schools themselves and Greek national consciousness
and culture came into prominence by letting them administer their schools freely,
particularly “secondary education” (Hörner et al., 2007, p. 202). Also, separating and
having the right to self-govern educational system in Cyprus “came to take over many
of the tasks of the family, including a discipline that was explicitly national” which
was one other reason to pave the way for developing ethno-nationalism between
ethnic communities and anti-colonialism against the British (Bryant, 2004, p. 11).
When the British realized that giving both communities, particular Greek Cypriots, a
chance to administer their own schools was a mistake, they tried to get full control of
schools in order to prevent any possibilities of losing the island. Evidently, the
educational system plays an important role in creating nationalist feelings among each
ethnic group.
Obviously, once they started practicing their national consciousness in their
schools, the two communities started to come closer to either Turkey or Greece.
“Each community honored the national holidays, played the national anthem and used
the flag of its mother country” (Joseph, 1997, p. 76). This kind of separation between
the communities initiated the Cyprus problem which started around the early 1900s.
However, it became more severe in the middle 1900s under the British rule,
particularly “during the 1912 – 1913 Balkan wars, the First World War, and the
Greek- Turkish war of 1919- 1923” (Joseph, 1997, p. 76). After the British realized
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the coming danger of losing its power on the island, “in 1933 legislative measures put
primary education completely under the control of the British Government” by
removing Greek history from curriculum by the colonial power to prevent any kinds
of revolt against them (cited in Attalides, 2003, p. 27).
Eventually, the British administration had been trying to get full control over
the socio-cultural structure of Cyprus through using the educational institution
because they wanted to carry out mobilization for social change to prevent any kind of
problems with the inhabitants of the island during the period of its administration.
However, according to Temiz (2009), throughout the history of Cyprus, the
educational institutions had significant influence on strengthening the sociocultural
structure of societies. She also pointed out that the historical and cultural features of
Turkish Cypriot was affected by the colonial policies and began developing of their
own national identification. She stated two main assertions with regards to these
processes which are as follows:
1. The British administration followed a method to implement a social-cultural
change over Cyprus.
The period of 1878-1914, the British focused on changing the socio-cultural
structure of Cypriots by organizing the educational system in accordance with
their ruling policy.
The British policy created a conflicting structure among ethnic communities
through the educational system. Basically, this is the classical way of its colonial
policy, “divide and rule”, through the education in Cyprus.
During the period of the British rule, the British promoted ethnic discrimination in
order to ensure control of the island.
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In general, teachers as the main actors in the educational system play a dynamic
role in transferring the socio-cultural structure through the younger generation.
2. With the cultural process throughout the colonial period in Cyprus, it is obvious
that these processes affected the Turkish Cypriots’ struggle for existence and led
to them to differentiate their national identity.
In response to this attitude of the British, the Turkish Cypriot community had seen
the educational institution as an organization which would help them protect and
maintain their own socio-cultural existence.
Due to the educational system and the ruling policy of the British on the island,
the socio-cultural structure of Turkish Cypriot had been affected. In order to protect
and to maintain their existence on the island, they started developing nationalist
feelings against the Greek Cypriots.
Under the rule of the British, while the political mobilization began in the
educational area, another mobilization also gave start in the trade field and directly
affected the changing economic structure parallel with other developments under the
British. Eventually, the model of traditional society in Cyprus had started to transform
into the modern society step by step. That was a signal of social mobility which
already started spearing among societies on the island. Accordingly, societies in
Cyprus gradually began to gain a new understanding of class which resulted in a
development of a bourgeoisie class within Greek Cypriot community. Obviously, the
Greek bourgeoisie class took most of the advantages of the trade sector, which
provided more power to the Greek bourgeoisie class and played a very important role
in the development of nationalist struggle for enosis among Cypriot Greeks. Besides,
the political and cultural influences of Greece should not be ignored when looking at
the within Greek Cypriot community in these years.
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Depending on one sided developments on the island, the social unrest was
triggered among inhabitants, particularly among Greek Cypriots. The social unrest
turned into violence in the meantime of development of national feelings on the
island. As a result of all these developments under the British administration, the
British colonial policy, “divide and rule” became one of the strong methods to create
full control over communities throughout their administration in many areas such
education and administration because they “saw it as a unity containing populations
that spoke different languages and worshiped in different fashion” (Lindley, 2007;
Joseph, 1997; Bryant, 2004, p. 21). Accordingly, they thought that it would be easier
to follow a “divide and rule” policy against both ethnic communities by
differentiating their languages and religions in order to create a conflicting
environment on the island to put them into an oppositional position with each other.
While the British were using this policy in order to create separate communities, they
also used the ethno-cultural structures in order to provide different political elements
as reflections to each other. In this sense, Turkish Cypriots’ nationalist struggle which
was planted by the British as a provocation against Greek Cypriot nationalism was
affected by Turkish nationalism and adopted many of its methods while they were
struggling for their national movement. Following World War II, the Turkish Cypriots
started to organize themselves politically. Additionally, Turkish Cypriots’ nationalist
movement was shaped by Turkish nationalism and also it was born to develop as a
contra-nationalism against enosis. The Turkish Cypriots’ nationalist aim was opposite
to the Greeks’ nationalist aim. While one side was seeking to be close to Turkey, the
other side was seeking to be close to Greece.
Overall, even though the British succeed on the separation of the two major
communities on the island by implementing its division and rule policy right after
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settling on the island, it could not prevent the development of anti-colonial
nationalism against it.
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Chapter Three: Rise of Greek Cypriot Nationalism
When the Ottoman Empire invaded Cyprus in the sixteenth century, it “gave
some basic socio-political features to Cyprus” (Attalides, 2003, p.1). The Greek
community on the island made especially good use of these opportunities by gaining
power. Furthermore, the Ottoman Millet system provided the church an extensive
autonomy under its administrative power; the Orthodox Church gained the right to
rule the Christian Greek Cypriot population in the island right after “destroying the
Venetian feudal structure” (Ibid). Because the Orthodox Church gained authority by
ruling the Christian population, it became very powerful among the Greek community
on the island. The Church also received a lot of economic and political opportunities
in order to control the Greek community.
When the Archbishop became a representative in the Christian millet under the
Ottoman rule in Cyprus in the sixteenth century, he held the dominant position
amongst the Greek community by conserving their ethnic identities, such as religious,
cultural, political and social self-identities Considering the dominant power of
religious based nationalism over societies in the sixteenth century, the control of the
Orthodox Church over the Greek Cypriots was inescapable from that time until the
modern day. The religious based nationalism in Greek Cypriot community had been
continuously active until the development of Hellenic nationalism on the basis of
modernization in the late eighteenth century.
The power dissipation of the traditional bonds and religious values of the premodern period occurred from the creation of modernity, particularly with regards to
nationalism, that had significant effects on changing the world view and creating
hundreds of nation-states, such as Greece, in the world. After modern societies were
born, the view of the whole world including politics, culture and religion had changed
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due to nationalist ideologies of nationalism. Hellenic nationalism was born with the
declaration of the independence of Greece in 1828. The transition from cultural and
religious based ideology to nationalism got its start with regards to the political
dimensions of a new nation. The development of an enhanced national identity for
Greece was based on the “Megali Idea” would determine the fate of the Greek Cypriot
nationalism on the island.
While the ideology of nationalism was spreading all over the world in different
forms with regards to the territorial base, the Hellenic nationalism was one of the
ideological national movements that started spreading over Greece at the time. For
instance, Greece became a nation-state in the beginning of the nineteenth century
“with national aspirations to expand its then very limited borders at the expense of the
Ottoman State” (Attalides, 2003, p. 1). The declaration of the independent state of
Greece in 1828 affected the Greek society in Cyprus, and at the same time, the
irredentist national movement of Greece greatly impressed them.
In a short time, the national feelings of the motherland spread among all
Greek Cypriots on the island on the basis of the ethno-national similarities between
Greek Cypriots and Greek people. Because of the ethno-national similarities,
including common culture, religion and language, between motherland Greece and the
Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot community of the island easily adopted Hellenic
nationalism and put it into practice in a short time. These ethno-national similarities
became the main target of the Greek Cypriot national struggle. This interaction
between Greeks and Greek Cypriots was happening, probably, for the first time in the
history of Greek Cypriots, considering the island had not been a Greek territory
throughout its history. After the beginning of the modern period, the Greek Church of
the island became totally dependent on Greece in most areas. Under the influence of
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the Greek national movement, the “Megali Idea” was adopted as a state doctrine and
started attracting the Greek Cypriot community of the island (Kızılyürek, 2005a, p.
75). Also, the level of national pride rose until the partition was completed over the
island in the late twentieth century.
The national feelings of Greek Cypriots gradually increased in the 1820s, and
at the same time, irredentist positions started taking hold in the Greek community in
the island. Once nationalist feelings became deeper among Greek Cypriots, they
found themselves seeking to become a part of motherland Greece. In order to make
this a reality, they sent a memorandum to Greece asking for guidance while they were
expanding the national feelings among Greek Cypriots. The memorandum was
discussed being a part of the new boundaries of motherland Greece, rather than being
under the rule of any other state. In order to achieve their main target, Greek Cypriots
started struggling against the current administration year by year. However, the level
of national feelings among Greek Cypriots was not strong enough to struggle for the
unification with motherland Greece (enosis) in the beginning (Kızılyürek, 2005a).
Even though the level of national feelings was very low and there was no violence
based national feeling among Greek Cypriot community, as Markides (1974) noted,
the social changes of Greece directly affected on Greek Cypriots in Cyprus. For
instance, the cultural movement in Greece was also connected with the movements in
Cyprus. Markides (1974) goes on to point out that:
The Byzantine Empire included within its domain both Cyprus and
mainland Greece. Thus, a type of cultural union between the two
countries was maintained in spite of the 600 miles separating Cyprus
from the mainland. And, although Cyprus followed a different
historical evolution after the Byzantine era, the legacy of Byzantium
lived on. Thus, any major cultural movement in mainland Greece had
its corresponding impact on Cyprus as well (p. 311).
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The Orthodox Church dominated Greek Cypriot society, and it started also
having economic control over it. As explained in the second chapter, the economic
growth of Cyprus, with regard to modernization starting in the nineteenth century,
caused the transformation from a basic organizational structure to the complex one. In
the case of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots benefited the most from the economic profit of
the island and developed their bourgeoisie class in response to globalization. This
process of economic growth in the Greek community created the social movements
among Greek Cypriots, particularly in the market economy. At the same time, the
middle class was created throughout the island giving the Greek Cypriots an increased
awareness of their national movement. Mobilizing the middle class against the current
administration was one of Greek community’s weapons to get rid of the foreign
administration and unite with their motherland Greece.
Modernization resulted in the decrease in the rate of illiteracy, which caused
people to become more conscious about the world around them. This consciousness
included a sense of belonging, as in the example of the Greek Cypriot community.
The rate of literacy also affected the development of nationalism which triggered
national awareness among most societies, including the Greek Cypriot society of the
island. Hence, the proportion of the illiterate increased among the Greek Cypriot
community in these years, and this directly affected on imposing the nationalist
feelings to Greek people in the island. As a result, Greek community of the island,
particularly the middle class, started developing nationalist feelings in order to use
them to stand up for their rights. Also, these nationalist feelings against the current
administration and the Ottoman Empire gradually became more radical over time. In
these years, Greek nationalism was not very radical, but it was already starting to
affect people of Greek Cypriot community. On the other hand, “the severity of
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Turkish measures ensures that until the occupation by the British in 1878, there were
no overt Greek nationalist actions” (cited in Attalides, 2003, p. 25).
While the Greek Cypriot community nationalist movements were gradually
developed in the level of radical struggles against others, the British Empire in 1879
was settled on the island. Right after the arrival of the British Empire in the island,
some reforms were carried out “which deeply affected Cypriot society, and which had
effect on an important part of it, particularly the church, which lost its representative
function in relation to the secular power” (Attalides, 2003, p. 24). All these reforms
were not just imposed to Greek Cypriots; Turkish Cypriots were also on the target of
the new administration of the British. One of the effects of the changes among
Turkish Cypriots was to lose their power in the administration. The balance in the
council had been changed depending on the population ratio of each community. In
this sense, Greek Cypriots gained more power in the council according to the
population ratio of Greek to Turks which was 3 to1. Even though, they were placed in
the council of new administration, they could have only given advice but not disposal.
Hence, the British took the population of communities very seriously and treated
Greek and Turkish Cypriots depending on the ratio of their population in any given
community. In addition to these changes in administration under British rule, the
Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie class took the larger portion of the economical profit and
started developing itself. However, these progresses paved the way for the creation of
inequalities among the two major communities over the island because while Greek
Cypriots were developing themselves by catching up with modernization, Turkish
Cypriot was not even stepped into the modern world in these years (Kızılyürek,
2005a). Basically, first inequality among Greeks and Turks originated by
modernization. As Gellner said, the transition from pre-modern societies to modern
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societies did not simultaneously spread all over the world as in Cyprus case for
example. Unlike, this process created inequalities based on sharing economic and
political power and wealth among nations. In the Cyprus case, the transition to
modernization between communities was not simultaneously among Turkish and
Greek Cypriots, too. Two-way social development in Cyprus could be one of the
reasons of unequal developments, especially on the basis of modernization, between
two major communities in the island. More specifically, there were two ruling classes
over Cyprus beginning with the Ottoman period. Turkish Cypriots engaged in
administrative and military fields, and Greek Cypriots engaged in commerce. The
process of two-way social development between two major communities created two
separate social structures in the ruling class since the late seventeenth century. In this
sense, it can be seen, on one hand, Greek community of the island gained more
advantages, particularly on the economic level, by catching up with modernization
and developing themselves in parallel with new world. On the other hand, the Turkish
community lagged behind in modernizing and missed all of the advantages that were
created with the new economic development. As Kızılyürek (2005a) notes, the
unequal developments between two communities on the same island would underlie
the first seeds of the ethnic conflict among groups of Cyprus. Although, the seeds of
the well-known Cyprus conflict were panted in these years, it would become
increasingly visible in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The rapidly evolving modernization process would encourage the Greek
Cypriots to struggle for enosis (the unification with motherland Greece). As
Kızılyürek (2005b) states that the modernization of the Greek community in Cyprus
had been rising in parallel with the motherland Greece, which also encouraged them
to fight for enosis. This political ideology called enosis was adopted by a mass of
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Greek Cypriots and had been spread into the Greek community on the island in order
to achieve their mission. This main political goal of Greek Cypriots definitely
identified nationalism with “enosis” in its own way. As Attalides (2003) points out,
“political ideology becomes one with personal identity” in the Greek Cypriot society
in nationalist level (p. 34). Since the beginning of the development of nationalist
feelings among Greek Cypriot community, “enosis” was the only type of nationalism
that sought to unite with motherland Greece. In this case, Greek nationalism could be
an example of ethnic nationalism that “defines nationhood in terms of lineage”
(Kupchan, 1995, p. 4). As Anthony Smith states, nations need some common ethnical
attributes including “physical characteristic, culture, religion, language, and a
common ancestry” (Bacık, 2002, p. 20). In the case of the Greek Cypriot community
of the island, Greek Cypriots were seeking to unify with motherland Greece because
they considered themselves of Greeks ancestry in terms of sharing some common
ethnic elements. These thoughts and beliefs had strongly influenced the development
of Greek nationalism on the island against the British and against the Turkish
Cypriots. Thus ethnic nationalism was on the rise in the Greek community of Cyprus.
While nationalist-based process was developing in the Greek community
against others on the island, Turkish Cypriots did not modernize economically as
Greeks did and they became very weakened compared with Greek Cypriots
(Kızılyürek, 2005b, p. 32). However, comparing the two communities of the island,
“there was no opportunity for a nationalist element to be introduced” for Turkish
Cypriots in these years because there was no one to provoke and support Turkish
Cypriots to develop nationalist feelings at that time (Attalides, 2003, p. 42). For
instance, motherland Greek was the one that was supporting nationalism in Greek
Cypriot community; nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots were lacking the support of
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motherland in those years. As a result, there was no national feeling rising among
Turkish Cypriots until the beginning of the twentieth century when the republic of
Turkey was established. Consequently, they had been collaborating with the British
rule against the Greek community because they did not have any other way to handle
the conflict with the Greeks conflicts (Kızılyürek, 2005b). After Turkish Cypriots
started facing Greek Cypriots nationalist struggles, the national feelings started rising
among Turkish Cypriots step by step, but it was not spreading as fast as the national
feelings of the Greeks. Hereby, Turkish national movement led the defensive
nationalism that was called “contra – nationalism” (Kızılyürek, 2008). Lacher (2006)
also pointed out that Turkish Cypriot nationalism was definitely a “defensive
nationalism” that was “constructed not to serve elite interests, but to secure the
survival of the numerically smaller group which found itself under violent attack”
(para.11).
Comparing both communities’ national movements, it is clear that the Greek
national movement was different than the Turkish national movement. Greek
nationalist feelings were led by action-oriented nationalism, while Turkish nationalist
movements developed as a reaction to the Greek nationalist movement. Obviously,
Greeks developed their nationalist aspirations on the island because they found out
that that way would help them to reach enosis. The reason of the Greek dispute
against the British in the island was because Greek Cypriots saw the British as a
barrier to the unification with Greece in any area including economic, cultural and
political. On the other hand, the reason for the British assault against enosis was to
secure its own place on the island.
The administrative changes, including economic and political, that would
encourage Greek Cypriots to fight for enosis arrived on the island with the British in
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1878. Besides these economic and political changes, the British also intervened in the
educational system of the Greeks and the Turks and “instituted a dual educational
system” (Morag, 2004, p. 605). Therefore, there were a lot of changes as to quality
and quantity in the educational system of Greeks and Turks especially after the
establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The British elaborated the dual
education system and let Greek and Turkish Cypriots use their own educational
systems. The creation of the dual educational system “would be socialized into
becoming Greeks and Turks” rather than Muslims and non-Muslims (Morag, 2004, p.
605). The number of Greek and Turkish schools increased gradually; conversely,
comparing Turkish and Greek schools, it seems that the number of Turkish schools
was almost half of the number of Greek schools. The unequal rise of numbers of
schools between each community is an indication that Greeks took more advantages
from schools for using them as a tool of spreading nationalism. In addition to these
reforms of the educational system, the British even provided economic help for
Turkish and Greek Cypriots’ schools and gave them a chance to administer their
schools themselves; however, they did not fully remove themselves from the
administration of the schools.
When the Greek and Turkish communities gained self-government of their
own educational systems, both communities had the opportunity to create separate
national identities -- Greek instead of Christians, and Turks instead of Muslims. They
were even against developing “Cypriotism” on the basis of collectivity in the island
because both communities preferred to be a part of their motherland and share the
same national identities on the basis of common cultural factors, religions, and ethnic
structure rather than adopting a new common identity with others with whom they
shared no common ethnic elements. Smith explains this case by pointing out that
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“they signify bonds of solidarity among members of communities united by shared
memories, myths and traditions that may or may not find expression in states of their
own but are entirely different from the purely legal and bureaucratic ties of the states”
(Smith, 1991, p. 15).
Although the British gave them the right to govern their schools themselves,
the British did not assume that Greek Cypriots would infuse the identity issue into
their schools’ curriculum to “overt political, national intents in the content and
teaching of education” to students in order to achieve enosis (Bryant, 2004, p. 125).
Greeks on the island brought from Greece many Greek books that were related to
Hellenism and its history. It was obvious that the main goal of these books was to
encourage the Hellenic Nationalism among Greek Cypriots. Some Greek intellectuals
were trying to impose the Megali Idea to all Greek Cypriots by using the educational
system on the island because “the schools were seen as a central mechanism for
promoting Hellenism and Greek identity within the Greek Cypriots” (Lindley, 2007,
p. 229). Eventually, having the right to use their own models of the educational
system planted the seeds of future dispute between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.
Parallel with raising the rate of literacy in the island, Greek newspapers started
publishing in these years as an instrument of imposing the national feelings among
Greek people in the island in order to mobilize nationalist movements against the
current administrative power and Turkish Cypriots. Seven Greek newspapers were
published and 4,600 of them were sold in 1900 (Katsiaonis, 1996). The main theme of
all these newspapers was to spread the seeds of the “Hellenic Nationalism” and the
“patriotism.”
Eventually, every single change of the British administration provided the
Greek community an opportunity to create nationalist atmosphere on the island in
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order to unite with motherland Greece. For this reason, they wanted to get rid of the
British administration. Basically, besides any other types of nationalism, “anticolonial nationalism” was also developed on the island right after World War II in
order for the Greeks to gain fully take over the administration of Cyprus from the
British. The reason for the development of the decolonization process in the Greek
community was because Greek Cypriots were seeing themselves socially and
culturally different in many ways from the British, which led them to develop an antinationalist struggle against the current colonial administration in order to fulfill
enosis.
Until the year 1931, Hellenic nationalism and the idea of enosis had been
spread throughout the Greek villages in the island. The high level of nationalist
feelings of Greek community led to one of the biggest uprisings, which was called
“the uprising of October 1931” in the year 1931 “…accompanied by cries for
‘freedom from British oppression’ and ‘union with mother Greece’.” (Markides,
1974, p. 315). The biggest attack against the British colonial power carried out in
1931 to burn down the Government House by Greeks in order to find a way to
achieve enosis. Following the 1931 uprising, “the Legislative Council was abolished
and the symbols of Greek nationalism” such as the Greek flag – which had been
extremely popular among Greek Cypriots who hung them from their homes, schools,
and public buildings and the Greek national anthem were banned by British rule
(Morag, 2004, p. 613, 606). The British also decided to create and to impose the idea
of “Cypriotism” on inhabitants of the island, including both Turkish and Greeks, to
keep Greek Cypriots away from the national liberation movement of Greece.
Although, the 1931 uprising was a sign of a demand of decolonization of the island,
Greeks could not succeed in achieving the plan.
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In the 1930s, Greece lost its economic and political power because it lost most
of the struggles in which it was involved during World War II and elsewhere. In
addition, there was an ongoing civil war in Greece at the same time. As a result of
these wars, Greece did not have enough power to struggle for the “Megali Idea,”
especially right after the struggle with the Ottoman Empire. These wars, particularly
losing power against the Ottomans, made Greece become weak and became fully
depended on others, particularly to Britain. After they became a dependent state to the
British colony, they would prefer not to object to the British and decided to stand
against enosis because in these years they really needed the British help in many areas
in order to renovate the country. Therefore, Greece decided not to take a risk by
insisting on evolving enosis and announced that Greek Cypriots had to change their
strategy and give up the idea of becoming a part of Greece in order to convince the
British to stand their side and keep on helping them. However, although Greek
Cypriots lost motherland support for their national mission, they would not stop
fighting for enosis. This process was also a reason for uprisings against the British
rule by the Greeks of the island.
Since the arrival of the British on the island, they never wanted to lose the
island because of its strategic importance related to the controlling of the Suez Canal
(Attalides, 2003, p. 3). The self-interest of the British explains why they had never
agreed with the idea of enosis since the beginning. For this reason, the British
provided a slight concession to the inhabitants of the island. However, the Cyprus
Church totally disagreed with the new idea of the British and demanded the
realization of enosis. Although, churches lost their power after the rise of nationalism
in the Greek community, the Greek Orthodox Church was still trying to control the
Greek Cypriot community of the island in order to find a way to put enosis into effect
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and not to lose its full authority. On the other hand, while the right wing, particularly
the Greek Church, stood against negotiations with others for the island’s future, the
left wing Greek political party, AKEL, agreed to attend the negotiations in order to
find a middle course for everyone’s interests on the island.
The different view of right and left wings of the Greek community created two
opposing sides of Greeks who believed in and supported different ideas with regard to
the current situation of the island. The political-based differentiation of Greek
Cypriots triggered the conflict within them as well. Even though the thought of
negotiations divided the Greek community into two groups on the basis of political
ideas, the negotiations with British failed. Still, the competition and the conflict
between the Greek Church and AKEL become very visible. Hereupon, AKEL decided
to find a way to negotiate with the church to prevent any kinds of problem with the
church. In order to pave the way for negotiation with the church, AKEL decided to
follow a political path.
In the same year of 1949, Makarios, who was one of the leaders of the EOKA,
became the Archbishop of Cyprus. He later became the first President of Cyprus in
1960 and brought the Cyprus dispute into the international arena (Papadakis, 2005, p.
19). “In 1950, the Cyprus Church prepared a referendum to prove the necessity of
realizing enosis on an international level. The question of the referendum was: “Are
you a supporter of enosis or are you against it?” and 95.73% of Greek Cypriot said
they were supporters” (Kızılyürek, 2005a, p. 233). As a result of the referendum,
almost all of them agreed on enosis, which meant that problems would continue on
the island even though third parties were involved in the Cyprus dispute to solve it.
Obviously, no one, including third parties, really wanted to establish a peaceful
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environment on the island and build a good relationship between Turkish and Greek
Cypriots because this way would never serve the self-interests of any of the parties.
On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot community fell outside of the conflict
within the Greek community. Each community of the island had different political
interest; while one side was fighting for enosis, the other one was fighting for taksim,
which made them incapable of developing any political ideology in common. The
main point of both nationalist movements on the island was to bond with their
motherlands, although Greek Cypriots lost their motherland’s support in these years
and came under the influence of the United States of America (USA) instead of the
British.
The changes within motherland Greece were seen as a great opportunity for
Greek Cypriots to start new negotiations with Britain to set the island economically
and socially independent in order to open the way to be a part of motherland Greece.
Basically, Greek Cypriots were trying to gain their freedom and set their own state.
As a result, the tension significantly increased in 1953 on the island. In order to
prevent Greek Cypriot uprisings on the island, Greece and Britain met to discuss the
Cyprus problem. Although they negotiated to find a solution for the current problems
on the island; according to the British, there was no problem regarding Cyprus and,
therefore, no reason to negotiate about it. Thereupon, Greek Cypriots decided to bring
the Cyprus case into the international level, particularly into the United Nations in
order to solve the Cyprus problem by establishing enosis. The purpose of presenting
the Cyprus problem to the UN was to fight for their self-determination rights in order
to get rid of the established British colonial regime to be able to put enosis into
practice. The principle of self-determination emerged in the eighteenth century to let
nations choose their sovereignty and to set their international political stature without
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any external influence. Although Greek Cypriots were striving to get their selfdetermination rights to achieve enosis, the Republic of Turkey, Turkish Cypriots,
Britain, and the USA were all against such a proposal, although they all had different
political interest on the island. The disagreement on the Greek proposal brought all of
them except Greek Cypriot community into the same side to find a way to prevent the
enosis. As a result of the disagreement, they intervened with the UN in order to
prevent the Greek Cypriots from putting enosis into practice. However, this
intervention was not enough to convince the Greek Cypriot community to give up
fighting for enosis (Kızılyürek, 2005a).
After all of these endeavors for enosis, Makarios (Greek Cypriots leader) saw
the difficulties on achieving enosis even though they tried hard to get outsiders help
for their self-interests on the island and developed an “armed struggle” as an
alternative plan after 1950 to achieve enosis (Kızılyürek, 2005a). In order to succeed
this time with the alternative plan, Makarios contacted with “X” organization
(extremely nationalist Greek organization brought to the island against British
administration) which was led by Yorgos Grivas, who was in Greece to get help for
enosis. After negotiations between Makarios and Grivas, they decided in 1954 to
establish two new organizations in Cyprus for the purpose of carrying out the armed
struggle. One of the organizations, called EOKA (Greek for National Organization of
Cypriot Struggle), was established on April 1, 1955. The main goal of the EOKA was
to politicize Greek nationalism [to] “draw symbols and inspiration from mainland
Greece, and the symbols of Greek Cypriot armed struggle (1955 – 1959) were
carefully selected to correspond to the Greek ones” (Loizides: 2007, p. 175). One the
EOKA was established, it “began its military campaign against British rule – the
Greek Cypriots were now in open revolt” (Morag, 2004, p. 613). “Although the
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targets of the Greek Cypriot insurgents of the EOKA organization led by George
Grivas were initially either British or leftist Greek Cypriots, violence had also become
inter-communal during the 1957 – 58 period” (Morag, 2004, p. 600). Obviously, the
creation of the conflict between two major communities of the island was a product of
historical, cultural, religious factors and third parties. Thereupon, on the British side,
in order to prevent losing the island, the British decided to put into practice their
colonial policy of “divided and rule.” Additionally, the British administration used a
new strategy by hiring police from the Turkish community to use against Greek
Cypriots in order to prevent the Greek violence across the island. Eventually, the
British started planting the seeds of ethno-national conflict between the two
communities to ensure its self-interests on the island.
While tension was getting higher on the island among Greek Cypriots, Turkish
Cypriots and Britain, three guarantor countries, Turkey, Greece, and Britain, started
negotiations for creating a new state in order to prevent conflicts on the island. As a
result of these negotiations between the guarantors, building a fourth country, which
would be called the independent Republic of Cyprus, was accepted. The fourth
country was also going to provide “through the system of guarantees [to] manage to
counterbalance the interests of Greece, Turkey, and Britain under the guise of
maintaining stability on the island” (Richmond, 1999, p. 42). Once the system was set
to counterbalance the interests of the guarantors, the new state was established in
1960 with a new constitution that prohibited “the anti-colonial struggle of EOKA”
and contra-nationalist struggle of TMT. According to the new constitution, both
communities were supposed to stop practicing their nationalist movements, enosis and
taksim. Although the new constitution was a way to set a ceasefire between the two
communities by preventing their own political practices, it just worked for a couple of
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years until the first break down in 1963. The main purpose of establishing the new
state was to provide a peaceful atmosphere on the island; however, the conflict
between the two communities never stopped.
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Chapter Four: Rise of Turkish Cypriots Nationalism
A) The Progress of the Turkish Cypriot Community under the rule of the Ottomans
The arrival of the Ottoman Empire into Cyprus in the late sixteenth century paved the
way for social and demographic structure changes on the island. Adding a mass of Muslims
to the native inhabitants of Cyprus was one of the important changes during the Ottoman
administration. Another important reform with the arrival of the Ottomans was the ruling
system as the Ottomans brought their traditional system, the Millet system, which treated
people according to their religions. The Millet system was put into effect immediately after
the Ottoman settlement to create a religiously pluralistic structure in order to exclude ethnic
bonds between native and new inhabitants. Considering the ruling system was adopted in
1571, these Muslims, even after moving to the island, continued living under the traditional
system of the Ottoman rule although Christians/Greeks composed the majority of the
population of Cyprus. In conclusion, religion-based identity was constructed in order to
categorize and separate people on the basis of their religious beliefs regardless of their
political and socioeconomic status starting from the Ottoman period on the island. Political
and socioeconomic statuses were afforded no notice under the Ottoman administration as
“politically, culturally, and socially the significant fact is [that] there are two populations in
Cyprus, one a Greek Orthodox majority, the other a Turkish Muslim minority” (Taeuber,
1955, p. 11).
In the case of religious-based separation, which created unequal stratification on the
island (i.e., a tax concession for the Muslim community whereas non-Muslims were paying
taxes related to their business), “welfare difference” had not really appeared in the peasants’
classes of either religious group during the Ottoman Empire period on the island. Because
most of the peasants were located in the agricultural system of the Ottomans, there were no
real social differences that appeared within peasant classes of both communities (cited in
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Kızılyürek, 2005a). Most peasants usually lived in mixed villages and shared the same social
conditions and ways of acting together in their daily lives on most occasions such as wedding
ceremonies. As a result, before ethnic identities were constructed in Cyprus, there was no
social conflict based on ethnicity among Muslims and non-Muslims during the Ottoman
Empire (Kızılyürek, 2005a). On the contrary, the mostly peasant classes of both ethnic groups
were acting together for specific reasons, regardless of their religion and ethnicity. However,
this stability only continued until both religious-based groups realized the importance of their
ethnicity; it was only at that point that would they develop rival nationalist feelings.
Until the transformation from the Ottoman administration to the Republic of Turkey
was completed, the Ottomans began losing power in many areas, including politics,
economics and the military. Although most of the states, particularly in Western Europe,
were gaining power and technology in these areas, the Ottomans could not compete with
them and become a dependent state upon the West. Therefore, each of the European
countries, such as Britain and France, began opening their consulates in the territories of the
Ottoman Empire, including Cyprus. The settlement of these European consulates on the
island was a result of the industrial revolution, during which the Christian bourgeoisie class
of Cyprus turned the settlement process into an opportunity to build a close relationship with
these foreign embassies (cited in Kızılyürek, 2005a, p. 211). Eventually, Cyprus itself was
affected by every single process of the Ottoman Empire, including the economic evolution
and devolution of the empire. However, one-sided developments caused another reason for
the creation of inequalities between Turkish Muslims and Greek Christians on the island.
While one ethnic group was attaining advantages from the European countries, the other
remained under the influence of the current colonial power of the island. While the
modernization process accelerated in the Greek Christian community, Turkish Muslims
caught up with modernization almost a century later than Greek Cypriots. Parallel with
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nationalist movements in the Ottoman territory, modernization-based nationalist sentiments
of the Christian/Greek community on the island paved the way for a gradual disconnect from
the traditional structure of government and military-based government of the Ottomans.
Besides the effect of modernization on the rise of nationalist feelings in Greek Christians of
Cyprus, motherland Greece nationalist ideology also had a very important influence on
developing nationalism in the Greek communities on the island. On the other hand, following
the traditional system and order of the Ottomans pushed Turkish Cypriots away from
obtaining benefits from the new modern world and its reforms until they realized the
deficiency of nationalism, at which time they would become a subject of the nationalist attack
of Greek Cypriots in the beginning of the twentieth century.
Because of the negative progress in the Ottoman territory, Ottomans declared some
reforms called “Tanzimat Reforms” in 1839 in order to maintain their territorial sovereignty.
The West also supported the declaration of Tanzimat reforms in order to provide more
privileges to Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire after Christians entered the
territory. More specifically, according to Tanzimat reforms, equality in most cases between
different religious groups such Christians and Muslims was promoted. As Smith states,
“Ottoman rule witnessed successive attempts to reform the basis of the empire (Tanzimat),
including a resort to ‘Ottomanism’ through equality and citizenship for all subjects” (Smith,
1991, p. 103). Providing equality and citizenship for all subjects to non-Muslims paved the
way for the creation and development of nationalist sentiments within ethnic groups under
the Ottoman administration. In fact, this was a cause of the fall of the Ottoman empire in the
beginning of the nineteenth century.
Although the Ottomans were losing power, they continuously struggled with other
empires in order to expand their territories, protect existing territories, and more. When the
time came to struggle with one of the most powerful enemies of the Ottoman Empire, Russia,
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the Ottomans decided to ask for protection from one of the biggest colonial empires of the
time, the British Empire. Thus, the British colonial power settled on the island to fulfill the
purpose of protecting the Ottomans from Russia at the end of nineteenth century.

B) The Progress of Turkish Cypriot Community under the British Rule
Until the 20th century, the colonial powers imposed their economic, political and
socio-cultural structures upon many people from other territories -- especially weaker
territories -- to assimilate them in order to strengthen their place in a specific region. Another
policy of colonialism was to set unequal relationships between the inhabitants of the colonial
territory in order to easily dominate the people. As with many other colonial territories, the
colonial policy was applied in Cyprus by the British empire in 1878 when it settled on the
island. The empire, by putting the “divide and rule policy” into the effect, created various
ethnic identities on the basis of different religions, cultures, historical narratives and
languages between the inhabitants of the island -- Turkish and Greek Cypriots -- in order to
expand its power and strengthen its place on the island.
Along with the general colonial policies, the arrival of the British rule on the island in
1878 changed the current system in many areas on the basis of the status quo. As a result of
the reforms of the new colonial power, Muslim Turks lost their former power in the
administration although the British did not entirely change the governmental structure. Even
though Muslims lost their representative power in government, “the British began to rely on
Muslims as instruments of repression against the Orthodox Christians” in order to keep
British dominance on the island (Lacher, 2006, para. 26). In this sense, it is clearly seen that
the British and Muslim Turks were allied and supported each other against the Greek
Cypriots. For instance, the Legislative Assembly was used as a tool against the Greeks to
prevent enosis (the unification with motherland Greece). Another example is the

83

“…(employment of) Turkish Cypriot policemen against the Greek Cypriots EOKA fighters
(Greek for National Organization of Cypriot Struggle), which was bound to lead the conflict”
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots later in Cyprus’ history (Papadakis, 2005, p. 65).
While associating against the Greeks, the bourgeoisie class of Christians was
continuously growing and enriching as all the economic developments of the Ottoman
Empire had fallen into their hands. Nothing could succeed in stopping the rate of growth of
the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie class, as even the British and Turkish were trying to set a bar
against the growth of the Greek community of the island. Fundamentally, the Greeks did not
recognize the British colonial rule as legitimate on the island because the transition from the
Ottoman to the British was merely a step for Greek Cypriots to achieve the idea of “enosis”
(Zink, 2008, p. 590). For this reason, the Greeks of Cyprus were following their course
without taking others seriously on the island at first. During the years that followed, however,
the Greek Cypriot community developed a very strong bond with “enosis,” which caused the
creation of the anti-colonial nationalist movement within Greek Cypriots on the island after
they realized the passive violence of the British against them. Year after year, anticolonialism grew stronger and “was led by a conservative Church hierarchy” in order to open
the door to success for enosis, which meant “the freeing of Cyprus from foreign rule” and
uniting the whole island with motherland Greece (Attalides, 2003, p. 22). Although the
British did not have any intention of letting Greek Cypriots achieve their mission, the Greek
Cypriots began stepping forward into an irredentist national movement by using their
economic power to create a union with Greece (enosis). This one-sided growth on the island
strengthened the two-sided structure between the ethnic communities of Cyprus because,
even though “the Cypriot Muslims were opposed to enosis with the Greek Christian state,
(they) had no alternative motherland other than the Ottoman Empire or the world of Islam.
Neither unit that was able to (develop) nationalist sentiments” on the basis of modernization
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or gain support from motherland against Greek nationalist movements (Attalites, 2003, p.
43). Considering the Greeks as a majority group who adopted “an ethnic nationalism” as a
principle in order to achieve enosis, “ethnic nationalism directly produces social disturbances
for the minority/other people” who were Turkish Cypriots, directly causing problems
between them (Bacık, 2002, p. 33). Overall, Turkish Cypriots as a minority group had
difficulties supporting their national movements against the majority group’s nationalist
struggle. They became the weak side on the island because they did not have any supporters
during those years. As a result, some of the Young Turks, who were “…initially Ottomanists,
but were pushed increasingly toward Turkism by the defection even of Muslim subjects of
the Empire from loyalty to it...,” escaped from the Ottoman rule and refugees who were going
to organize them against the Greek nationalist attacks (Attalides, 2003, p. 37).
Although Young Turks agreed with the Sultan’s effort in many cases, they were not
very satisfied by the way he ruled the empire. For this reason, these intellectuals were trying
to find a way to prevent the Sultan’s “autocratic-rule” and were also attempting to prevent the
“Sultan’s despotism and failure” that was significantly shown in the effects of the
administration and order of the Ottomans (Yeğen, 2007). According to the Young Turks, the
Sultan was acting independently, which could have caused many problems in the territory of
the Ottoman Empire and would also directly affect its citizens. They also strongly believed
that the independent behavior of the Sultan could cause a partition in the multi-ethnic and
multi-religious Ottoman Empire. In order to prevent this partition in the Ottoman territory,
many of these intellectuals came together under the roof of the “Committee of Union and
Progress” (CUP) with the members who were known as the “Young Turks” in 1894 (Finkel,
2005). According to Akşin (2004), there were five common characteristics of the members of
the CUP used to describe them. These characteristics were (Akşin, 2004, p. 10):
1. They were young and therefore unable to seize the power.
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2. They belonged to the civilian or military bureaucracy.
3. Their education was Western-oriented.
4. Most of them were Turkish or eventually considered themselves Turkish.
5. In the aim of establishing a modern, Western-type capitalist society, they had a
bourgeois ideology.
These Young Turks were involved in many areas such as constitutionalism,
secularism, the development of Turkish nationalism (while Ottomanism was in practice), a
new system of government and a national language reform in the beginning of the 20th
century. Their ideological struggle on the basis of those areas had appeared in the Republic of
Turkey when it was decelerated in 1923. Before the establishment of the Turkish Republic,
some who had escaped from the Ottoman Empire decided to carry out their campaign in
Cyprus in order to impose their ideology upon Turkish Cypriots as well.
Immediately after they moved into Cyprus in order to achieve the Cyprus plan, which
was the creation of an anti-Ottoman nationalism in Cyprus, the Young Turks provoked some
of Turkish Cypriots right after World War I (Attalides, 2003). The annexation of the island
by the British and the close relationship between the UK and Greece were two important
reasons that dragged Turkish Cypriots into concern over their future and also onto the Young
Turks’ side. Evidently, the new movement created on the island was not only against
Ottomanism but was also developed as a response to the enosis movement of the Greek
Cypriots and against the current administration of the island. More importantly, Greek
Cypriot nationalism had generated fear and anxiety for the Turkish Cypriots’ future during
these years. This fear and anxiety compelled Turkish Cypriots to become closer to the
newborn Republic of Turkey in 1923 and to its founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. They
became quite close followers of Turkey and began adopting every resolution of Turkey which
was enhanced to replace the traditional Ottoman system, including its political and cultural
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ruling policy under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. As Lacher (2006) states, “The
administrative proto-elite turned to Kemalism and embraced its reforms, not so much to guide
it to national independence, but as symbols of modernism, as an ideology of Muslim
reorganization and catching up with the Greek Cypriots” (para. 28). Overall, these Turkish
Cypriot intellectuals who were provoked by the Young Turks started supporting patriotism on
the basis of Kemalism against enosis. However, after the introduction of the Young Turks
onto the island, Turkish Cypriots ideologically divided into two groups. On the one hand,
some of Turkish Cypriots became quite close to the Young Turks and embraced their
ideology; on the other, some of them were still insisting on following the tradition of
Ottomanism and staying on the British side. According to Lacher, “The power struggle
between the two segments of the Turkish Cypriot elite continued until the mid-1950s”
(Lacher, 2006, p.29).

Kemalism-Based Reforms in the Turkish Cypriot Community
The modernist Turkish Cypriot elites decided to be on the Turkish side and follow and
put into practice the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first leader of the Republic of
Turkey. Eventually, following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, a group
called Kemalist came to power in order to develop a secular state instead of traditionalist
Ottoman rule. In order to improve upon the main ideas of the Young Turks, these elites, who
were well educated in secular schools and quite close followers of Western reforms, were
planning to adopt Western ideas and put them into effect by customizing those reformist
ideologies regardless of traditional ruling norms of the Ottomans starting from 1923. The new
state ideology of Kemalism, which was named after its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
generally symbolized nationalism and secularism. Along with the reforms of the new state,
some of them were generated as legal and cultural reforms to support the new ideology of the
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Republic of Turkey. The main target of the new nation state was to create a “modern nation”
as a transitional form of multi-religious and multi-ethnic groups to a common “nationalismnational identity and ethnic identity formation” on the basis of Turkish origin instead of
changing the national religion or ethnic heterogeneity in order to prevent national uprisings
on the land (Bacık, 2002, p. 32). According to Akman (2004), the purpose of these changes
on the basis of Kemalism was to create a new state in the “level of contemporary civilization”
by just focusing on modernization (p. 16). In the view of Turkish Cypriots, these reforms
were symbols of modernization in order to reorganize and catch up with the new world,
especially with the Greek Cypriot community. For this reason, right after the reforms of
Turkey were announced, some were put into effect even before they were implemented in the
Turkish nation itself. Those Western-based reforms were;
1) The abolition of the Islamic schools and religious courts was put into effect in
1924.
2) The Caliphate was abolished in 1924.
3) The co-education became possible for both girls and boys, which was prohibited
before on the basis of religion.
4) The Western-style hats (new dress code) were put in use instead of the traditional
headgears (fez and sarik), which were prohibited (because according to new state
elites who adopted secularism and modernism, the traditional hat was alleged as
“uncivilized” compared to the Western trend) in 1925.
5) German, Italian, and Swiss models were adopted as new secular codes in 1926.
6) The Ottoman lunar calendar was changed and replaced with the Gregorian
calendar.
7) The declaration of Islam as a religion of the new state was removed from the
constitution to make the constitution more secular in 1928.
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8) The reforms of the alphabet and numerals were implemented; more specifically,
the Arabic alphabet was replaced by adopting the Latin alphabet and Western
numerals.
9) Sundays became the official holiday instead of Muslim Friday in 1935.
10) The statute of women was changed in a practical way. To a greater extent, women
were allowed the right to vote first in 1930 (municipal election) and then in 1934
(national election). They also were allowed the right to be voted for in the national
parliament under the Kemalist regime. Moreover, the new state regime stimulated
the public visibility of women. (Akman, 2004, p. 20).
The main goal of these reforms was to break the sociocultural traditional norms of the
Ottomans and the multi-religious system in order to create the new Turkish nation-state
norms, which included new social, identification, and cultural formations. In addition, the
main purpose of Kemalist reforms was to create Turkish nationalism in order to make a
Turkish nation and Turkishness the dominant identity on the land. According to Yeğen
(2007), founding members of the Republic of Turkey were definitely generating an antistruggle to the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman heritage, because they wanted to
create a collective identity on the basis of Turkishness. Basically, while religious-based origin
was minimized in the system, the importance of ethnicity within the Muslim community of
the island raised in the beginning of the twentieth century parallel to the transformation from
the Ottomans to the Republic in 1923. In this sense, the term “Turkish” became a symbol of
the Republic of Turkey regardless of religious origin. At the same, the term “Turkish”
became a symbol of Turkish Cypriots in the beginning of 1900s as well, following the
identification formation within the Greek community of the island.
Muslims of the island did not only adopt the ethnic-based identity but also embraced
the new state of Turks which was called the Republic of Turkey because they felt religiously,
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linguistically, politically, and culturally closer to them. Feeling closer to motherland Turkey
was not expressed by naming Turkey as the motherland until the second half of the twentieth
century. In this sense, they would be “socialized into developing a Turkish rather than a
Cypriot identity” that would make them “extreme nationalists” in order to defend themselves
against the Greek Cypriot nationalist movements during these years (Morag, 2004, p. 606).
Although all of these reforms were made under the Kemalist regime, which was the
landmark for the Turkish nation, the new Turkish regime adopted a Western-oriented path,
including the legal and cultural structures of Europe, to establish the new Turkish state and
Turkish nationalism (Akman, 2004). Perhaps this path was a reason for creating and
spreading a national liberation movement and the consciousness of belonging on the basis of
Turkishness rather than the Ottoman identity toward the Anatolia. Basically, “It was
Ataturk’s realization that the internal consolidation of a secular modern state involved the
renunciation of “Turanism” or the pan-Turk ideal that resulted in the establishment of a
Turkish nationalism based on the Anatolian homeland as the official policy of the Turkish
Government” (Attalides, 2003, p. 37). In this sense, it is clearly seen that after this
significantly important evolution of the Turkish nation and nationalism, the new state became
more dependent on European adaptation and European countries by adopting Westernoriented norms.
On the other hand, in Cyprus’s case, it is obvious that Turkish Cypriots were excited
about adopting and putting all of these reforms of the Republic of Turkey into practice in
order to prove that they were part of them and gain attention for the current nationalist-based
struggle of Cyprus between themselves and Greek Cypriots. As Kızılyürek (2005a) noted,
although traditional and religious elites of Turkish Cypriots were still insisting on being on
the British side, the Young Turkish Cypriot elites were seeking to modernize together by
adopting Turkish reforms in order to catch up to the same level with Greek Cypriots in the
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modern era and also to develop a solid nationalist identity against the Greek nationalist
struggle. Along with these actions of the Turkish Cypriot elites, Turkish nationalism was
gradually starting to be revealed and organize against the Greek nationalist movement, which
created two enemies on the island. For this reason, intellectuals of the Turkish Cypriot
community who were seeing themselves as a part of mainland Turkey and were following
secular Turkish nationalism demanded to unite with Turkey in order to respond to the Greek
Cypriots’ call for enosis. However, Turkey was refusing to become involved in the Cyprus
conflict during those years. This new situation would open the door for the inter-communal
violence later in the history of Cyprus.
While both ethnic groups grew angry toward each other, the British and traditional
groups of Turkish Cypriots were not satisfied with the new movement of intellectual Turkish
Cypriots who adopted Kemalism and started developing a contra-nationalism against Greek
nationalism. For this reason, the British government deprecated the nationalist struggle of the
Turkish Cypriot community. As a result, the British abolished cooperation with Turkish
Cypriots and refused to assist them in spite of the development of the nationalist ideology of
the Turkish. The traditionalist Turkish Cypriot elite, however, stayed on the British side by
being against the new nationalist movements of the Turkish Cypriot elites. Obviously, along
with the detainment of the British, the Turkish intellectuals who “were affected by
Kemalism” were having problems through the imposition of their thoughts and beliefs toward
the Turkish Cypriots community (Kızılyürek, 2005a, p. 33). Eventually, the British and
traditional Cypriot Turks were two barriers to the development of Turkish nationalism on the
island because they were seeking to hold the current position of the island and were totally
against spreading national feelings on the basis of Kemalism within the Turkish Cypriots.
The only way to be operative on the island and spread and impose their national ideologies
was to gain acceptance by the British administration (Ibid). In this sense, intellectual Turkish
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Cypriots had to convince both the British and the traditional Turkish Cypriots to develop the
nationalist movement of the Turkish community of the island. For this reason, “They opened
a campaign against the religious and traditional elite” in order to eliminate any kinds of
barriers in front of them and to ensure nationalism on the basis of modernization within the
Turkish Cypriot community (Ibid).
While both communities were faced with some differences of opinion within their
groups, the tension and conflict between the two groups grew very deep by sharpening their
national goals on the basis of the motherlands’ nationalism against each other. With that
progress, they had been approaching a step forward for the action-oriented conflict which
would become a reason for the separation of the island into two parts. For instance, enosis
became accepted and spread the seeds of hatred between Turkish Cypriots and the British
administration by Greek Cypriots in the first half of the twentieth century. Along with discord
against others on the island, the uprising against the British in 1931 showed the seriousness of
the Greek Cypriots during those years (Kızılyürek, 2005a).
After the 1931 uprising of the Greeks against the British, the British administration
closed the joint council and suspended the constitution, focusing on the social life, schools,
and teachers of Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in order to interrupt nationalist
movements and protect the British position on the island. However, these kinds of
interventions, such as oppression and bans throughout the island’s history, focused mostly on
the colonial period, would not be accepted by the affected societies and caused different
problems between the groups and the colonial power. For instance, those societies that were
under the colonial rule system usually refused to follow the colonial policy and refused to be
assimilated, fighting to keep their social structures alive instead of accepting new social
elements of colonial policy. Generally, socio-cultural dimensions are more difficult to be
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accepted when they are imposed by force by any other groups. Such cases usually end up
with an uprising against the colonial rule in order to secure independence of the land.
In the case of Cyprus, to prevent assimilation by the British colonial power, both
societies focused on their own educational systems in order to keep their socio-cultural
dimensions alive and to impose their nationalist feelings toward members of their groups. In
addition to this, considering the Turkish Cypriot community as a weak side of the island,
those under colonial rule needed to develop their nationalist struggle to defend themselves
against nationalist Greek attacks. In order to face the Greek attacks and to compete with their
nationalist movements, Turkish Cypriots decided to develop a contra-attack on the nationalist
level by using the educational system, the socio-cultural structure, and other methods to
impose nationalist feelings in their community and get the community members to accept
their national identity. Because of this, the educational system was divided into two
institutions. Whereas Cypriot Turks were using the educational system as a tool of protecting
and maintaining the existence of themselves, Greeks were using schools to achieve their
mission of “enosis.” In general, both groups’ schools were totally focused against the colonial
power usage and opposed each other’s nationalist movements.
As the educational system became a center for spreading nationalist feelings toward
group members, the curricula of Turkish schools were programmed on the nationalist level.
In this sense, the educational system, particularly the primary school’s educational system,
became the center of teaching the national feelings “to spread the image and heritage of the
“nation” on the basis of ethno-nationalism among members of each ethnic group of Cyprus”
(Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 115). The curricula of the Turkish schools of the island were intended
to include social reflexes in order to protect the structure of their identity regardless of their
defeat by the colonial force. Briefly, in Turkish schools, as Temiz (2009) claims, the duties of
teachers were to transmit the Turkish historical heritage and social values to students and to
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help them put these values into practice in order to develop nationalist sentiments within the
Turkish community of Cyprus. Obviously, teachers became the center of the nationalist
struggle in both communities. Basically, if the society is a developing society, such as the
Turkish Cypriots were under the control of the British colonial power, the role of teachers is
very important in order to maintain their identity and historical narratives of their community.
Keeping socio-cultural dimensions alive is one of a teacher’s responsibilities to develop a
solid structure of the society where doing so is a risk through political, cultural and social
assimilation by others. In Cyprus, considering the Cypriot Turk community as a nondominant community under the British colonial rule, schools and, particularly, teachers
played a very important role in developing a solid nationalist struggle by keeping alive their
national identity by using historical narratives. While both societies were working on
building their national identities separately against the other, the British were also paving the
way for deepening every difference including religion, language and cultural differences and
economic inequalities among both communities of the island in order to destroy the
relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and to create two separate communities in
order to be able to keep their control easily under British administration.
After the Turkish Cypriot side developed an anti-enosis nationalist movement on the
island, differences between the ethnic groups had gradually been sharpened within the two
motherlands –Turkey and Greece. In the case of the Turkish Cypriots, getting closer to
motherland Turkey and adopting the ideology of Kemalism, which resulted in construction of
“Turkishness” within their community, were becoming extreme nationalist movements.
Obviously, as Greek Cypriots began identifying themselves as Hellenes, Turkish Cypriots
identified themselves as Turks under the new state of Turkey, which was another solid reason
for the creation of two rival identities on the small island. Getting closer to mainland Turkey
partially eliminated the fear and anxiety of the Turkish Cypriots and made them look to the
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future for a bright outlook in those years. However, “The conflict started precisely when
identities became constructed in these terms, which placed them in a direct continuity with
the various Greek/Turkish conflicts on the Balkans, the Aegean islands and Anatolia over the
150 years preceding the separation of the island in 1974” (Lacher, 2006, para. 25).
Obviously, the development of rival national identities also paved the way for the creation of
two separate national movements on the island. In order to compare and differentiate both
national movements of Turkish and Greek Cypriots in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot nationalism
was developed as “counter-nationalism since the beginning, which means it was formed as a
response of enosis” (Kızılyürek, 2005, p. 230). As Loizides (2007) states, “in the case of
Turkish Cypriots, nationalism has been driven by reaction to Greek Cypriot demands,
insecurity, and fears of marginalization” (p, 174). Although the Turkish nationalism began a
bit later than the Greeks nationalism, “the more urbanized nature of Turkish Cypriot society –
compared to the Greek Cypriots – ensured that the Turkish Cypriots were able to organize
quickly and put forward national demands once they felt that Greek Cypriot national
demands might lead to enosis” (Morag, 2004, p. 600). As a result, the nationalist feelings of
the Turkish community on the island were identified against Greeks and their national
ideology enosis.
As ethnic groups became closer to their motherlands by adopting all reformations and
developing rival movements against each other, the British were still struggling against the
development of national movements of ethnic groups on the island. However, after repressive
measures were taken in 1931, when the British power realized that schools of Turkish people
and Greeks had become an instrument of spreading nationalism toward inhabitants, the
administration seized the educational system and made both communities use the British
educational system until 1950s. Basically, the British rule saw the coming danger and
“decided to get full control over Cypriot Turks” and over Cypriot Greeks “to assimilate them

95

by imposing the ‘Cypriotism’ in order to serve its self-interest on the island” (Temiz, 2009).
The main idea of the British was to create a new common identity based on geographical
location of the island in order to prevent the development of separate national identities
depending on their blood, states Temiz (2009). Interestingly, even though the British were
using its “divide and rule” colonial policy in order to separate the two major communities, the
British decided to create a geographical location based upon an upper identity to impose
inhabitants of the island to “mark the difference between inside and outside” of the island and
to prevent the construction of primordial identity with the motherlands to safeguard the
British place on Cyprus (Giesen, 1998, p.13). Eventually, the British were trying to create a
collective identity to impose upon Turkish and Greek Cypriots in order to destroy their
primordial-based identity with their motherlands, as both started seeing themselves ethnically
and historically tied with their motherlands of Turkey and Greece.
A short while after the 1931 uprising against the British administration, the British
gradually began allowing the two major communities to install their own political parties
after the British realized the impending danger of a potential revolt by the two communities.
This proved be a mistake, as both the right and left wing parties of the Greek community
strongly supported the idea of enosis, which was developed at the level of anti-colonialism.
Subsequently, the Greeks started fighting for their self-determined rights to achieve their
mission of enosis.
According to Kızılyürek, “The British helped Turkish Cypriots to install an
organization which was called the Turkish Minority of the island of Cyprus (known as
KATAK) in 1943” (Kızılyürek, 2005b, p. 224). The organization of KATAK was the first
Turkish organization that was established against enosis on the island. Although the British
and the traditional group of Turkish Cypriots were against the elite Turkish Cypriots, all of
them stood on the same side since the enosis was in question. During those years, the British
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realized the potential danger of Greek attacks and began negotiations with Turkey to get their
attention toward nationalist attacks in order to secure the British position on the island.
According to the British, the involvement of Turkey in the Cyprus problem was significantly
important to be able to prevent Greek Cypriots from achieving their mission of unification
with Greece at that time. For this reason, the British administration started “Cyprus
Lobbying” in Turkey in order to persuade Turkey to help Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek,
2005b, p. 233). While they were lobbying with Turkey, the British were continuously trying
to create more trouble between the ethnic groups of the island on the basis of British colonial
policy. Although the British were showing the world that they were the mediator of the
Cyprus case, they were actually trying to provoke inhabitants against each other. Along with
this negative progress against Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, Turkey decided to jump into the
Cyprus problem in order to protect Turkish Cypriots rights on the island in the 1950s. The
effort of intellectual Turkish Cypriots cannot be ignored in convincing Turkey to adopt their
positions, “which allowed them in turn to gain almost complete dominance within their
community” (Lacher, 2006, para. 35). Immediately after the announcement of the Turkish
decision on the island to assist the Turkish Cypriots, the British arranged a meeting with
Turkey and Greece to fix the current problem of the conflicts in the communities between
themselves and against the British. However, the Greek Church of Cyprus was not satisfied
with the involvement of Turkey in the Cyprus problem because, according to them, Turkey
could have been a visible obstacle to the issue of enosis.
Also, being a member of NATO in the 1950s was another reason for Turkey to
involve itself in the Cyprus problem and to help Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 2005b). Along
with the decision of Turkey to become involved in the Cyprus problem, Turkey drew a new
political strategy for the island. Dependent upon the new political strategy on Cyprus, Turkey
immediately began provoking Turkish Cypriots against Greek Cypriots by organizing them
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more carefully than before. Moreover, all this progress on the island proved to be a strong
attachment to the motherland simply because of the “perceptions of common origin and
history with Turkey or Greece have been instrumental in mobilizing each community in favor
of competing nationalist projects” (Loizides, 2007, p. 174). The competition-based nationalist
projects on the island caused an enormous problem for the future of both communities on the
island because these projects created barriers to reconciliation. After the development of rival
nationalist movements, the settlement of the peaceful atmosphere on the island became very
difficult. The British were trying to find a common way to reconcile the two communities in
order to secure its position on the island. Therefore, Britain invited both Greece and Turkey
to the Conference of London to reconcile them; however, none of the British offers on the
conference satisfied either Turkey or Greece. As Greece was still insisting on achieving
enosis, Turkey was insisting “that Cyprus should remain under Britain or revert to Turkey”
but not become a part of Greece (Richmond, 1999, p. 41). As a result, “The first ever violent
confrontation between us (Turkish and Greek, NM) took place under the British in 1956”
(Papadakis, 2005, p. 65).
In 1956, while the negotiations between Britain and Turkey were continuing,
“Taksim” (the Turkish Cypriot political belief that was developed against enosis) was
suggested by Britain. This suggestion was placed as a national Turkish political belief in the
Cyprus issue. When Turkey officially became a part of the Cyprus dispute in the late 1950s,
“…aid from Turkey for the organization of a Turkish Cypriot underground organization was
provided. This was named Volkan, subsequently to become The Turkish Resistance
Organization (TMT)” (Attalides, 2003, p. 47, 48), because “Turkish Cypriots opposed this
(EOKA, NM), asking for the partition -- Taksim -- of Cyprus, and set up their own fighter’s
organization called TMT” (Papadakis, 2005, p. 39). Basically, “TMT…existed as the Turkish
Cypriots Counter part of EOKA” (Attalides, 2003, p. 48). The organization of TMT became
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“a barrier to the Greeks’ national aims” (Attalides, 2003, p. 41). The new slogan of TMT was
“either division of the island or death.” After the establishment of the Turkish organization,
tensions became very high among both communities and Greek attacks were turned toward
Turkish Cypriots. More specifically, nationalist Greeks attacked mixed villages where
Turkish and Greek Cypriots were living together. After the problem turned violent, Turkish
Cypriots gradually started leaving the mixed villages. As is clearly seen, both ethnic
communities were organizing themselves “at different points in the political dialog” for their
struggle against others and were developing new organizations against each other.
Eventually, the violence conflict broke down (Richmond, 1999, p. 41). Obviously, while the
Cyprus conflict created internal tensions, it also revived tensions on an international level,
particularly between Greece and Turkey.
As a part of the conflicting nationalist projects of Greece and Turkey, the irredentist
ideology of the motherlands expanded, which resulted in violent conflicts between Turkish
and Greek Cypriots on the island. Additionally, while Turkish Cypriots were organizing
themselves against the Greek Cypriots’ national movements, their national feelings were
determined by the concept of “others” not “us” (Kızılyürek, 2005a). The meaning of “others”
was Hellenic Nationalism and Greek Cypriots who were politically against them. As a result,
Turkish Cypriot nationalism was shaped as contra-nationalism in order to respond to Greek
nationalism instead of developing itself to serve Turkish self-interests. Considering “enosis
(as) an additional guarantee against the expansionist intentions of a reviving Turkey,”
nationalist Turkish Cypriots took the nationalist Greek Cypriots actions as an opportunity to
create a contra-nationalist movement against them (Richmond, 1999, p. 41).
Parallel to this progress on the island, Turkey and some of the Turkish Cypriot
intellectuals who became extremely nationalist, started giving Turkish names to villages
where Turkish Cypriots lived separately from Greek Cypriots and also began giving Turkish
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names to the Turkish shops. Besides these changes, Turkish Cypriots were prohibited from
being in a trade relationship with any of the Greek Cypriots and were also prohibited from
building a friendship with them. What they were trying to do was to create a socially ethnic
separation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Overall, after Turkish nationalism was built
and planted as a national idea of Turkish Cypriots, Turkish belief systems were transformed
from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey and concentrated on Turkish
nationalism.
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Chapter Five: 1960 Republic of Cyprus
Cyprus has been ruled by many empires and colonial powers during its
history; however, it has never ruled itself until the Republic of Cyprus which was
established in 1960. To a greater extent, during the last couple of centuries, the
inhabitants of the island -- Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots -- were first led first
by the traditional Ottoman Empire from 1571 to 1878, and then second, by the
modern British colonial power from 1878 to 1959 until it became the Republic of
Cyprus, in which inhabitants of the island had an opportunity to rule themselves
regardless of third parties and which was established in 1960 in order to build a
peaceful environment to prevent any kind of conflict.
Until the republic was established in 1960, inhabitants witnessed many
conflicts, particularly under the British administration, because it was one of the
major European colonial powers that imposed its own nationalist world-view toward
its colonial states (Attalides 2003, p. 22). After the tension and violence had gradually
increased, giving a signal of danger to the British during its administration on the
island, the British decided to build a new state on the island in order to change the
course of the events and to prevent nationalist movements on the island before
incurring any damages. Following the idea of the British, a new plan was prepared
and offered to the motherlands of Greece and Turkey in order to create the fourth
country to find a middle course for the island’s future and also to find a way to secure
their own self-interests on the island. Additionally, Kızılyürek (2005b) claims that the
three members of NATO, with cooperation from Turkish and Greek Cypriots, created
the fourth country to keep their friendship in peace between each other, as well.
According to the plan of building a new state in order to secure the British, all
of the parties, including Turkish and Greek Cypriots, the British, Turkey and Greece
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were supposed to be a part of the plan because all of them were already involved in
the Cyprus problem. Therefore, two representatives from the motherlands of Greece
and Turkey discussed and signed the plan after a long negotiation period and came out
with three major agreements -- (Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, the
Guarantor of the Alliance Agreement, and the treaty of alliance) -- at the end of 1959
in Zurich. Finally, Turkey, Greece and Britain, who were members of NATO,
announced the establishment of the “independent” state on the island, which was
going to be declared the Republic of Cyprus in 1960.
In 1960, the Treaty of Zurich and London was signed by Turkey and Greece,
and after the United Kingdom, Turkish Cypriots, and Greek Cypriots representatives
also approved of these agreements, the Republic of Cyprus was established. Thus, the
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots dominated a bi-communal society by August 16,
1960 (Joseph, 1997). The island, under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, officially
became an independent state that was built as “a power sharing model” and that
“received almost universal international recognition” (Zink, 2008, p. 589; James,
1989, p. 483). Turkey, Greece, and the UK became guarantor countries of the
Republic of Cyprus along with the Treaty of Guarantee by which they were
responsible of the sovereignty of the island. Evidently, the Treaty of Guarantee
provided these three guarantor countries the “right to intervene militarily in Cyprus to
prevent any abrogation of the constitution or a fundamental change in the status quo”
(Morag, 2004, p. 615). Bülent Ecevit (the prime minister of Turkey at that time)
interpreted the new state of Republic of Cyprus in the following way;
… the continuity, peace and security of the independent republic of
Cyprus thoroughly depended on the relationship between the Turkish
and Greek communities in the island, and also depended on the
friendly relationship between three guarantor countries, Turkey,
Greece and the United Kingdom. (cited in Kızılyürek, 2005b).
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As Ecevit stated, the fourth state was founded to create a peaceful atmosphere
to provide a secure environment for inhabitants of the island and to build a good
relationship between the three guarantors, which was very important to ensure the
safety of the new state and the surrounding of the island. However, although the
fourth state was also created in order to serve all of the guarantors’ self-interests and
to prevent conflict on the island and in the Mediterranean, the visible peace survived
only three years in Cyprus.
Along with the new-born state, a new constitution was also created in order to
serve the common will of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. According to the new
constitution of Cyprus, “in the executive branch, the political framework of the bicommunal republic provided for a presidential regime, the president Greek Cypriot
and the vice-president Turkish Cypriot, elected by separately by the two
communities” (Joseph, 1997, p. 77). Under the constitution of the new-born republic,
the administration was dependent upon a ratio of 70% - 30% Greek and Turkish on
the island. According to the rate of the population of ethnic communities, seven Greek
and three Turkish ministers were to be elected for the new legislative council of the
republic as a way to protect Turkish Cypriots right under the republic; however, this
was like a “dual authority polities,” which easily creates a dispute among ethnic
groups who are on the coalition, particularly if both ethnic groups were intended to
have opponent ethnic nationalism (Horowitz, 1982, p. 345). Under the compromise of
the new constitution of the new republic, “Cyprus was to be independent and
sovereign, allied to Greece, and Turkey but not to NATO. The Republic of Cyprus
was enjoined to fore-go both union (enosis) with Greece and partition (taksim)
between Greece and Turkey” (Camp, 1980, p. 47). As Kızılyürek (2008) asserts, the
new republic inhibited the ideology of enosis and gave equal rights to both
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communities. On the other hand, as Lindley claims, the main reason for excluding
enosis and taksim was because these underlay the conflict in Cyprus and could create
problems by the merging of churches, school/education, and politics in a divisive and
nationalistic way (Lindley, 2007, p. 229). In addition, Turkish and Greek languages
were also added into the new constitution as national languages.
After the announcement of the independence of Cyprus in 1960, the
constructed common environment for both communities could not stay in peace for
long because Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not satisfied with the situation of the
establishment of the federation and, especially, sharing the state equally with other
groups, which did not fully meet with their expectations. “The Greek Cypriot
leadership under the new Republic’s president, Archbishop Makarios, was extremely
unhappy with the structure of the government as it gave the Turkish Cypriots almost
unlimited veto powers over any significant legislation or policy sponsored by the
Greek Cypriot community” (Morag, 2004, p. 617). Eventually, “It was inevitable that
the Greek Cypriots would maneuver to gain majority rights and the Turkish Cypriot
side would follow in order to defend itself from minority abuse” (Richmond, 1999, p.
43). On the other hand, in addition to the dissatisfaction of the creation of the state
and equal power sharing with Turkish Cypriots, a civil war in the Greek community
was started between nationalist wings who totally disagreed with the establishment of
the new independent state, and president Makarios and his followers who signed the
agreements of the new state. The new situation in Greece brought conflict within the
Greek community and divided them into two sides. Basically, the new independent
state brought a complex system on the island rather than peace.
In many cases, the result of the transition from multi-ethnic and multireligious traditional society to modern society generates a “common will” on the basis
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of the political and social transformations within and between communities.
Nevertheless, in the Cyprus case, the results demonstrate that the establishment of the
Republic of Cyprus underlined two distinctly separate national ideologies and
generated two separate national consciousnesses into conflict instead of constituting
the “common will” under the same roof of the republic between two ethnic groups -Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Also, the establishment of the new state created civil war
within the Greek community. Kızılyürek (2005b) explains the situation in one of his
studies as the fact that modernization could not arrive at an arrangement between the
two communities in Cyprus; still, the modernization brought nationalism and also
created ethnic conflict between the two communities of Cyprus. On the other hand, as
a result of modernization, the socioeconomic differences significantly increased
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots after the declaration of the new republic in 1960.
Along with the unequal environment on the island, both communities continued
sharing the administration of the new republic for a couple of years without violent
actions. The peaceful environment on the island only served the self-interests of
Britain, Turkey and the USA, because any possible problems on the island in these
years would have definitely run against those interests. Another visible danger was
the possibility of creating a war between two NATO members -- Turkey and Greece - if problems appeared between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. For this reason, the
new constitution was prohibited, giving the Greeks their self-determination rights and
allowing them to put enosis into effect in order to achieve their mission. Another
possible danger might have been “a much wider conflict in the eastern
Mediterranean” (Richmond, 1999, p. 43). In order to prevent all these possibilities,
the constitution of the new state provided rights to interference for the guarantors to
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temporarily stop the conflict between the two major communities and provide the
peace on the island.
Nevertheless, Turkish and Greek Cypriots only co-existed in peace for just
three years under the independent state. One of the main reasons was that each
community wanted to get more advantages from the new state. “For the Turkish
Cypriot side, their task now became one of retaining their extra privileges. For the
Greek Cypriot side, their task now became one of reducing and destroying the
perceived circumscription of their sovereignty and allowing the will of the majority to
come to fruition” (Richmond, 1999, p. 42). The Greek Cypriot community had never
been satisfied with sharing administrative power with the Turkish Cypriot community
because Greeks saw themselves as a majority who had the right to take more
advantages from the republic, whereas Turkish Cypriots were a minority group of the
island. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots believed they had the right to gain
equality from the new state because they were also owners of the land. Considering
that Greek Cypriots had been dreaming of the unification with Greece since the
nineteenth century, living in and sharing the same state with Turkish Cypriots would
not satisfy them. Being “forced to live with Turkish Cypriot under the Republic of
Cyprus instead of living with their agnates” paved the way for extreme
disappointment within Greek Cypriot community (Kızılyürek, 2005a, p. 103). In sum,
then “due in part to the high degree of sociocultural segregation and mistrust between
the communities, neither a common sense of nationhood nor a shared acceptance of
the legitimacy of state authority emerged” (Zink, 2008, p. 592). Basically, the power
sharing administration of the new state between two communities who were
sociocultural separated “failed to defuse intercommunal tension” on the island (Ibid).
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Even though the state constitution abolished the nationalist movements of both
communities, the Cyprus problem had never disappeared within the Greek Cypriot
community and continued even after the establishment of the republic in 1960 until
the outbreak of conflict in 1963. Obviously, “all political leaders among the Greek
Cypriots considered the 1960 form of independence as a temporary arrangement”
(Attalides, 2003, p. 120). For this reason, Greek Cypriots tolerated sharing equal
rights with Turkish Cypriots in regard to the independent state for only three years
before they put forth an action-oriented struggle in order to achieve enosis.
Although Greek Cypriots deprecated the new state and continued to importune
the unification with Greece by following Hellenic nationalism, as Kızılyürek (2005a)
noted, the new state was a symbol of failure of the Hellene national movements in
Cyprus. Even though independent state in Cyprus became very weak in the front of
the symbolic meaning of nationalism and represented the failure of the Hellene
national movement, president Makarios was planning to abolish all agreements in five
years and implement self-determination rights in order to achieve the Greek Cypriot
mission (Kızılyürek, 2005a). Following the plan of Makarios violence shortly began
against the Turkish Cypriot community, during which unrest between both societies
started again. At the same time, there was ongoing civil war between the right and the
left wings of the Greek community. However, Republic of Cyprus President Makarios
had not given up planning to make the island as a part of Greece, in spite of different
opinions in the Greek community. Eventually, President Makarios’ ambition was to
take advantage of the proclamation of the republic. In order to succeed in enosis,
Makarios proposed to change “thirteen points” from the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus
(Camp; 1980, p. 49). Regardless, this proposal was one-sided because “president
Makarios, rather than talking with the Turks, made the proposals public and
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concurrently tried to gain international support” (Kaloudis, 1999, p. 8). As a result of
this one-sided proposal, the Turkish Cypriot side of the republic, Turkey and the
United Kingdom, rejected the proposal of Makarios, because all thirteen proposals
were determined to “ … end the power of the Turkish-Cypriots minority to block
action desired by the Greek-Cypriot majority, including the abolition of majorities in
both Greek and Turkish sides of the legislatures, the abolition of separate judicial
systems for the two groups, the elimination of separate city governments in the five
major towns, and the elimination of the veto power of the Turkish-Cypriot vicepresident” (Camp, 1980, p. 49-50). Basically, Makarios was planning to achieve the
idea of enosis legally, by keeping Turkey out of the island and pushing Turkish
Cypriots out from the administration of the republic by proposing these thirteen points
(Camp, 1980; Attalides, 2003).
Additionally, following these tensions on the island, as James (1989) claims,
“in November 1963, the (Greek Cypriot) President Makarios announced a plan for its
amendment which resulted in the withdrawal (or as the Turkish Cypriots say, the
exclusion) of Turkish Cypriots from all governmental arrangements” (p. 2). In
December, problems developed and created more racial and cultural issues against
Turkish Cypriots on the island. Basically, “The nationalism of the two ethnic groups
naturally fed each other. The leaders planned for the time when the Republic would
break down and there would be a free-for–all for territory that would became Greek
on Turkish” (Attalides, 2003, p. 55). The outbreak of hostilities in December 1963
brought about a complete breakdown of inter-communal relations and a process of the
physical separation of the Turkish and Greek communities began (Joseph, 1997, p.
78). Thus, at the end of 1963, the Republic of Cyprus was abolished by the Greeks.
The state of Cyprus only lasted three years without any visible problems until the
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proposal was reported; evidently, the two communities were waiting for the right time
to express their political feelings on the island (Kızılyürek, 2005a). After their victory
over the Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Greece started work on abolishing the
London and Zurich agreements. Finally, after campaigning to abolish these
agreements, both agreements were announced as abrogated by President Makarios in
1964. This was the second victory for Greek Cypriots to achieve the elimination of
barriers for enosis; the Greek community has been in force as the only real
representative of the 1960 constitution and continue to be recognized internationally
as if they were the only representatives of the republic.
Following these events on the island, the tension became more dangerous for
both societies. According to the constitution, both guarantor countries, Turkey and
Greece, were supposed to avoid conflict on the island on any level between Turkish
and Greek Cypriots, but they could not succeed at maintaining peace between them.
“On March 4, 1964, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186, by which it
recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) (The International Debates, 2005, p. 70) and “the UNFICYP was
deployed on March” 27, 1964” (Lindley, 2007, p. 230). The United Nations
Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) was deployed to prevent any intrusions onto the
island. According to the UN charter as a mediator, “states do not want the states
system to be broken up, and so the best the mediator can do is get parties themselves
to agree to a modification of sovereignty and a lessening of demands for ethnic selfdetermination” (Richmond, 1999, p. 49). Eventually, in order to prevent the problem
among the two ethnic communities, the United Nations had a debate and declared a
mandate. This mandate of UNFICYP was originally defined in the following terms:
in the interest of preserving international peace and security,
to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and,
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as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration
of law and order and a return to normal conditions.
(The Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public
Information, as cited in the International Debates, 2005, p. 70)
According to the International Debate (2005), the mandate goal was to
confront both societies, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, in 1964, and was
extended by the Security Council to try to “build a negotiating culture” on the island
to solve the problems (Richmond, 1999, p. 49). For this reason, “The basic U.N.
strategy for dealing with Cyprus has been to stabilize the existing situation with its
peacekeeping force while urging the two sides to settle their differences” (Loizides,
2007, p. 62). Although the UN military was settled on the island in order to convince
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to settle on “a mutually acceptable agreement”
in order to build a peaceful environment on the island, the crisis was still continuing
to increase (Richmond, 1999, p. 50). Evidently, “conflicts involving ethnic groups
have always been difficult to resolve, and the Cyprus dispute is no exception”
(Kaloudis, 1999, p. 4).
The high tensions over Cyprus after 1963 created a geographical separation
between the two ethnic groups. After the physical separation started, Turkish Cypriots
moved onto a small part of the island from 1963 until 1974 when the partition was
completed by the Turkish military. To put it another way, “The Turkish Cypriot
leadership and public servants withdrew from the government and began setting up a
separate administration” (Joseph, 1997, p. 78). Along with nationalist feelings after
the beginning of the enclave period, “the Turkish Cypriots began giving Turkish
names to their villages where the control was in Turkish Cypriots hands. After the
invasion of 1974, they replaced Greek symbols and monuments with Turkish ones in
the part of Cyprus that they controlled” (Morag, 2004, p. 607). Indeed, it is highly
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likely that ethnonationalism played a very important role in creating the irredentist
struggle between the two communities on the basis of their motherlands’ irredentist
policies and led them to become enemies. Ethnonationalism, in turn, paved the way
for the ethnic and geographical separation first in 1963 and again in 1974.
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Chapter Six: 1963 – 1974 Nationalism in Cyprus
The unequal distribution of values and resources including economic, political,
sociocultural activities, social organizations and social classes or groups in a society
could cause structural devolution and conflict between two or more ethnic groups
with regard to their self-interests. In the Cyprus case, the different values and needs of
each ethnic group of the island led to the structural separation and high level conflict
on the basis of ethno-nationalism during the history of Turkish and Greek Cypriots on
the island. The incompatibility between institutions and different ethnic backgrounds
of both groups on the island resulted in the creation of different sociocultural
structures that could not succeed in creating a peaceful environment between Turkish
and Greek Cypriots on the island. The result of having different interests by two
major ethnic groups of the island paved the way for the high level of violent conflict
which ended with a demographic and geographic partition in 1974. No one could
prevent this result, although three guarantors -- Britain, Turkey and Greece -- were
involved in the Cyprus case to restore the peace and order on the island. Besides these
three powers, as Morag (2004) states, the United States and the Soviet Union also
became involved after the Cold War to solve the Cyprus problem. As Morag claims,
“The course of the national conflict on Cyprus has been intimately connected both
with the fact that nationalism in Cyprus was imported from the respective mainlands
and the fact that the island has had great geo-strategic significance -- not only for
Greece, Turkey, and Britain but for the United States and the Soviet Union as well”
(Morag, 2004, p. 618). In view of the United States’ self-interest, the U.S. involved
itself in the Cyprus problem to benefit from the situation by trying to solve it because
“the oil problem and the burgeoning Middle East crisis, the need to reconcile the
NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, or at least to avoid the worst outcome -- the
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neutralization of both as reliable bases” all increased Cyprus’ “locational importance”
and created US interest over the island (Attalides, 2003, p. 138). As Morag (2004)
stresses, the hidden reason for third parties to involve themselves in the Cyprus
problem was to prevent the possible war between two NATO allies (Turkey and
Greece NM). Obviously, interests of other powers during that period were mostly to
own the island; however, the U.S. had different attitudes regarding Cyprus, and the
involvement of the U.S. in the Cyprus dispute never turned into an action. The
importance of the Mediterranean to the U.S. drew the island’s importance to a high
level for the U.S and made the U.S. get involved. Basically, the aims of the U.S. were:
1. To maintain naval superiority over the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean.
2. To strengthen NATO militarily and politically, including the “border” allies:
Greece and Turkey.
3. To encourage Yugoslavia’s military and political independence from the Soviet
Union.
4. To protect and strengthen Israel as a western outpost in the Middle East and to
counter the Soviet presence in some Arab states.
5. To contain and reduce Soviet influence with states of the region (Cited in
Attalides, 2003, p. 149).
Despite the fact that the island was very small, it was strategically important
for the world. Therefore, these countries were involved in the Cyprus dispute and
caused the nationalist struggle among Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island rather
than establishing a peaceful environment among both ethnic groups. According to
Morag (2004):
The external aspect of the Cypriot conflict thus had two components.
The first is nationalist and emotional and has to do with domestic
politics within Greece and Turkey – which were affected by the plight
of their respective compatriots in Cyprus. The second components has
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to do with considerations of international Realpolitik – that is to say,
the geo-strategic value of the island both in the context of the ongoing
tension and hostility between Greece and Turkey, and in the context of
the Cold War. (p. 618).

The solution that all parties, including the U.S., arrived at was to create a new
state on the island where both ethnic groups and their motherlands, Turkey and
Greece, could all be satisfied. In order to prevent the stated aims of the U.S. and to
serve third parties’ interests, the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 established a new
constitution, even though the Republic of Cyprus was not expected to have a long life
by the powers which were involved.
The 1960 Constitution proved its inadequacy within three years after the
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and “highlights the inter-ethnic violence that
did exist between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots between 1957 and 1974, and
correctly identifies the Greek Cypriot pursuit of first enosis, and letter of a
majoritarian political system as crucial to the inter-ethnic conflict on the island, it too
remains self-serving” (Lacher, 2006, para. 19). As Attalides (2003) states, “That is
why the inter-communal conflicts of 1963 – 1967 are probably the most tragic events
in the history of Cyprus” (p. 90). Briefly, the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of
Cyprus failed because Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots failed in ruling the
power-shared state. The main reason for this was that both could not succeed in
creating a common will to develop a peaceful environment, regardless of creating an
environment without fear and anxiety on the island. It is often said that this instability
of the post-colonial state brought ethnic conflict to high levels on the island and
promoted the two rival ethnic identities that tended to provide two different national
interests shaped by the motherlands’ nationalism between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots. Furthermore, the new unstable position of the land resulted in unavoidable
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separations, first in 1963 and later in 1974, which came into existence by an inability
to construct a common will for the shared state and for the future of the island.
Basically, a lack of common will of both communities destroyed the newly
established state in 1963 and never succeeded in developing any peaceful
environment, meaning that the “two communities in a failing consociation democracy
believed that the other community was intent on gaining more powers and therefore
turned to their motherlands for support” (Richmond, 1999, p. 43). According to
Morag, “This was especially true of the Turkish Cypriots who, lacking the economic,
political, and international resources if the Republic of Cyprus, were forced to be
completely dependent on Turkey” (Morag, 2004, p. 619).
When the Cyprus dispute broke out into a violent conflict in 1963, the way
that nationalist Greek Cypriots followed in order to achieve their self-interests drew
the island’s fate. In order to achieve their aim by 1963, one wing of Cyprus
government, the Greek Cypriots, prepared a new plan called the “Akritas Plan” for
weakening the other wing of the government, the Turkish Cypriots, and to unite with
Greece. The action-based new plan was required to destabilize the Republic of Cyprus
and abolish the new constitution and finally unite with Greece. Along with the new
plan, the Greek Cypriot community wanted to prove that the Cyprus problem would
have always existed even though the Republic of Cyprus was created in order to solve
it. The Akritas Plan was supported by a Greek organization, which was against the
possible peace with leftist AKEL (left wing Greek political party) and the Turkish
Cypriot community. The main reason for developing rival movements against AKEL
by the right wing of the Greek Cypriot community was because AKEL supported
peace with the Turkish Cypriots and followed different political thoughts than the
right wing of the Greek Cypriots. Although, the strategy of AKEL was changed after
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the 1940s and stood for statements of nationalism, the right wing of the Greeks had
never accepted them as an indicator of their nationalist struggle regarding the Cyprus
predicament.
The way that right wing Greeks chose to put their plan into practice made
Turkish Cypriots leave the administrative position of the state and forced them to
move out from the mixed villages where Turkish and Greek Cypriots had lived
together until 1963 through enclaves. As Morag (2004) states, the “Enclave Period,”
which means “the island was de facto partitioned into Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot areas – each with its own political leadership and administration,” was started
right after the problems turned violent between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the
middle of the twentieth century (p. 601). Besides political assumptions, the enclave
period was the first step of social and geographic ethnic separation between Turkish
and Greek Cypriots. As Lacher asserts, “So the return of inter-ethnic violence in 1964
finally saw the large-scale relocation of the Turkish Cypriot into such enclaves”
(Lacher, 2006, para.36). At the inter-communal level, nationalist struggles of both
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots culminated in violence starting from the enclave
period. Basically, the “enclave period,” as Volkan (1979) said, was a solid trauma to
the Cypriot Turks when they were obligated to live in enclaves starting in 1963-1964.
Most of the Cypriot Turks became refugees during this time, a period which lasted for
eleven years. According to Volkan (2008), the enclave period of the Turkish Cypriots
could be divided into two main periods, which were:
1. First period (1963-1968): “Cypriot Turks were virtually imprisoned in the enclaves,
which covered only three percent of the island.”
2. Second period (1968 and the summer of 1974): “They were “allowed” to move out
of them and pass through the Cypriot Greek territory to visit other enclaves. Still
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the land they were forced to flee to in 1963-1964 was not available to them for
resettlement (Cited Volkan, 2008, para. 6).
After the start of the enclave period, the number of mixed villages had been
gradually reduced year by year until the partition in 1974. As is seen in Table 3, the
number of mixed villages in the late 1970s when the British arrived on the island was
at 43 percent, which was the highest ratio of mixed villages on the island compared to
the historical stages of the island from the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, along
with the start of the enclave period, as is shown in Table 3, the number of mixed
villages in the late 1900s was at %10. The ratio of ethnic demography in the mixed
villages of the island had been gradually diminished in line with the growth of the
Greek villages, particularly starting from the British Empire period. As a result, along
with the enclave period, the ratio of mixed villages had been replaced with separated
villages.

Table 3: Ethnic - based Demographic Segregation
Year Mixed Villages GC Villages TC Villages #Villages %Mixed %GC

%TC

1891

346

342

114

802

43

43

14

1931

252

358

84

694

36

52

12

1960

114

392

117

623

18

63

19

1970

48

444

11

503

10

88

2

*Cited in Lindsey, 2007 p: 231
[GC, Greek Cypriots; TC, Turkish Cypriots]

Recent situations, including the result of the bloody violence in 1963 during
which “soon after the beginning of the conflict the Government of Cyprus fell
exclusively in to Greek Cypriot hands” and starting with the “Enclave period,”
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provided satisfaction among the Greek Cypriots community in the 1960s (Morag,
2004, p. 620). When the Greek Cypriots achieved full administration rights of the
Republic of Cyprus, they brought it to the international level as if they were
succeeding in ruling the state since the beginning of its establishment. However, after
the Turkish Cypriots’ movements through enclaves, “1.6% of the area of the new state
started being under control of the ‘Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration’ and
contained almost half of the Turkish Cypriot population under its control” (Attalides,
2003, p. 33). Additionally, “conditions inside the Turkish Cypriot enclaves had indeed
been very bad but this had had the effect of making the Turkish Cypriots increasingly
dependent on Turkey for economic aid thus strengthening their separate identity,”
which opened a new page of problems for the Turkish Cypriots (Morag, 2004, p.
602).
As Kızılyürek (2005a) asserts, the same year that the U.S. and the Soviet
Union became involved in the Cyprus problem, the Greek junta secretly came to the
island. Following this, the Greek Cypriots and Greece continuously proceeded step by
step to achieve their goal of enosis; however, the U.S., the United Nations and NATO
decided to find a way to solve the Cyprus dispute. They created a new plan which was
called the “Ancheson Plan” in 1964. Theoretically, this plan was offered for Cyprus to
make two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, create an agreement in order to keep
Cyprus secure from the West. Although Turkey and Turkish Cypriots agreed with the
plan, Greece and Greek Cypriots were not satisfied with it. This plan even brought
different opinions into the Greek Cypriot community; while one side of the Greeks
who were supporters of enosis stood against the Ancheson Plan, others sympathized
with the plan and agreed to give a small portion of land to Turkey (Kızılyürek,
2005a).
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Although there had been some ongoing negotiations for building a peaceful
environment on the island, high levels of violent conflict on the island emerged
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1960s. The reason for this intense conflict on
the island was that the military of Greece tried to conquer the island and confiscated
the administration of the Republic of Cyprus. While “the biggest crisis [was]
occurring in 1967,” “Turkey almost invaded” the island to prevent the violent conflict
in which Turkish Cypriots became the subject of the context (Lindley, 2007, p. 230).
Although Turkey’s plan was to enter Cyprus and find a solution for the military coup
of Greece in order to prevent the violent conflict against Turkish Cypriots, the U.S.
did not allow Turkey to do so during the 1967 crisis (Camp, 1980). In addition to the
U.S. force on Turkey and Greece, Turkey put some conditions before Greece with
regards to not entering onto the island. Greece accepted all of Turkey’s conditions
and, as Kızılyürek (2005a) noted, the Greek army and their leader Grivas left the
island and went back to Greece.
After stopping the biggest crisis in 1967, the negotiations between both
communities started once again in 1968; however, no solutions could be reached to
eliminate the current situation of the island. Ethno-nationalism inhibited the
negotiations with regard to drawing the tension higher between Turkish and Greek
Cypriots regardless of creating a peaceful environment on the island. Although Greek
Cypriots were losing their prestige in front of the West by paving the way for
difficulties on negotiations, President Makarios did not want to compromise with the
Turkish Cypriots. Because of negative moves by Makarios, two NATO allies, one
from Turkey and one from Greece, were invited as representatives for negotiations in
order to find a way to put both ethnic communities under the same state of peace. No
agreement, however, could be reached.
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While negotiations were in progress during this time, Makarios and Atina
started developing different ideologies for the island. Hence, the nationalist movement
of Greek Cypriots changed its route through different methods. By extension,
Makarios as a president embraced the Republic of Cyprus and decided to fight for the
republic in order to make the island “a Greek Cypriot dominated Cyprus” on the basis
of ethno nationalism (Vural and Peristanis, 2008, p. 4). Eventually, “the forcible
removal of the democracy in Greece made enosis a much less attractive ideal” for the
Greek Cypriot community and made them embrace the republic in order to fight for
their political aims (Richmond, 1999, p. 44). All of these unexpected results in the
Greek Cypriot community led to incompatibility with the interests of Makarios. From
this point of view, it is obvious that enosis was gradually coming to the end instead of
succeeding.
One of the main reasons for discarding enosis was to become divided on a
question with Greece and the U.S. with regards to having different interests for the
island. The meaning of leaving enosis and embracing the Republic of Cyprus was still
covered to exclude Turkish Cypriots from the government of the republic. Thereupon,
Greece, with the U.S.’s secret hand, decided to assassinate Makarios because he was
against any kind of agreements with Turkey and Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek,
2005a). While this progress was ongoing around Cyprus, however, General Grivas
went back to the island in order to establish a new organization, which was called
EOKA B to struggle against Turkish Cypriots and to achieve enosis. By that time,
Greece realized how the island was geographically important as a military base for its
own interests. As a result, “Greece engineered a coup d’etat against Makarios led by
Nikos Sampson and the National Guard, (and) a full-fledged enosis leader came to
power in Nicosia” which caused violence to arise on the island again in 1974 (Morag,
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2004, p. 620). The violence reached its highest level between the two communities
immediately after the intervention of Greece in 1974. This new situation brought
thousands of Greek troops into Cyprus (cited in Attalides, 2003, p. 17), soldiers who
were secretly transported by the Greek foreign minister to the island in July, 1974
(Ibid).
While the intervention of Greece was ongoing on the island, the Turkish Prime
Minister Bülent Ecevit was trying to “persuade the British Government to intervene
jointly in Cyprus, as guarantors; (however) the British Government refused”
(Attalides, 2003, p. 164). “Thus Turkey had objectives above and beyond those of the
Turkish Cypriot community, whose role now became one of finding a sufficient
reason to demand decisive Turkish intervention” (Richmond, 1999, p. 43). On the
20th of July, 1974, the Turkish military, as a guarantor country, brought its military
service onto the island to prevent the conflict and to protect Turkish Cypriots without
permission from third parties, including the UK and the U.S., because the Greek junta,
who had begun the bloody violence over Cyprus in 1974, were mistreating and killing
Turkish Cypriots. The unexpected Greek intervention to Cyprus was the cause of the
Turkish intervention on the 20th of July, which ended with a geographic and
demographic partition. Basically, “the coup and the invasion of the summer of 1974
represent a severe setback to the full decolonization of Cyprus. The setback was
administered by the two countries which had influence over political movements and
ideologies in Cyprus itself, that is, Greece and Turkey” (Attalides, 2003, p. 58).
Eventually, “this was a victory for the Turkish Cypriots, as this was the first time that
Turkey had taken unhindered and direct action on their behalf and much of their later
efforts were to be directed at preventing the withdrawal of Turkey from Cyprus”
(Richmond, 1999, p. 45). However, this case was the second reason that caused the
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Greek Cypriots to leave struggling for enosis and embracing the new state. The main
reason was that the intervention of Greece caused the unexpected Turkish
intervention, which ended with the partition in 1974. The Greek Cypriots were very
frustrated by the result of the 1974 clash of Greece, which changed the island’s fate.
The partition “was not only that the Turkish-Cypriots fled from their house
and property, but also from a bilingual society” (Özerk, 2001, p. 258). “In the eyes of
the Turkish-Cypriots the Greek language was no longer the language of neighbors; it
was now the language of enemies. This, of course, had consequences for the view of
the Turkish-Cypriot School Board on the use of Greek and any school issues
involving the Greek language” (Ibid). Also, “at the end no one won” but the partition
was done (Papadakis, 2005, p. 165). As Papadakis asserts, no one won anything in the
end; however, as a result of the partition, the island was divided demographically and
geographically into two main lands, including north and south, where immigration
forced communities to move from one region to another. Turkish immigrants who
were living in the southern part of the island were forced to move to the northern part
of the island where Turkish military gained control over the 37% of the north part of
the island and placed Turkish Cypriots and its military camps. Greek immigrants who
were living in northern part of the island were forced to move to the southern part of
the island where all Greeks were reunited under the republic. “In fact, the events of
1974 filled most Greek Cypriots with strong feelings of anger and anxiety about their
future” after the Turkish military was settled on the island (Loizides, 2007, p. 177).
When the Turkish Cypriots settled in the north part and developed a country,
called the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, it was recognized
only by Turkey. The Greek Cypriots settled on the south part of the island under the
Republic of Cyprus, which was recognized by the world. Unilateral declaration of the
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independent TRNC under the leadership of an instrumentalist leader was announced
as an independent state to keep political self-interests on the same level with the
Greek Cypriots who still had control over the Republic of Cyprus for possible
confederation (Walker, 2005). However, as Volkan states,

“

…in the end, when the

island was de facto divided into the northern Turkish and the southern Greek sections,
Cypriot Turks felt safe, due to the presence of the Turkish Military on the island” for
a while (Volkan, 2008).
Immediately after the demographic and geographic partition was completed,
“the UN Security Council had moved to call for a cease-fire” on the island (Attalides,
2003, p. 164). The ceasefire, between the 25th and 30th of July, was negotiated
between the Foreign Ministers of the guarantor powers, the United Kingdom, Turkey
and Greece, in Geneva by leading the Security Council in “agreeing to the
implementation of the cease-fire and for a return to constitutional normality in
Cyprus, as well as to the implementation of security Council Resolution 353 which
called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the island” (Attalides, 2003, p.
164). In July and August 1974, “the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions
that have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and have required the force to
perform certain additional functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the
ceasefire” (The International Debate, 2005, p. 70). After meeting in Geneva one more
time in August, it was not possible to put all these agreements into effect because the
ethno-nationalist debate between the groups was still continuing into communities in
the island. During the negotiations, the United Nations, Greece and Greek Cypriots
were on one side, and Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were on another in which they
stood against each other in spite of finding a way to solve the Cyprus problem.
“Following the de facto ceasefire, UNFICYP inspected the deployment of the Cyprus
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National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces, and ceasefire lines and a
buffer zone were established between the areas controlled by the opposing forces”
(The International Debate, 2005, p. 70). UNFICYP went to Cyprus simply “to help
the parties implement their wish to maintain peace” instead of setting “a position to
enforce the peace,” (James, 1989, p. 482). Overall, according to the International
Debates, since 1974, the UN secretariat and the representative of the Cyprus case
have been trying to find a formula that both sides --Turkish Cypriots and Greek
Cypriots-- can accept and sign for peace (The International Debate, 2005). However,
they have not arrived at any solutions since the partition occurred in 1974 and there is
still a cease-fire instead of a peace agreement on the island today. As Richmond
states, “Ethnonationalism was responsible and once again the international
community found it expedient not to take a clear stand, thus reducing the
effectiveness of peacemaking” (Richmond, 1999, p. 51).

The Greek Cypriot Society in Cyprus since 1974
While all these politically based negotiations had been in progress on the
island, there were some other ongoing issues within the ethnic communities of
Cyprus. Since 1974, besides the demographic and geographic separation of the island,
most things had also changed, including each community’s political aims and future
plans for the island and for themselves on the basis of time. To some extent, the Greek
Cypriots were fighting for implementation of their national movement called enosis
on the basis of Hellenic nationalism in order to unite with Greece. However, since the
partition in 1974, Hellenic nationalism was not answering the expectations of the
national struggle of the Greek Cypriots anymore. Thus, the Greek Cypriots moved
away from Hellenic nationalism and built up Greek Cypriot nationalism by
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identifying themselves with the independent state, the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover,
“the desire to fight for enosis began to wane in Cyprus, primarily because it was seen
as unattainable and risky, but also because Cypriots enjoyed more liberties, and a
better standard of living than mainland Greeks, not to mention full control of the state
apparatus” (Loizides, 2007, p. 183).
Regardless, the new process created a new form of nationalism on the basis of
dual opinion, which meant that the political left and right wings of the Greek
community developed two individual nationalist perspectives within the Greek
community (Kızılyürek, 2005a). One side that had been trying to be a part of Greece
left the action-oriented nationalism and moved through to the defensive nationalism
against the Turkish intervention and stood for “sending Turkish military back to
Turkey” in order “to get rid of Turkish invasion” (Ibid). Eventually, this group’s new
mission was to reunite both parts of the island, a mission which was called “Epan
Enosis.” According to Kızılyürek (2005a), that was an obligation that brought
disagreement in order to prevent the establishment of the federal state in Cyprus. The
other side stood for establishing “a federal state with Turkish Cypriot” by creating a
multicultural community on the island and governing it with Turkish Cypriots.
Obviously, the leftist side of the Greek Cypriots was persisting in developing “a postnationalist common vision” based on “the principle of federalism, bi-community, bizonality and political equality” whereas the right side was persisting in traditional
nationalist ideology of enosis (cited in Vural and Peristianis, 2008, p. 46). In the end,
the new national movement of the Greek Cypriots fundamentally made a claim and
adopted the Republic of Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2008) and Greek Cypriots adopted
‘Cypriotism’ as a national identity and started identifying themselves as a “Cypriot.”
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After the struggle of the Greek Cypriots with the Turkish Cypriots and third
parties with regard to the Cyprus problem, both communities on the island were
continuously negotiating in order to find a way to solve their issues. Along with these
negotiations and with newly adopted ideologies of both communities established in
the 1977 agreement, the federation-based solution was adopted as a new ideology that
depended on two separate states and two separate communities on the island. As
Kızılyürek (2005a) asserts, the federal state of Cyprus was approved as one of the
principles of Greek community. Depending on the new principle of the Greeks, the
Greek Cypriot community was started gradually, gaining a good impression before
the world’s political platform simply because they supported a federation-based
solution. Gaining a good impression in front of the world would help Greek Cypriots
to become a member of the European Union (EU) in 2004. Although a peace solution
on the basis of federalism was the new target of the Turkish side from the beginning
of the Cyprus dispute, the Greek side embraced it as their idea and thus started
gaining the good impression of the world. This was the case, even after the first
violent conflict which started in 1963 and continues until today, because the Turkish
could not defend themselves in the world’s political platform and, as a result, lost all
the good impression of the world.
While Greeks were making a good impression in world diplomacy by
supporting the “federation” on the island, they still disagreed over political equality
with Turkish Cypriots under the same administration. Although the idea of a federally
based solution among Turkish and Greek Cypriots was confirmed by Spiros Kibrianu
(Leader of Greek Cypriots at that time) and Denktash (Leader of Turkish Cypriots at
that time), according to Kızılyürek (2005a), Makarios and most of the Greek Cypriots
definitely disagreed with sharing the administration on equal terms with Turkish
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Cypriots. According to them, it would not be appropriate to give the minority as equal
a voice as the majority because they still considered Turkish Cypriots as a minority
group of the island. One of the well-known examples of this thinking is the 1963
clash, which was based on sharing the administration on equal terms with Turkish
Cypriots and which ended in disaster. The year 1965 when Greek Cypriots were
trying to provoke the UN in order to prevent Turkish Cypriot getting equal rights from
the administration of the new state was another example of this. In this case, the only
thing that they would have agreed on was to give Turkish Cypriots minority rights
instead of majority rights. Eventually, beside ratio of population, the only reason for
disagreements on equality in power sharing was that “Greek Cypriots asserted that the
Republic of Cyprus was a nation-state which was only belonged to them” (Kızılyürek,
2008).
Although there were different opinions on how to solve the Cyprus problem,
the negotiations between two communities under United Nations control were in
progress until the end of 1990s. However, no solutions regarding how to create a new
state on the basis of federation or confederation have been reached. In addition to this
deadlock, Greek Cypriots changed their reunion (Epanenosis) route to the EU. On
July 4th, 1990, they appealed to be a member of the EU; however, the EU refused
them the first time because, according to the EU policy, the Turkish side was
disqualified for admission into the EU. In 1993, Greek Cypriots made their request to
the EU once again, and finally, in 1999, during the EU meeting in Helsinki, the Greek
Cypriots’ application was approved to be put into process. Throughout negotiations
for the possibility of Greek Cypriots’ membership to the EU, Greece tried very hard
to press the EU to accept Greek Cypriots in as a member of the European Union.
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After the Turkish invasion in 1974, Greek Cypriots gained some advantages
from the situation of the recent history of the island in front of the world. One of the
positive advantages gained was membership of Greece in the EU because, after their
entrance into the EU, Greece tried very hard to put the Greek Cypriot community into
the UN schedule to make them a member of the UN as well. A second positive
advantage was that Greek Cypriot started getting economic and cultural help from
their motherland Greece in order to create re-Hellenic nationalism within the Greek
Cypriot community (Kızılyürek, 2005a). The positive advantages that they gained
helped them to develop after the partition and to defend themselves in front of the
world on the Cyprus case. As a result of the motherland’s help there was acceptance
into the European Union (EU) in 2004. In this sense, the Turkish Cypriot community
was excluded from the EU and declared to be an illegal state. In addition, embargoes
were imposed on them because they were blamed for the partition of the island.
Accepting Cyprus as a member was against the principles of the EU, as long as nonviolent conflict on the basis of ethno nationalism still existed on the island, they did.
“They have found a strong precedent in the international system for their positions,
and are the victim of ethnonationalist sentiment on the island, and between Greece
and Turkey” (Richmond, 1999, p. 53). As is seen, although both communities tried to
impose negotiation culture in order to solve the ethnic conflict on the basis of
“…agreeing on a federal solution within the EU sphere of influence…” they could not
succeed in solving the problem by that and were accepted into the EU without finding
a solution for the Cyprus problem (Richmond, 1999, p. 53). Overall, although national
feelings of Greek society were reduced, their target for the island has changed. After
entering into the EU, Greek Cypriots turned their attention toward their new state
where they have full control.
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The Turkish Cypriot Society in Cyprus since 1974
While one side of the island was gaining advantages from the world, things
were going differently for the other side of the island. Eventually, the demographic
and geographical separation of the island brought a conclusion in which the island had
been divided into two parts: north and south. Turkish Cypriots who came under the
influence of the “territorial isolation” by the world settled on the north part of the
island and Greek Cypriots who became an internationally recognized state in the
world settled on the south part of the island (Vural and Peristianis, 2008, p. 48).
Basically, the geographic and demographic separation created fragmentation among
Cypriot Turks and Cypriot Greeks in the post-1974 (Özen, 2009). Volkan (2008)
explains this situation in his words as;
A world opinion accepting the Cypriot Greeks as victims and the
Cypriot Turks (or Turks in general) as aggressors has been established.
Although this was perhaps due to the failure of Turkish diplomacy,
psychologically speaking it might also be due to the Western World’s
stereotypical perceptions of Turks as the heirs to the Ottomans, who
were the enemies of the West. Whatever the cause, the Greek side of
the island was recognized legally as a state by all nations, except
Turkey, while only Turkey accepted the Turkish side as a legal entity.
This reality created an invisible enclave for the Cypriot Turks. (p. 11).

Eventually, the Turkish part of the island has never gained the advantages that
the Greek side did, and has remained a less developed region compared to the
southern part of the island. To some extent, whereas the territory of the Greeks
received full access to the political and economic benefits of international recognition,
the territory of Turkish Cypriots became dependent on Turkey for economic, political,
and military support. This caused the northern part of the island lag behind the
southern part of the island. In addition, being an unrecognized region resulted in
“international isolation” and “Turkey’s interference in Turkish Cypriot community
affairs, economic stagnation, and the colonization of Cyprus by Turkish settlers,” thus
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preventing the Turkish community from developing itself and catching up with Greek
Cypriots (cited in Loizides 2007, p. 177). In order to colonize Turkish Cypriots and to
make them fully dependent on Turkey, the “Turkish Government refused financial aid
from the UN and did not let Turkish Cypriots take advantages of that opportunity”
(Attalides, 2003, p. 96).
In order to alleviate the current situation of the island, the negotiations started
right after the partition in 1974 and still continue today. The cease-fire instituted at
that time continues to exist. While negotiations were in progress between the two
communities following the year of the partition in 1975, the Turkish Federated State
of Cyprus was established by the Turkish Cypriot community. After the establishment
of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots were faced with a
multiparty system for the first time in their history. In these years, particularly after
the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, the Turkish leaders
changed their political ideology from federation to confederation until the Turkish
Cypriots declared a new state called the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 15th
November 1983. “The declaration of statehood in 1983 implied not only a desire for
international recognition, but a promise to be realized domestically,” and also to build
a self-sustaining liberal state in order to gain fully independence on the island (Lacher
and Kaymak, 2005, p.32). However, according to the United Nations (UN), the
declaration of the new state of Turkish Cypriot was against international law and
“they forced Turkish Cypriots to dismantle the new unrecognized state” and continue
negotiations with Greek Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 2005a; Kızılyürek, 2005b). Kızılyürek
also points out that in addition to the UN’s offer to the Northern Cyprus, the United
State of America (USA) was also against the newly established state of Turkish
Cypriot community. For this reason, the USA also asked the Turkish community to
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step back and continue negotiations with Greek Cypriots to try to find a mutual
solution that would provide a peaceful environment for all communities of the island
regardless of ethnicity. The main reason for US involvement was to prevent disputes
in the Mediterranean area in order to secure the peace and to protect its self-interests
in that area.
Moreover, the partition and the newly established state of Turkish Cypriots
were internationally unacceptable situations because they were against international
law. As Kızılyürek (2005a) notes, according to the European Union, the only
recognizable state on the island was the Republic of Cyprus, which was controlled by
Greek Cypriots. It can be said that the new “enclave period” started for Turkish
Cypriots after the partition of the island in 1974, although it took a different form than
the first enclave period in the 1960s. Volkan (2008) also contends that historical
developments after the summer of 1974 have continued to traumatize Cypriot Turks
in a slow and often unrecognized fashion. Therefore, along with all negative progress
that had characterized the Turkish Cypriot community, Turkish Cypriots decided once
again to negotiate with Greek Cypriot in order to improve their international situation.
However, improving the current situation would not be easy for Turkish Cypriots
because, although one side agreed to some conditions, the other side was against
them. But each time, Turkish Cypriots seemed to be inconsistent in the negotiations.
For instance, although Denktash who was the leader of Turkish Cypriots’ community
adopted as a principle the UN’s proposal for a solution in 1985, the Greek Cypriot
leader rejected the proposal because “Greek Cypriot negotiation tactics have been
balanced between the need to pander to international opinion --which supports the
bicommunal, bizonal framework -- and local opinion, on the part of the nationalists,
or simply a continuation of the status quo.” (Richmond, 1999, p. 46).
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While on one hand the political issues were ongoing and between Turkish and
Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, each community started their new lives separately
on the divided island. Even though the Greek side was gaining advantages and
developing itself, the Turkish Cypriots were faced with an unexpected surprise on the
northern part of the island. Even though the arrival of the Turkish army into the island
brought happiness to Turkish Cypriots by rescuing them and also by drawing
boundaries of a new state with the promised security, freedom, democracy, liberation,
and other presumed benefits, life in the northern part of the island ultimately
disappointed them. These expectations of help from the Turkish motherland were the
main reasons for seeking help from them since the first enclave period in 1963;
however, they received nothing but a problematic life from the Turkey after the
partition. According to Papadakis (2005),
Those (Turkish Cypriots NM) who remembered described how
initially they felt overjoyed with the arrival of the Turkish army in
1974. Their lives in the 1960s, when they were locked up in enclaves
under constant fear, were not lives. In 1974, they were worried when
Greek Cypriot extremists came to power with the coup, some of whom
had become heroes by killing Turkish Cypriots in the late 1960s. They
thought their lives were over. The arrival of the Turkish army brought
new hope and their own state with the promise of safety and liberation.
But all the promises of freedom, democracy and prosperity were
betrayed. (p. 200).

The reason for Turkish intervention was to provide safety and better living
standards for Turkish Cypriots by taking them out of the Greek Cypriots hegemony
and by providing them freedom, democracy, and liberation; however, nothing went
through as expected. Eventually, the disappointments of Turkish Cypriots, led many
of them to blame themselves for being blind until 1974 by expecting help from
Turkey (Papadakis, 2005). Volkan (2008) sums up this frustration by stating, “After
experiencing an initial increased “we-ness,” and exaggerated nationalistic feelings
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and excitement over “being free” during the years following 1974, large-group
identity splits began to appear clearly in TRNC” (p. 28). Therefore, the changes for
Turkish Cypriots after 1974 became clear and this would gradually be reflected in a
different nationalist ideology of Turkish Cypriots.
While Turkish Cypriots were frustrated by lack of support from Turkey, they
were simultaneously forced to be Turkized by starting to replace all Greek names with
Turkish names after they moved to the northern part of Cyprus in 1974. Although this
policy was put into effect starting with the enclave period in 1963, Turkey focused on
Turkizing Turkish Cypriots purposefully after 1974 in order to colonize them and get
full control of them. However, after facing disappointments in the post-1974 period,
imposed Turkishness did not satisfy most Turkish Cypriots. Following this new
implementation, each family was compelled to choose a new Turkish family name on
the basis of Kemalist reforms in Turkey, in which each family was supposed to have a
Turkish family name. However, Turkish Cypriots were still using their fathers’ names
as a family name until Turkey interceded in the island in 1974. This was another step
of imposing the seeds of “Turkishness” among Turkish Cypriots. Eventually, Turkey
started organizing everything on the basis of “Turkishness” in order to take control of
the northern part of the island. After the partition, a large number of Turks were
brought to the northern part of the divided island to impose Turkism on Turkish
Cypriots. However, the new people brought new problems to the Turkish Cypriot
community because these new inhabitants and Turkish Cypriots were different in
many ways, including culturally and linguistically (different dialect of Turkish
language) from each other.
In order to impose “Turkism” among the Turkish Cypriots, the new
administration of the Turkish Cypriot community was trying to enforce idea that
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everyone on the northern part of island was Turkish. Some Turkish Cypriots refused
to accept this new political ideology and made their own statement along the lines of
“I am a Turkish Cypriot and it is my right to live in my country with my own separate
identity” (cited in Kızılyürek, 2005b, p. 250). Volkan (2008) summarizes this general
sentiment of Turkish Cypriots after 1974 as:
There are Turks who defensively feel more Westernized and superior
to the Turks who settled on the island from mainland Turkey after
1974. And there are those who emphasize being Cypriots over being
Turks. There are simply “Cypriots” who feel closer to Cypriot Greeks
than to mainland Turks, in spite of being rejected by the Cypriot
Greeks again and again. (p. 27).

While these problems were occurring on the northern part of the island, the
new generation of Cypriot Turks started changing their philosophy of life and gaining
a new voice against Turkish nationalism step by step in the post-1974 years. The main
reason for developing rival nationalist feelings against Turkish nationalism was
because the disappointment of Turkish Cypriots that had been raised after the
partition. Turkish Cypriots gradually started leaving the ideology of “taksim” and
developing a new ideology on the basis of Cypriotism. The new generation of the
northern island developed a different worldviews (including working class,
bourgeoisie class, leftists and rightists) that focused on Cyriocentrism in order to
differentiate themselves from new Turkish inhabitants of the island and to protect
themselves against the assimilation by Turkey. More specifically, while the left wing
Turkish Cypriots were identifying themselves as “Cypriots” to justify their new
nationalist struggle, which was “peace on the island,” most right wing members of the
bourgeoisie class were identifying themselves as “Cypriots” to distinguish themselves
from the new citizens of Northern Cyprus and to differentiate themselves from the
new inhabitants on the basis of social classes (Kızılyürek, 2005b). However, this
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situation led to a tendency to discriminate, which created “otherization” against the
Turkish population who came to the island after 1974 (Kızılyürek, 2005b). At the
same time this otherization created opposition to “taksim” (Ibid).
One of the reasons for developing an opposition to Turkey was that Turkish
Cypriots became second-class citizens in their own country, particularly those who
were supporting “peace on the island” and were against “taksim and enosis,” although
they thought that the Turkish military was there to “protect their rights,” (Kızılyürek,
2005b). Moreover, those Turkish Cypriots who were leftist were treated differently as
a result of their thoughts and political views, in order to persuade them to give up
their aim to create a “Turkish state” on the island. They were put into different social
classes and treated unequally on the post-1974 island. This situation also caused
partisanship over the northern part of the island. A large proportion of Turkish
Cypriots who still believed in peace remained unemployed in their own country. On
the other hand, Turkish Cypriots who supported the right wing and people who came
from Turkey after 1974 were usually hired because their political thoughts and beliefs
were the same, or at least similar, with Turkey’s. To a large extent, people were
divided into two distinct groups on the basis of their political ideologies, left and right
wings, which created two rival groups in a small territory.
Another unexpected issue after the partition on the northern part of the island
involved housing and employment policies, which were “inequitably deployed” and
which triggered discomfort in the Turkish Cypriot community once again (Kızılyürek,
2005a, p. 292). Although the Turkish who were brought to Cyprus after the partition
obtained land, houses, and jobs, which made them better off economically compared
to their lives back their home in Turkey, most of the Turkish Cypriots who moved
from South to North were mistreated. These immigrants of could not even consider
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owning a portion of the property that they used to have before the partition, and most
of them who were leftist became poorer than before in their own country. Political
discrimination emerged in the Turkish Cypriot community, although they had never
faced these kinds of problems before the partition of 1974. Along with the inequality
in the northern island, Turkish Cypriots started viewing the Republic of Turkey and
Turkish immigrants, who were imported into the island after the partition, as enemies
but these were not unilateral feelings. As Kızılyürek (2005b) notes, after facing all
these unexpected issues after the partition, they stood by “Cypriotsm,” even though
Turkish Cypriots stood by “Turkishness” while Hellenism was on the rise against
them (p. 259).
Besides the partisanship, which caused the unemployment problem within the
Turkish Cypriot community, the economy could not be developed in northern Cyprus,
which was also an underlying factor behind the housing and unemployment problems
throughout the northern part of the island. In the post-1974 years, the Greek Cypriot
community succeeded in rebuilding its economy and reconstructing its own industry;
however, Turkish Cypriots failed to do the same on their part of the island. In this
sense, as a result of partisanship and lack of industry in the north of Cyprus, the
unemployment problem increased in the northern part of the island. As a result of the
rise of the unemployment in the Turkish Cypriot community, many Turkish Cypriots
migrated to other countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia, and left
their own country in the hands of Turks who had arrived from Turkey in the post1974 period. Richmond explains this situation by stating that “the Turkish Cypriot
side was now faced with assimilation into Turkey, which, although true to the
ethnonationalist ideology, would not improve the lot of the Turkish Cypriot
community” (Richmond, 1999, p. 47). All this progress created anxiety, fear, and
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worries about the future of the Turkish Cypriot community while they were expecting
a future in a peaceful environment and created a situation in which many of them left
their own country and became refugees in other countries in order to find a better life.
Beyond the politically based problems, there were also culturally based
problems that had appeared between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish (from Turkey)
after 1974. Even though socialization consists of being with and a part of others in the
same environment, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people could not socialize well.
Turkish Cypriots even started seeing themselves as owners of the island and did not
accept the Turkish as islanders. Basically, they both failed to develop a common
ethno-cultural environment on the northern part of the island. The main reason for the
failure was that things had changed among Turkish Cypriots and they started
discovering and identifying the differences between the Turkish and themselves after
the partition (Kızılyürek, 2005a). For instance, the two communities in northern
Cyprus distinctly separated from each other by having different customs, attitudes,
traditions, life standards, etc. According to Kızılyürek (2005b), daily life was
precisely the problem because each group was sharing different customs on the basis
of their historical narratives that were reflected differently in cultural elements and in
turn, shaped their identities differently. Eventually, unity and solidarity were not
achieved in the expected way between Turkish and Turkish Cypriots on the northern
part of the island; instead, social unrest between them emerged, and this characterizes
Cyprus today.
Obviously, the new situation caused fragmentation among these groups. For
this reason, Turkish Cypriots, mostly left wing, realigned into groups where people
identified themselves as “Cypriots” instead of as “Turkish,” to advocate Cypriots
rights and thoughts, and to keep Turkish Cypriots’ culture alive. Turkish Cypriots
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established new organizations including KOGEF --which was a left wing
organization-- and Halk Der -which was a right wing organization. Turkish Cypriots
leftists generally concentrated on building a struggle on the basis of Cypriotism on the
island in order to build Cypriocentrizm by focusing on “culture.” The reason for
focusing on the cultural factors was because Turkish Cypriots had been becoming
very introverted and experiencing cultural shock, which led them to drift away from
their culture after 1974 (Kızılyürek, 2005b).
Although KOGEF and Halk Der had different political views, their shared
purpose was to struggle for “Cypriotism” and “peace it Cyprus.” Whereupon, the
KOGEF charged itself to start a new cultural movement by creating some events and
organizations in order to develop consciousness of Cyrpriotism regardless of
Turkishness, especially after the new state of Turkish Cypriots was established post1974. In order to make Turkish Cypriots perceive the Cypriot consciousness, the new
cultural movement was focused on Cypriot folk dance, Cypriot’s songs and lullabies,
and the Turkish Cypriot dialect as cultural factors, which they believed would help to
unite Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 2005b).
Besides the domestic issues of the Turkish Cypriots, on an international level,
they had been subject to political and economic embargoes in many areas, which was
one of the Greek Cypriots’ victories after the partition. “The political debate among
Greek Cypriots centered on how to gain concessions from the Turkish Cypriot side
under the new framework, and in order to do this the Greek Cypriot side establishes
an economic blockade against the Turkish Cypriot community and began to wage
potent diplomatic war against Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side” (Richmond,
1999, p. 46). Basically, living in an unrecognized country provides its people invisible
lives as they were not able to have a passport, to travel freely, or to have an industry
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to develop a trade sector (Papadakis, 2005). Political and economic embargoes
imposed on Turkish Cypriots included not being recognized by international
organizations, not being able to trade directly with any other countries in the world,
not being able to send and receive mail to the Turkish side of the island after the
partition, and also not being able to travel/fly directly to any other countries except
Turkey. Travel documents issued to the Cypriot Turks by the northern Cypriot
Turkish authorities were not recognized by the international community. People have
to fly through Turkey to get to the Turkish side of the island or to the rest of the
world. The same process existed for mail, also. For instance, if a Cypriot Turk wanted
to send or receive mail, he had to add under his address “Via Mersin 10 Turkey”;
otherwise, he would never be able to send or receive the mail. “Cypriot Turks were
not allowed to compete in sports in foreign countries (except in local competitions in
Turkey)” (Volkan, 2008, para. 12). However, there are some exceptional situations, in
which Turkish Cypriots are not allowed to compete with Turkish teams. For instance,
professional football teams are not allowed to have any match by UEFA. As Volkan
(2008) points out, “The northern part of Cyprus is inhabited by people who do not
have typical human rights, who do not have a large-group identity that is legally
accepted by billions of others surrounding them (except Turks on the mainland) and
who, in a sense, are second-class human beings. After living in actual enclaves for
eleven years, the Cypriot Turks from 1974 to the present time have continued to live
in an invisible enclave” (p. 12).
As a result, Turkish Cypriots have been paying the price since 1974 because
they have been facing political, economic, and sociocultural problems throughout
their history including both the pre-1974 and post-1974 eras on the island (Kızılyürek,
2005a). The Turkish Cypriots realized that the post-1983 goal for independence and
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international recognition was unattainable while, at the same time, they risked losing
EU accession (cited in Loizides 2007, p. 181). “Nevertheless, it is clear that the war
during the summer of 1974 massively traumatized Cypriot Greeks. The most
traumatizing event for the Cypriot Turks, however, was a long-lasting, eleven-year
state of humiliation, dehumanization and annihilation anxiety, in spite of their
continued hope that one day mainland Turks would save them” (Volkan, 2008, para.
10). However, in the end, the Turkish militarily intervention was not a solution for the
Turkish Cypriot’s future as it was hoped by Turkish Cypriots that it would be. In
conclusion, Turkish Cypriots could not attain a better life, and they have been still
struggling for their future with Turkey instead of with Greek Cypriots. The scenario
of assimilation of Turkish Cypriots of the island still exists, but the characters are
different.
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PART THREE
Theoretical Review and Conclusion
Chapter Seven: Ethnic Identity, Nationalism and Their Development in Cyprus
Historical events in Cyprus have played a very important role in the
institutionalization of nationalist movements and the political conflict between
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot nationalist movements on the island of Cyprus.
Evidently, “internal and external realities and conditions played an important role in
the eventual creation of these rival nationalisms” and different ethno-national
identities in the island that caused ethnic and geographical partitions among the
Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities (Morag, 2004, p. 622). In order to make the
case of the “Cyprus problem” understandable, the sociological elements of Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalism of the island were analyzed in this study in
relation to some fundamental elements of the conflict, including (1) the importance of
geographical location of the island, (2) the process of modernization, (3) the internal
impact of colonial powers, including the Ottoman and British Empires on the
development of nationalism on the island, (4) the class structure of Greek and Turkish
Cypriot societies and their direct and indirect effects on the development of
nationalism on the island, (5) the historical clash between two major societies of the
island and within each societies between right and left, (6) the strong relations
between inhabitants of the island and the motherlands of Greece and Turkey, (7) intercommunal relations between Greek and Turkish communities on the basis of
traditional animosity and their effects on the process of the development of Greek and
Turkish Cypriot nationalism on the island, (8) the involvement of third parties
including the United States of America (USA), in relations to their self-interests, the
stabilization of international power particularly in the surrounded of the
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Mediterranean area and between two NATO members Turkey and Greece, and (9) the
clash between inhabitants and current nationalisms in the motherlands are discussed
in order to make clear and more understandable nationalism itself and the
identification formation with reference to the specific case of the “Cyprus problem.”
Besides the influence of these external factors, several other factors influenced
the ongoing divisions between the two communities. Among these were the
following: demographic changes on the island (Muslims entering the island after the
conquest of the Ottomans), different sociocultural factors (including Islam and
Christianity), the educational system, different languages (Turkish and Greece), the
economy, class factors, strong ties with the two motherlands (Turkey and Greece),
separate domestic politics of Turkish and Greek Cypriots (taksim and enosis), the
opposing nationalist organizations of Turkish and Greek Cypriots (TMT and EOKA),
and the establishment of statehood in 1960 were all factors that paved the way for the
development of two separate national movements and caused the development of two
rival nationalist identities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots which set the island’s
current position. All these internal and external factors played a very important role in
developing nationalism on the island. Although all these factors played a significantly
important role in the creation of nationalism among the inhabitants of the island and
paved the way for the position of today’s situation, the major factor in the creation of
the Cyprus conflict lies in the constitution of the “Millet System” of the Ottoman
Empire right after the annexation of the island by Ottomans in 1571. The Millet
system divided the inhabitants of the island based on their religious view and put them
into different categories—Muslims and non-Muslims—and treated them differently.
Since the arrival of the Ottomans to the island, inhabitants of the island, depending on
their religion, acquired a different character and paved the way for the creation of two
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rival ethnic identities and two different national movements. The rest of the factors,
internal and external, exacerbated the process of the development of the conflict
environment on the island.
Besides all these factors, the powerful effect of the educational system on both
ethnic groups could not be ignored during the development of nationalism and the
creation of two rival ethno-national identities on the island. Obviously, considering
the role of the educational system in the process of the development of separate
nationalist movements and rival ethno national identities would make it easier to
understand how the two major communities of the island have gradually become
enemies and why their relations turned into a violent conflict, especially right after the
annexation of the island by the British and the establishment of colonial rule in 1878.
Basically, nationalist ideologies on the basis of primordialism (same blood, language,
religions, and culture) over Cyprus played an important role in the creation of the
rival ethno-nationalist identities, although the Western type of constructed state of
Cyprus established in 1960 provided common citizenship under the name of
“Cypriotism” and provided equality (shared power in the administration of 1960 state)
for its citizens. Obviously, separate ethno-national identities of the ethnic
communities of the island always created problems throughout of the island’s history
since the 1500s. To some extent, having different kinds of national aims for the same
land by two major communities of the island, along with intervention by third parties,
exacerbated the nationalist tensions among ethnic groups until the partition was
completed in 1974. Although the island was ethnically and geographically divided
into two parts in 1974, historical narratives of the island have still played a significant
role in shaping the current forms of nationalism among Turkish and Greek Cypriots,
especially in the post 1974 years. For instance, in the Republic of Cyprus where
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Greek Cypriots live, the birthday of the nationalist organization “EOKA” has been
celebrated every year in a sign of nationalist celebration on the part of Greek
Cypriots. Another example of nationalism in the southern part of the island is the use
of flags. Anyone can see flags everywhere they go in the south region of the island. In
other words, whenever Turkish Cypriots go to the Greek side of the island for some
reason (for instance sightseeing), they can see Greek flags everywhere. In parallel
with the example of the southern part of the island, on the northern side of the island,
in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), there is a huge Turkish Cypriot
flag that can be seen from the entrance of the border in the capital city Nicosia.
Whenever Greek Cypriots pass the border from the South to the North, they definitely
see the enormous Turkish Cypriot flag on the highest mountain of northern Cyprus.
Lately, flags of Turkish Cypriots and the flags of Turkey in the region of TRNC can
be seen on the top of hills in most places, particularly in the Karpass peninsula where
a lot of Greek Cypriots usually prefer to visit. Another example of nationalism in the
post 1974 years in the TRNC is the celebration of “20th July,” which is a day when the
island ethnically and geographically divided in order to rescue Turkish Cypriots from
the Greek junta. Turkish Cypriots celebrate the day of the Turkish intervention 20 th of
July, 1974 every year, whereas the other side of the island considers it as a black day
in the history of Cyprus. Obviously, the current form of nationalism of Cyprus
between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots was not an invention of recent history
of the island. On the contrary, both nationalist ideologies had been formed on the
basis of the policies that were pursued by ethnic communities on the island under the
influence of the nationalist ideologies of the motherlands over the last two centuries.
In other words, although the recent forms of nationalism on both sides of the island
have been shaped by the current politics of both communities, they are an extension
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of the first forms of nationalist ideologies established by both Turkish and Greek
Cypriots.
After the British came to power on the island in the late nineteenth century, it
can be clearly seen that the changes of the political system and social hierarchical
structures of the island on the basis of the colonial policy of the British paved the way
for developing nationalist feelings within two ethnic communities of Cyprus as an
extension of the motherlands’ nationalist ideologies. Along with the beginning of the
British colonial administration over the island, the traditional structure of the Ottoman
authority structurally changed, and these changes directly affected the elites of the
island, particularly the Greek Cypriot elites who engaged in the trade sector and had
become the most powerful class of the island under the Ottoman administration. The
Orthodox Church also lost its representative power after the British came to the island
because the new administration wanted to dominate the inhabitants directly. The
Orthodox Christian Church of the island was established under Ottoman rule in the
late 1500s and gained representative power of religion under the millet system of the
Ottomans, which provided non-Muslims some privileges, such as freedom, until the
British came to the power. Along with the Millet system, the structure of the political
system, the legal system, and the educational system of Muslims and non-Muslims
had been organized according to their religions and ethnic ties. However, the
sociocultural and politically based internal developments among both communities,
which evolved throughout the period of the Ottoman Empire, changed directions and
affected the separation of Muslims and non-Muslims on the island. The religion-based
differentiation under the Millet System of the Ottomans between inhabitants of the
island created two rival ethnic identities and gradually started shaping the future
position of nationalist conflict of Cyprus. As an example, the Christian bourgeoisie
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class who controlled the trade sector were developing themselves parallel to the
process of modernization.
The importance of ethnicity and other forms of identity increased among the
Greek Christian community, which caused the development of an extreme nationalist
group against others, especially against the Turkish Muslims on the island, at the
beginning of the 1900s. In other words, as a result of modernization, people’s
expectations in many areas, including politics, economics and sociocultural areas, had
been transformed from the traditional level to the modern level, which caused a
separation between religious groups of the island and paved the way for the creation
of a nationalist group by non-Muslims against others. On the other hand, while Greek
Christians were modernizing, Turkish Muslims were still a part of a ruling class under
the effect of the traditional system and not in line with developments of the modern
world. They suffered as a result of their insulation from new trends and customs of
modernization, which weakened them vis-à-vis Greek Christians on the island at the
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. Actually, as
a result of naming a traditional community, Turkish Muslims continued living in
limited life standards and following religious-based regimes that prevented them from
developing nationalist feelings against others. Obviously, unequal developments on
the basis of modernization created two different communities on the island, which
caused problems in their relationship in the long term and eventually turned their
relations into violent conflict.
Although a new political system was introduced to the island with the arrival
of the British in 1878, Greek Cypriots saw this as an opportunity for their national
ideal (union with Greece). The new political system, to some extent, replaced the
millet system and aimed to provide equality under the same system of governance for
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both communities. Under Ottoman rule, communities on the island were treated on
the basis of their religions instead of on an equal basis. The British allowed the Greek
community to put their nationalist ideologies into effect and be a part of the Greek
motherland. The British also provided opportunities for both communities to develop
a print media in order to express their political beliefs and opinions. This opened a
new door for the Greek community of the island to achieve their mission by using
media as a tool for spreading and imposing national aims throughout the Greek
Cypriot community. Along with the growth of literacy among communities of the
island, people, especially Greeks, started using the media, such as newspapers, as a
tool to develop nationalist feelings. In addition, teachers were also playing a
significant role in imposing and spreading ethno-nationalism among members of
ethnic groups in order to maintain their ethnic ties and to keep alive their unique
ethnic identities by underscoring the differences between them and others in the
island. It can be clearly seen that “the main mechanisms of nation -building were the
educational system- which was in the hands of the Orthodox church – the activities of
voluntary associations formed by intellectuals mostly educated in Greece, and the
Greek consulate” that was a sign of the ethnonationalist conflict on the island that
would lead to a division of the island later in its history (Cited in Mavratsas, 1996, p.
87).
After the educational systems of both communities had become a tool for
spreading national feelings among member of their ethnic groups, the British
administration realized the coming danger and tried to get full control of the
educational system of both communities during its administration to prevent the
development of ethno-nationalism in an attempt to maintain its position in the island.
Both communities used the schools as an instrument of spreading nationalism and
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imposing ethnic identities among the respective population by following a traditionalbased educational system instead of secular-based system in order to dominate people
more easily. The curricula of the educational system of the Greek community
emphasized the very strong primordial ties with motherland Greece and taught the
language of Socrates, the Bible and Byzantium to students in order to develop a
literate and a nationalist society for the Greek inhabitants of the island. As an example
of nationalist Greek Cypriot society, Greek society denied the teaching and learning
of the Turkish language throughout their history on the island, although the island was
bilingual. In other words, the Turkish language was never put into their curricula even
though there were some other elective language courses in the Greek schools. In order
to develop a literate and nationalist society according to Greek Cypriots, the
educational system needed to be in their hands, because education was the easiest way
for them to instill Greek irredentist nationalism throughout Cyprus in order to fight
for the Greek Cypriot’s right of self-determination, which was to unite with
motherland Greece. On the other hand, Muslim students were taught the languages of
the Qur’an and of poetry. These languages were Turkish, Arabic, and Persian.
Comparing the Turkish curricula and Greek curricula, it could be said that the Turkish
were a little bit more flexible than the Greeks because the Greek language could be
found in the Turkish schools’ curricula.
Also, in most of the mixed villages, Turkish people spoke Greek in order to
communicate with their neighbors. Basically, it can be said that Greek Cypriots were
more nationalist than Turkish Cypriots throughout their history on the island.
However, the Muslims schools’ curricula emphasized the strong bonds with the
Republic of Turkey after the Turkish republic was declared in 1923. Additionally, the
curriculum of the Turkish community of the island was changed on the basis of the
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Kemalist reforms of the new state. Along with ethnic closeness toward the Turkish
Republic, the identity of the Muslims was replaced with “Turkish” on the island in
line with what was also occurring in Turkey. As Bryant (2002) states, “Turkish
identity was self-consciously constructed for them by Ataturk in the republican
period” (p. 525). In this sense, it is clear that the idea of “Turkishness,” which was a
recently constructed identity, was a new adopted ethnic concept within the Turkish
Cypriot community at the beginning of the twentieth century. At the same time, the
primordial ties of the Greek Cypriots with Greece on the basis of blood and descent
had existed for thousands of years on the island. In other words, the effect of both
motherlands’ nationalism shows that “…the Muslims came to identify themselves as
Turks and the Orthodox Christians as Greeks…” in different time periods; however,
at the end, the differentiation of ethnic identities caused two rival nationalist
movements on the basis of ethnicity (Papadakis, 2008, p. 139). In this sense, it could
be said that “ethnicity, thus, began to be politicized and to replace religion as the main
identifying attribute” (Mavratsas, 1996, p 87).
As a result of the close ties to the motherland, Greek Cypriot nationalism was
developed almost a century earlier than Turkish Cypriot nationalism. Since the
beginning of the development of Greek Cypriot nationalism, Greek Cypriots,
particularly the Church of Cyprus, struggled against the British colonial rule for
decolonization of the island in order to have unification with Greece. On the other
hand, the Turkish community stayed for a long time under the Ottoman influence until
the declaration of the Republic of Turkey. The establishment of the Turkish Republic
basically paved the way for the development of nationalist movements in Turkish
Cypriot community as well. They became closer to the Turkish Republic by adopting
and putting into effect the Kemalist reforms of the Republic of Turkey (new
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alphabets, numbers, dress code, etc.) in order to catch up with the modern world and
to attract the attention of Turkey to the current Cyprus problem. Turkish Cypriots also
adopted a national movement in line with the ideology of the Republic of Turkey in
order to maintain their existence on the island. Actually, Turkish Cypriots were
obliged to develop a contra-nationalism against Greek Cypriots and adopted Turkish
nationalism in order to develop their nationalist movement to struggle for their future
on the island. However, along with the development of the Turkish nationalist
movement, the serious problems between the two communities started and after
awhile turned into violent conflict in the twentieth century.
Nationalist movements of both communities became strong organizations in
the middle of twentieth century, particularly during the struggle for independence
against the British colonial rule. First, the Greek Cypriot nationalist organization
EOKA was established during the 1950s for achieving enosis (the unification with
Greece). Along with the establishment of the armed organization EOKA, Greek
Cypriot nationalism reached its peak at this time. On the other side, Turkish Cypriot
nationalism was born as a reaction to Greek Cypriot nationalism. As a result of the
development of nationalist movements of the Turkish Cypriot community, the
ideology of their struggle was born, which was called Taksim (partition in the island
and unification with Turkey) as an answer to Greek Cypriot ideology of enosis. On
the other hand, following the establishment of the Greek Cypriot armed organization
EOKA, the Turkish Cypriot organization TMT was established to respond the actions
of EOKA.
In 1960, when the island became independent in a united form under the name
of the Republic of Cyprus, both ethnic communities became more nationalist through
the educational system, religious leaders, and written media until 1974, when the
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biggest violent conflict broke out between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus undermined the aspirations of the Greek
Cypriots to achieve enosis and forced them to live under the same roof with Turkish
Cypriots and also to adopt “Cypriotism” “in the form of “ethnic community
identification: Greek Cypriotism and Turkish Cypriotism, respectively” (Loizides,
2007, p. 174). This case was an unexpected situation for an Eastern type of
nationalism (Greek Cypriot nationalism) to share the administrative system with
Turkish Cypriots who were a minority on the island according to Greeks. By
extension, Greek Cypriots were not very comfortable with living together with
Turkish Cypriots and sharing the collective identity with Turkish inhabitants of the
island because they had different blood, language, religions, culture and historical
origins.
However, along with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the form of
identity “Cypriotism” was constructed in order to create a civic society on the island.
However, from the beginning, both communities were against the idea of
“Cypriotism” because both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities strongly believed
that the given features, including “being born into a particular religious community,
speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following
particular social practices” were important to be a part of a specific group rather than
a constructed group (Geertz, 1963, p. 109-110). As Mavratsas (1996) states, “The
main internal opposition against Greek-Cypriot nationalism has come from what may
be broadly called “Cypriotism,” a political ideology and cultural discourse that, by
placing the center of attention on Cyprus, rather than the Greek nation, functions as a
territorial nationalism with strong civic elements” (p. 87). Cypriotism, thus, “does not
deny the Greek or Turkish ethnicity of the inhabitants of the island; it stresses,
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however, that their ethnic identity and, thus, on a more general level, their culture, has
also acquired sui generis features that not only differentiate the Greek and the Turkish
Cypriots from the Greeks and the Turks but also create some common ground
between the two communities of the island” (Mavratsas, 1996, p. 87). Although it did
not deny their ethnicity, both communities were not satisfied with the idea of sharing
the same identity under the same roof. Evidently, both ethnic communities on the
island were closer to the primordial approach by seeing themselves more closely
related to their motherlands than to each other. Based on this description, and
according to Kızılyürek (2005a), the case of Cyprus constitutes an “anomaly” because
the new state of Cyprus and the newly constructed identity of Cypriotism indicated
that the island “has its own sui generis character and, thus, must be viewed as an
entity which is independent from both of the motherlands of the two main
communities of the island – i.e., Greece and Turkey.” However, neither community
agreed with that idea (Kızılyürek, 2005a; Mavratsas, 1996, p. 87).
Besides the newly constructed identity for inhabitants, there were a couple of
other reforms in the constitution of the new state that caused new problems between
Turkish and Greek inhabitants of the island. Those changes were to provide equal
rights for both communities. However, these new laws of the new constitution of the
new state did not meet the expectations of either community, particularly the Greek
Cypriots’ expectations, because they were still focusing on their national aim of
enosis. Greek Cypriots became more nationalist and turned their ideologies into
violent action right after the new state was established because all these new laws of
the constitution were against the idea of enosis; sharing the power of the state equally
with Turkish Cypriots was totally against their political ideology. However, Greek
Cypriots started gaining benefit from the new state in a short while after the
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establishment of the state. In addition, the new situation brought a new idea to Greek
Cypriots, which was to use the administration of the republic according to their

Table 4: Historical Identities of Greek and Turkish Cypriots

Era

The
Ottoman
Empire

Identities

Muslims

Christians

Turkish

Greek

Cypriotism (failed)

Cypriotism (failed)

Republic
of
Cyprus

Cypriotism

Cypriotism

After
Partition

Turkish Cypriots

Greek Cypriots

The
British
Empire
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needs to achieve Enosis. In order to achieve their new idea, they had to find a way to
exclude the Turkish community from the administration of the new state to gain the
full power of it. Obviously, Greek Cypriots were seeking to build up a state based on
the ethno-cultural dynamics by which Turkish Cypriots were excluded in order to
serve its own rights. Considering “the ethno-cultural vision of community is based on
the belief of common ancestry and ethno-cultural sameness,” the seeds of Eastern
type of nationalism, which is based on primordialism, within Greek Cypriots cannot
be ignored (Vural and Peristianis, 2008, p. 42). As a result, once Greek Cypriots
realized that the new state would open new doors to achieve their national idea, they
chose to adopt the republic. In this sense, it is clear that the strategy of Greek
irredentism was a way to draw the fate of their struggle in the island by using the
republic as a tool for their national aim. Eventually, this led to the idea of
monopolizing the Republic of Cyprus without Turkish Cypriots. According to Eastern
nationalism, multi-ethnic nations usually ignore minorities and their rights. Multiethnic Eastern nations usually face political violence by citizens of the nation state
when they exclude minorities from the system. In 1963, political violence among
citizens (both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots) of Cyprus flared. In three years after
the first violent conflict after the establishment of the republic, Greek Cypriots
reached their aim and the independent Republic of Cyprus became a symbol of
Hellenic Nationalism (Kızılyürek, 2005a). Along with that, the Turkish were excluded
from the governance of the state and moved into enclaves until 1974.
As a result of these extremist nationalist struggles of both communities, the
island was ethnically and geographically divided into two parts, north and south, in
1974. After these violent events and ethnic separation of the communities of the
island, the two forms of nationalism continued to strengthen their meanings in
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different forms into their separate territories. Along with the 1974 partition, both
communities used the past events of the island to maintain their rights for the island in
order to strengthen their nationalist ideologies. Overall, as a result of the ethnonationalist conflict, the island divided into two parts by emphasizing the differences
of ethnic ties of both communities. After the partition, the nationalist ideologies of
both communities changed their meaning and their target comparing them in pre-1974
years because, basically, after the division of the island, the mission of enosis would
never have a chance to be completed. Actually, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish
Cypriot nationalist struggles developed new paths after the partition in 1974. For
instance, Greek Cypriots adopted the Republic of Cyprus in order to rule themselves
rather than becoming a part of Greece. In other words, the partition of 1974 was a
signal of the end of the struggle for enosis among the Greek community of the island.
Greek Cypriots changed their political ideology and adopted the Republic and
Cypriotsim in the post 1974 years.
Additionally, after the partition, the idea of nationalism and Cypriotism
“corresponds to the political opposition between right and left” in each community
(Mavratsas, 1996, p. 92). To put it another way, as Papadakis (2008) states, “For
much of the twentieth century another conflict persisted, this time within each ethnic
group between forces of the right and the left, with its own record of violence against
the left” (p. 131). For instance, while the right wing of the Turkish community was
still seeking to be part of Turkey, the leftist wing of the Turkish community was
supporting the idea of reunification with Greek Cypriots of the island and Cypriotism.
For instance, while the right wing of Turkish Cypriots were Turkocentrists who
supported Turkishness, the leftists Turkish Cypriots were Cypriocentrism who
supported Cypriotism (Kızılyürek, 2005b). One of the main reasons for the
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development of leftist idea was because of the way Turkey treated them after the
partition. Although, after the partition, both communities started to live in their new
homes, the Turkish people did not really find what they were expecting (i.e., safety,
democracy, liberty) from Turkey. With all the disappointments of Turkish Cypriots,
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1983, which is only
recognized by Turkey. However, on the other side of the island, Greek Cypriots
started their new lives under the state of the Republic of Cyprus, which is recognized
by the world, and they continued gaining advantages from the current situation of the
island.
Although the partition of the island brought happiness to the Turkish Cypriot
community from the beginning, it still brought a lot of disappointment, anxiety, and
fear for their future by mainland Turkey. The interference of Turkey in many areas of
social and economic life and colonization of new Turkish settlers on the island
prevented the development of the northern region of the island, while the southern
part of the island continued to developing. Obviously, considering the lack of the
access to the economic and politic benefits of international recognition, the Turkish
Cypriot community became economically and politically dependent on Turkey, which
caused a lot of problems for the Turkish Cypriot community in the post-1974 years.
As a result of this negative effect on the Turkish Cypriot community, “the term
“motherland” is no longer used for Turkey, while the terms “our island” or “our
country” are often used for Cyprus” (cited in Mavratsas, 1996, p. 138). Additionally,
people in northern Cyprus started to use “Cypriots” instead of “Turks” to describe
themselves and to underline the difference between Turkish people and themselves.
Overall, it could be historically argued that Greek Cypriot irredentist nationalism
gradually developed as a reaction to the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the
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British Empire to fulfill the purpose for enosis/union with Greece starting from 1850s
until the middle of 1900s. The Greek Orthodox Church of the island played a very
important role in the development of irredentist national ideology of Greek Cypriots,
Table 5: Western and Eastern Concepts of Nationalism as Applied to Greek and
Turkish Cypriots
Ethnic Identity

Type of
Nationalisms

*Cypriotism
Left
Wing

*Peaceful
coexistence on the
island with Turkish
Cypriots

Greek

Ex: AKEL

Cypriots

*Very strong bond
with motherland
Greece

Right
Wing

Eastern
Nationalism

*Focus on the
well-known
animosity between
motherlands,
Greece and Turkey
*Turkish
colonialism
Ex: Orthodox
Greek Church
President Makarios
* Cypriotism

Turkish

Left
Wing

*Focus on peaceful
time with Greeks
Cypriot neighbors
in the past

Cypriots

*emphasizes the
violent conflict
within Greek
community
Ex:Kogef
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Western
Nationalism

* Historical-based
strong bond with
motherland Turkey
since the conquest

Right
Wing

*focus on the wellknown animosity
between
motherlands,
Greece and Turkey
*existence of
enosis
Ex: Denktash (1st
President of
Turkish
community after
1974) and his
followers

which was a part of Hellenic nationalism (national liberation movement of Greece).
Greek irredentism, based on “Megali Idea” (big idea, major mission), was developed
to encompass all Greeks by sharpening and imposing national feelings and national
identity within Greek societies including Greek Cypriots of Cyprus to maintain and
safeguard the political unity of Hellene – Orthodox society. Overall, as mentioned in
historical narratives of Cyprus, the ethnocentric idea of Greece, which is also called
Hellenic nationalism, was strongly supported by Greek Cypriots, particularly by the
dominant power Orthodox Church, in order to achieve union geographically,
culturally and politically with Greece to expand the territorial bases of Greek society
on the basis of primordial tie with all Greeks.
On the other hand, following the Greek Cypriot irredentist nationalism,
Turkish Cypriot defensive nationalism, which was in line with Turkish nationalism,
was created as a reaction to Greek nationalism to fulfill the purpose for partition on
the basis of ethnic origin in the island from the beginning of the 1920s after the
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Republic of Turkey was established. As has been documented, Turkish nationalism
was born in order to transform the society from state to nation and followed
Kemalism, which was developed with Western elements on the basis of
modernization at the beginning of the 1900s. The seed of Turkish nationalism was
planted when the Ottoman modernization period started with the entrance of
European powers into the territory of the Ottomans. Along with that, beginning with
the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman elites who were called Young Turks, and later the
Republican elites, who were called the Kemalist group, adopted Western
developments and followed modernization to create a competitive environment
against the rise of Western powers in their territory and included Turkish Cypriot
community in their plan. In this sense, it could be said that the modernization period
of Turkish Cypriots paralleled changes at the same time in the Republic of Turkey. As
a result, nationalism among Turkish Cypriots gradually started spreading into Turkish
Cypriot community during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and gained its latest
meaning with the ideology of Kemalism after the Turkish Republic established in
1923.
Based on Turkish nationalism, the ideology “taksim” was developed by
Turkish Cypriots as a respond for enosis and was imposed on the mass of Turkish
Cypriots in order to partition of the island on the basis of ethnicity. Comparing both
ethnic groups’ national struggles, it is clear that the process of the development of the
Turkish Cypriot national movement started almost a century after Greek Cypriots
because Muslims maintained their place in the government and followed the
traditional regime of the current administration of the island, which weakened them
against Greek Christians. In other words, Greek Cypriot irredentist ideology was the
dominant movement in the political culture of the island, which caused the birth of
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contra-Turkish Cypriot nationalist ideology at the beginning of the twentieth century.
However, although both nationalist movements were born in different periods and for
different purposes, foreign conspiracies including Britain, Greece and Turkey paved
the way for the creation of two rival nationalist groups in the island in order to serve
their self-interests.
Theoretically, this study highlights embracing two forms of nationalism in
order to study the Cyprus case in terms of understanding the current situation of the
island of Cyprus. Eastern and Western types of nationalism were on the rise in the
island within two ethnic groups. Different types of nationalism under the different
names appeared on the island throughout its history, such as anti-colonial nationalism,
ethnonationalism,

European

nationalism,

Eastern

nationalism,

and

Western

nationalism since the end of nineteenth century. To some extent, according to Kohn’s
(2005) characterization of nationalism, Eastern nations are organic in terms of process
of nation-building on the basis of a blood bond; on the other hand, Western
nationalism is more political and civic, which was based on “a community of laws”
compared with Eastern nationalism. According to Kohn, Eastern nationalism is based
on emotional and authoritarian structure as opposed to the rational, pluralistic and
optimistic structures in Western nationalism. Generally, the facets that members of an
ethnically defined nationwide grouping share include physical characteristics,
sociocultural elements, religion, linguistic backgrounds, and a common ancestry. On
the other hand, Western nationalism “defines the term of citizenship and political
participation. Members of a national grouping that is defined in civic terms share
participation in a circumscribed political community, common political values, a
sense of belonging to the state in which they reside, and, usually, a common
language” (Kupchan, 1995, p. 4). Briefly, Eastern nationalism is constructed on the
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basis of “a blood related group” and the identification formation was created on the
basis of “blood” (cited in Bacık, 2002, p. 21). Civic identity is a constructed identity
and “outsiders can become members of the civic community, but only by participating
in the local practices and institutions and by slowly adopting the customs and even the
modes of reflexive criticism” as in the example of the constructed 1960 state of
Cyprus (Tempelman, 1999, p. 18). According to Bryant (2004), “Both of the
dominating nationalisms present in Cyprus appear to conform to these ideal typical
models, and the manner in which they invoke ideas about forms of ‘natural’ relations
that can constitute the basis for forms of historical proof” (p. 213). Also, considering
the ethno-cultural similarities with the motherlands, it is clear that all factors, as
previously mentioned, are basically historical evidence of the characteristic of the
Greek-Hellenic nationalism and Turkish nationalism as reflected in Cyprus.
Especially after the establishment of Turkish and Greek nation-states, the progress of
nationalism of these two nation-states produce a strong effect on shaping nationalist
ideologies of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and their ethno-national
identities separately and parallel with the motherlands’ nationalism instead of creating
a common cultural environment on the island.
Generally, according to the characterization of nationalism of Hans Kohn
(2005), Turkish Cypriot nationalism represents a Western type of nationalism that is a
form of “Civic” or “Euro” nationalism and is a “constructed type” that “gives itself a
historical origin and places emphasis on chronologies and the process of
homogenization” (Bryant, 2004, p. 213). Yannis Papadakis (2008) also claims that
“The Turkish Cypriot side follows a social-constructivist model of history, which
presents nationalism and national identity as emerging under specific historical
conditions rather than as a given” (para. 1). The historical background of Turkish
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Cypriots emphasizes conquests -- the 1571 Ottoman conquest and the 1974 Turkish
conquest -- “and does not claim an ineluctable destiny for the island or themselves”
(Bryant, 2004, p. 213). Bryant also claims that this history of conquests was the main
reason that Turkish Cypriots adopted the Turkish identity that was constructed by the
leader of the Republic of Turkey, Ataturk, in the 1920s. As discussed in the historical
narratives of the island, it is clear that Turkish Cypriots see themselves as a part of the
island just because they fought and struggled for the island since they conquered it in
1571. On the other hand, Greek-Cypriot nationalism represents an Eastern type of
nationalism, which is a form of “Ethnic” nationalism that is “primordialist” and has a
strong ethnic bond by blood with Hellenic-Orthodox (Bryant, 2004, p. 213). Bryant
(2002), in a different study, states that “the Greek Cypriot community has tended to
use metaphors of “soul” or “spirit” to represent their kinship with the land, along with
accompanying attributes of spiritual purity” (p. 511). Greek Cypriots “claim a
spiritual birth through the unity of history, religion, and land;” however, on the other
hand, “Turkish Cypriot nationalists claim a more literal birth through the conquest of
Cyprus by Turkish warriors whose blood spilled into and fertilized the land” (Bryant,
2004, p. 213-14). According to Kızılyürek (2005b), the nationalism of Turkish
Cypriots developed on the basis of “blood and ancestor,” along with power; on the
other hand, the Greek Cypriot nationalism developed on the basis of “culture and
religious,” along with purity.
Overall, I have argued that the rise and fall of both Cypriot nationalist
movements created two enemies and also created two rival ethnic identities, which
caused the failure of the civic nation state in 1960. The establishment of the 1960 state
was an important step in order to create a peaceful solution for the coexistence of two
ethnic communities in the island; it did not succeed because the clash between
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different national ideologies of both communities was very strong. Eventually,
Eastern-based Greek Cypriot irredentist nationalism was the dominant movement in
the political culture of the island for the last couple of centuries, accompanied by a
sense of ethnicity based on similarities in physical characteristics, cultural and ethnic
commonality, and religion in order to talk about a nation state on the basis of
ethnicity. According to this description, Eastern type of societies, such as Greek
Cypriots, generally pursue an “exclusive” and “discriminatory” policy against others
who bear different blood, such Turkish Cypriots. This policy was the main reason for
the failure of the 1960 state because Eastern-based ethnic communities strongly
believe that the nation state must be an organic whole, in which the blood ties are the
most important factor.
The strong impact of the Greek Orthodox Church of the island on the failure
of the 1960 civic state cannot be ignored. As a result of Eastern nationalism, the
church of the island lacks liberal, secular, and democratic features and has dominated
the Greek Cypriot people for centuries in order to keep their power alive. Even today,
the authoritarian regime of the church plays a very important role in assessing the
political, cultural structure of Greek Cypriot community. Actually, the Eastern-based
illiberal church of the island has been behind the conflicting environment between
Turkish and Greek communities in terms of its authoritarian regime to prevent the
creation of a civic state in which both communities equally share the power and share
the common national identity.
As a result, the two rival nationalisms of the island could not achieve Western
(political and civic) nationalism based on a constitutional citizenship although the
structure of civic nation was constructed under the state of the Republic of Cyprus in
1960. Eventually, the policies of dominant Eastern (cultural and ethnic) notions of
163

Greek Cypriot irredentist nationalism turned against Turkish Cypriots, which ended
up with the failure of the civic nation state of 1960. The dominating Greek Cypriot
nationalism thus created today’s political position of the island where both ethnic
communities live their lives in economically, politically, and socio-culturally separate
territories. Even today, the negotiations continue to build a liberal, secular, and
democratic nation on the island where both communities would be part of it. It is clear
that the relations between both ethnic communities are still developing based on the
historical past of both nationalisms of the island.
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